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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays that study mutual fund manager abilities and 
investment performance. Extant research suggests that mutual fund managers, as a 
representative group of professional investors, fail to outperform passive benchmarks. 
My thesis explores potential sources of fund manager underperformance. Specifically, 
it investigates whether fund managers have “bad” skills that persistently affect fund 
performance and, in addition, sheds new light on mutual fund underperformance by 
investigating the prevalence of behavioural biases among fund managers. 
My first empirical study examines whether mutual fund managers possess distinct 
trading skills. By decomposing aggregate characteristic-timing performance into 
buying and selling components, I show that on average mutual fund managers exhibit 
positive characteristic-timing ability when buying stocks but negative characteristic-
timing ability when selling stocks. Further persistence tests demonstrate that these 
differential trading skills are not merely due to chance: fund managers who exhibit 
superior characteristic-timing performance when buying stocks continue performing 
buying tasks well, while those who were poor performers in selling tend to 
underperform in the selling domain in the future. These results suggest that the lack of 
evidence of timing ability in the literature masks the distinct trading abilities that fund 
managers really possess. Moreover, using changes in portfolio style along size, book-
to-market, and momentum dimensions (i.e., active style drift) as a proxy for strength 
of conviction, my analysis reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship between fund 
manager conviction and subsequent characteristic-timing performance. In particular, 
when fund managers engage aggressively in active style drift, their poor selling ability 
is overwhelming, leading to negative aggregate performance. 
My second study advances my investigation of fund performance and trading skills by 
considering the fact that fund managers are often forced to trade in response to investor 
flows. I find strong support for the hypothesis that the liquidity provision imposes 
significant indirect trading costs on mutual funds. Fund managers exhibit negative 
characteristic-timing performance only when they experience significant fund inflows. 
By conditioning fund trades on the direction and magnitude of fund flows, my results 
are consistent with the theoretical predictions that liquidity-driven trades 
xi 
 
underperform valuation-motivated trades. In particular, fund managers making purely 
valuation-motivated purchases generate significant characteristic-timing performance 
but are not able to do so when compelled to work off excess cash from investor 
inflows. Fund managers are not able to produce characteristic-timing returns from 
their selling decisions, even when they are highly motivated by valuation beliefs. 
Further results reveal that fund managers who possess superior selling ability are also 
significantly better at buying stocks than the remaining funds and as a result, these 
fund managers exhibit significant higher aggregate characteristic-timing returns. 
Strikingly, fund managers who appear to buy stocks well are not able to outperform 
other funds when selling stocks and they exhibit no significant aggregate performance. 
Overall, these results highlight and reinforce the insight that fund managers have 
positive buying skill and negative selling skill. 
My final empirical study explores the effect of overconfidence on actively managed 
equity mutual fund managers. Using the sum of absolute deviations from the fund’s 
benchmark index (i.e., Active Share) as a proxy for confidence level, my results show 
that fund managers tend to boost their confidence after outstanding past performance: 
they are more likely to increase Active Share and also choose a much higher Active 
Share level. Such bias is more pronounced among solo-managed funds than team-
managed funds. More importantly, I uncover an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between confidence level and subsequent performance. In particular, excessive 
overconfidence, as reflected in an extremely high level of Active Share, is associated 
with diminished future fund performance, as well as more extreme performance 
outcomes and greater performance dispersion. I further document irrational investor 
reaction to fund manager overconfidence. There is a marked bonus for good 
performance by overconfident managers, as rewarded by higher fund inflows, while 
there is no pronounced penalty for poor performance, compared to other funds with 
comparable performance. Investors are not averse to overconfident fund managers 
even if they lose them money! 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Mutual Fund Underperformance 
There has been tremendous and persistent growth in the mutual fund industry over the 
last three decades. According to the Investment Company Fact Book (2015),1 total 
assets under mutual fund management in the U.S. market reached nearly $16 trillion 
by the end of 2014, making it one of the largest financial intermediaries in the United 
States.2 Assets under management are almost 120 times the $135 billion the industry 
managed in 1980. In 2014, more than 53 million households (43%) owned mutual 
funds, with a median household investing of $103,000. Mutual funds were managing 
about 24 percent of total household financial assets and owned more than 30 percent 
of total corporate equity in U.S. market.  
While these is no doubt that mutual funds play a key role in financial system, whether 
fund managers have the skill or talent to deliver exceptional returns to fund investors 
still remains unclear. In fact, a significant body of literature on mutual fund 
performance finds that on average actively managed mutual funds fail to outperform 
passive benchmarks, net of fees and after controlling for differences in systematic risk 
exposure.3 This negative average abnormal performance indicates that mutual fund 
managers as a group don’t have special ability to pick stocks that deliver superior 
                                                          
1 Source: Investment Company Fact Book 2015 (https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf). 
2 Note that equity funds make up 52% of the total assets managed by mutual funds and a significant portion of this 
amount is actively managed.  
3 See e.g, Lakonishok et al (1992), Grinblatt et al (1995), Daniel et al (1997), Carhart, (1997), Chevalier and Ellison  
(1999), Wermers (2000), Baks et al (2001), and Pástor and Stambaugh, (2002) and others. 
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returns. This disheartening finding of mutual fund underperformance is not improved 
upon with recent market timing studies, many of which document a perverse tendency 
of mutual fund managers to negatively time the market and suggest that fund managers 
tend to increase market exposure when market returns are low.4 Using more 
sophisticated timing measures, recent studies such as Ferson and Schadt (1996), 
Becker et al (1999) and Jiang (2003) still fail to provide convincing evidence to show 
that fund managers have superior market-timing ability. 
These findings, if they were true, would be troubling from an economic point of view. 
There should be no reason to reward fund managers who cannot beat the market 
consistently or only produce superior performance by luck. Yet, in reality, fund 
investors seem to neglect mutual fund underperformance and continue to invest their 
money in actively managed mutual funds paying significant amounts in management 
fees and expenses searching for superior returns. A recent study conducted by French 
(2008) shows that on average investors spend 0.67% of the aggregate market value of 
all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks each year on the costs of active investing. In 
other words, the typical investors would earn about 67 basis points more each year by 
simply switching to a passive market portfolio investing strategy. 
Why do mutual fund managers underperform? The answer is not that simple. Sharpe 
(1991) and Fama and French (2010) argue that average actively managed mutual fund 
cannot outperform average passively managed funds. That is because, although some 
active investors have positive returns at the expense of other investors and, after the 
costs of active investing, on average the net returns to investors must be a negative 
sum game. Fama and French (2010) re-examine the performance of individual mutual 
                                                          
4 See e.g., Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Chang and Lewellen (1984), and Henriksson (1984) and others. 
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funds by using bootstrap simulations to separate skill from luck. The authors conclude 
that the majority of fund managers do not have specially skills or talents and only a 
few, if any, fund managers can outperform and cover the cost of active investing.  
While a number of recent studies find similar results i.e., at best that there only exists 
a very small subset of mutual fund managers with genuine skills,5 performance 
persistence studies show that superior fund performance appears to be largely 
unpredictable from past performance, and many researchers attribute superior 
performance to luck rather than skill.6 Using a rational model, Berk and Green (2004) 
propose a possible explanation suggesting that abnormal fund returns that might 
reflect the scarce resource of managerial talent are quickly bid way in a competitive 
market: fund managers with skills and superior past performance will attract 
significant fund inflows, leading to increasing operational scale, marginal costs to 
active management and, eventually a lack of superior performance persistence. 
However, the competitive model of Berk and Green (2004) is not able to explain the 
performance persistence in the negative domain. Recent studies such as Kosowski et 
al (2006), Barras et al (2010), and Cuthbertson et al (2008) find that evidence of 
persistence among loser funds, but not among winner funds. In particular, Cuthbertson 
et al (2008) suggest that the inferior performance of most poorly performing funds is 
not merely due to bad luck, but instead most of them exhibit “bad skill”. It is 
particularly puzzling that most funds in the left tail of the performance distribution 
manage to survive in a competitive market. Cuthbertson et al (2008) conjecture that 
                                                          
5 See e.g., Kacperczyk et al (2005, 2008), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), 
Huang et al (2011), and Cohen et al (2011) and others 
6 See e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al (1993), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carhart 
(1997), Wermers (2003), and Bollen and Busse (2005) and others. 
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the survival of funds with “bad skill” may be due to information asymmetry, or 
irrational behavior on the part of fund investors. 
Most existing research relies on the CAPM or extended multi-factor models to 
evaluate mutual fund performance. However, such static analysis to a large extent 
overlooks the reality that active portfolio management is a dynamic process (Admati 
et al, 1986; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Becker et al, 1999; Ferson and Khang, 2002). 
Moreover, the unobservable nature of risk and the randomness in financial asset 
returns make it difficult to gauge whether mutual fund managers can deliver 
exceptional returns to their clients, even if they can do this (Kacperczyk et al, 2014). 
Existing performance measures can falsely attribute performance to uninformed funds, 
or fail to attribute superior performance to informed funds (Grinblatt and Titman, 
1989).  
More importantly, traditional finance assumes that the market and its participants are 
“rational” in theoretical models: they process new information efficiently and update 
their beliefs correctly, and constantly seek to maximize their expected utility (EU). 
However, Barberis and Thaler (2003) among others argue that these two underlying 
assumptions of economic rationality about human behavior are inaccurate. Behavioral 
finance argues that investors are human beings who are usually susceptible to 
behavioral biases and heuristics that can negatively affect their investment decisions. 
Considering the real world of professional asset management where is full of 
incomplete information and constant and intense competition (Tuckett and Taffler, 
2012), behavioral finance allows us to have a better understanding of the trading 
behavior and performance of investment managers. 
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This thesis studies mutual fund manager abilities and investment performance. 
Following the insights of behavioral finance, it aims to explore potential sources of 
fund manager underperformance widely documented in the literature. Relying on 
behavioral finance to provide the underlying theory and help explain for the reason 
why sell decisions are particularly susceptible to behavioral bias, my first two studies 
aim to provide reasons for the lack of evidence of overall characteristic-timing 
performance documented in the literature. Specifically, the second chapter of this 
thesis disaggregates extant research looking at whether fund managers or subsets of 
fund managers have characteristic-timing skill in terms of subsequent aggregate 
returns by breaking down such overall investment skill into its different components 
such as buying and selling skills. The third chapter advances the investigation of 
distinct skills by relating trade performance to fund manager motivations and explores 
the possibility of whether different groups of fund managers have different trading 
skills. The fourth chapter sets out to directly explore whether behavioral biases could 
play an important role in explaining mutual fund underperformance. Specifically, it 
investigates whether professional investors such as mutual fund managers are prone 
to self-serving attribution bias and overconfidence and, more importantly, whether and 
how these behavioral biases affect subsequent fund performance and fund flows. The 
following two sections present more detailed introductions to my research questions. 
1.2 Fund Manager Bad Skills 
A conventional belief has developed in the academic community that mutual fund 
managers, as a representative and important group of professional investors, have no 
special ability to time the market as a whole or separate risk factors. For instance, 
earlier empirical studies such as Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Chang and Lewellen 
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(1984), Henriksson (1984) and others show that significant market timing ability is 
rare among mutual fund managers. The most puzzling aspect of the empirical evidence 
in most of these studies is that average market timing performance across mutual funds 
is negative and that mutual fund managers who exhibit superior market timing ability 
show negative performance more often than positive performance. This suggests that 
the typical fund manager tends to increase market exposure when stock returns are 
low, which has been interpreted as “perverse market timing” ability in the literature. 
Using more sophisticated tests, more recent studies such as Becker et al (1999), Jiang 
(2003), Elton et al (2012) and others still fail to find convincing evidence that funds 
have superior market-timing ability. 
One possible reason for this unfavourable view of fund manager timing ability is that 
extant work on timing ability has concentrated on investigating whether mutual fund 
managers or a subset of them have timing ability by testing the market timing 
performance in aggregate which might not necessarily be a good indicator of the 
timing skills mutual fund managers really possess. The possibility that mutual fund 
managers may be good at some tasks but bad at the other tasks, such as buying and/or 
selling abilities may therefore be overlooked. 
The investment community tends to put most emphasis on decisions relating to how 
and when to buy stocks. The finance literature equally focuses mainly on buy decisions 
and various valuation methods and stock investment styles in the buy domain have 
been rigorously investigated and empirically tested in prior work. On the other hand, 
sell decisions, which are essential to capture all the performance produced from buy 
decisions in the investing process, have received relatively infrequent mention in the 
practitioner literature, and academic journals have tended to remain silent on this issue 
(Faugere et al, 2004).  
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Sell decisions are assumed in traditional finance literature to be other side of the same 
coin to buy decisions. However, in practice they are far less disciplined than buy 
decisions and, as a result, are more prone to behavioural influences, compared with 
buy decisions. The behavioural finance literature recognizes the existence of 
differential investment behaviours and explains how sell decisions are more likely to 
be susceptible to behavioural biases and heuristics. It suggests that buy decisions may 
be more forward looking in terms of prospective performance while sell decisions may 
be more backward looking focusing on past performance. For instance, several studies 
of selling behavior in natural and experimental markets provide evidence that 
investors are more reluctant to realize losses than gains (Odean, 1998; Weber and 
Camerer, 1998). Shefrin and Statman (1985) label this phenomenon the “disposition 
effect”. Working with a discount brokerage database, Odean (1998) finds that retail 
investors tend to selling winning stocks rather than losing stocks using the original 
purchase price as a reference point. A similar pattern can also be found in other 
markets such as the housing market (Genesove and Mayer, 2001). Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) show that house sellers tend to set an asking price that exceeds the 
asking price of other sellers with comparable houses when the expected selling price 
is below their original purchase price. On the other hand, behavioural biases can lead 
to the opposite selling phenomenon that investors tend to hold winners too long before 
selling them. One of the behavioural explanations is the “endowment effect”, a 
tendency for people to hold on to what they already possess rather than to exchange 
for a better alternative (Knez et al, 1985; Kahneman et al, 1991). Barberis and Thaler 
(2003) argue that the endowment effect is associated with loss aversion and regret 
aversion. 
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A survey conducted by Cabot Research and the CFA Institute provides direct evidence 
that mutual fund managers have to rely on subjective judgment to shape their sell 
decisions, rather than more quantitative or research based methods (Cabot Research, 
2007). In particular, more than 80% of participants in their survey indicate that 
judgment plays an important role in making sell decisions and over 70% of the 
respondents indicate that their decisions are formed from experience, trial and error, 
and advice from past mentors. 
If there is more skill required in selling stocks in it not being possible to make similar 
highly disciplined decisions as in the buy domain, mutual fund managers who have to 
make buy and sell decisions in their everyday career might not exhibit overall 
characteristic-timing skill but have differential characteristic-timing abilities for 
buying and selling. In this scenario, the lack of evidence of overall mutual fund 
performance along the market-timing and characteristic-timing dimension 
documented in the literature might mask the existence of positive buying but negative 
selling skills.  
Chapter 2 decomposes aggregate fund characteristic-timing performance into different 
components such as buying and selling and investigates whether fund managers have 
distinct trading skills. Using the CRSP Mutual Fund Holdings Dataset with a broad 
sample of 3384 unique U.S. actively managed domestic equity funds from September 
2003 to December 2013, I find that mutual fund managers possess distinct trading 
abilities. In particular, mutual fund managers on average earn characteristic-timing 
returns of 1.42% per year when adding stocks into their portfolios, indicating that fund 
managers possess abilities in the buy domain. However, fund managers exhibit no 
characteristic-timing skill when selling stocks. Instead, selling decisions are associated 
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with negative characteristic-timing returns of -1.78% per year, significant at the 5% 
level. 
Chapter 2 also aims to examine whether characteristic timing abilities persist over time 
by sorting mutual fund portfolios into quintiles based on their past characteristic-
timing performance and then tracking the future performance of each performance 
quintile. I find strong persistence of aggregate characteristic-timing performance in 
the negative domain, at least over the following four quarters, suggesting that mutual 
fund managers do not possess characteristic-timing ability in aggregate but instead a 
subset of fund managers tend to have poor timing ability that persistently hurts their 
overall portfolio performance. Furthermore, my results reveal that fund managers who 
exhibit superior characteristic-timing performance when buying stocks in the past tend 
to continue performing buying tasks well in the near term, while those who were the 
worst performers for selling stocks tend to underperform in the selling domain over 
the following quarter. In other words, a small number of mutual fund managers have 
“hot” hands in buying stocks, while another subset of fund managers have “icy” hands 
in selling stocks in the short term. Any extreme negative (positive) performance for 
buying (selling) is due to bad (good) luck. 
By using the absolute changes in portfolio style (i.e., active style drift) of Wermers 
(2012) as a proxy for fund manager conviction, preliminary tests in Chapter 2 examine 
the relationship between fund manager conviction and subsequent characteristic-
timing performance. If mutual fund managers are skilled, strong fund manager 
conviction, as reflected in large style changes in their portfolios, should be associated 
with superior subsequent characteristic-timing performance. However, a non-linear 
relationship might exist because large active style drift might, at least partly, result 
from other factors, rather than valuation beliefs, such as overconfident. 
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Indeed, an inverted U-shaped relationship between fund manager conviction and 
subsequent characteristic-timing performance is observed. In particular, strong fund 
manager conviction as reflected in most aggressive style bets is associated with 
diminished subsequent characteristic-timing returns, suggesting that there might be 
more than valuation beliefs in shaping these characteristic-timing decisions. Further, 
by decomposing aggregate characteristic-timing performance into buying and selling, 
I investigate the relative performance contributions from buying and selling activities 
to aggregate performance along different levels of fund manager conviction. My 
results show that on average strong fund manager conviction is associated with 
positive but insignificant characteristic-timing performance in the buy domain but 
strong conviction is associated with statistically and economically significant negative 
characteristic-timing returns when selling down stocks. In other words, when fund 
managers engage aggressively in active style drift, their poor selling ability is 
overwhelming, leading to negative aggregate performance. 
Chapter 3 continues the investigation of mutual fund characteristic-timing ability and 
distinct trading skills by considering the potential adverse impact of investor flows in 
my performance analysis. There is a large body of literature investigating mutual fund 
investor behaviours proxied by flows into and out of individual funds. The majority 
of studies in this literature place emphasis on understanding how individual investors 
react to certain fund characteristics. In particular, a number of articles have shown that 
investors seem to irrationally chase fund performance (e.g., Ippolito, 1992, Chevalier 
and Elison, 1997; and Sirri and Tufano, 1998). The non-linear performance-flow 
relationship can be used to explain several existing anomalies and puzzles documented 
in the mutual fund literature (e.g., Gruber, 1996; Chevalier and Elison, 1997; Zheng, 
1999; and Frazzini and Lamont, 2006) and asset pricing literature (e.g., Coval and 
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Stafford, 2007; and Lou, 2012). Surprisingly, less attention has been paid to examining 
the direct impact of fund flows on fund performance. 
Recent studies such as Chordia (1996) and Nanda et al (2000) argue that mutual fund 
managers provide investors with valuation expertise and diversified equity positions 
at low direct costs for liquidity. When investing on their personal account, individual 
investors bear the entire liquidity risk. On the other hand, mutual funds are required 
by law to pay a proportional share of the net asset value of the fund to investors who 
choose to redeem fund shares. This unique structural design of open-end mutual funds 
actually allows fund investors to buy and redeem fund shares without paying a large 
premium for immediate liquidity needs. 
However, this provision of low cost liquidity is not “cheap” for fund managers. 
Instead, it imposes significant indirect trading costs on open-end funds (e.g., Chordia, 
1996; Edelen, 1999; and Nanda et al, 2000). Fund managers themselves must engage 
in costly trades in response to significant fund flows. Significant investor inflows can 
compel fund managers to work off excessive cash by purchasing stocks, even if none 
of these stocks are believed to be undervalued at the time; similarly, significant 
investor outflows will constrain fund managers by forcing them to control liquidity in 
their portfolio by disposing of stocks, even if these stocks are perceived to be under-
priced. 
In effect, this liquidity-driven trading plays the role of the uninformed trading in the 
rational expectation models developed in theoretical work such as by Grossman 
(1976), Hellwig (1980), and Verrecchia (1982). In particular, Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) construct a model in which the market is not perfect: prices do not perfectly 
reflect the underlying information, so that those who invest resources in collecting 
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information can receive compensation. In such a market, equilibrium can be attained 
only when liquidity-motivated traders sustain losses to informed traders to compensate 
the informed traders’ cost of information processing. These theoretical studies predict 
that: first, investors who are forced to engage into a material volume of liquidity-
driven trades should experience losses to other informed trades; second, liquidity-
driven trades should underperform valuation-motivated trades. 
Nevertheless, the majority of previous empirical studies on mutual fund performance 
neglect the fact that mutual fund managers often have to trade in response to fund 
flows and these liquidity-driven trades can potentially place fund managers in the role 
of noise traders. Without controlling for the adverse effect of fund flows, conventional 
analysis may fail to attribute superior performance to informed fund managers and as 
a result, provide misleading inference regarding fund managers’ skills.  
Indeed, Ferson and Schadt (1996) find no evidence of “perverse” market timing when 
using conditional market timing models that control for time-varying expected market 
returns. Ferson and Warther (1996) document a positive correlation between aggregate 
fund flows and lagged instruments for time varying expected market returns, 
suggesting that fund flows are the source of “perverse” market timing ability. Focusing 
on individual funds, Edelen (1999) reveals a negative relationship between the volume 
of liquidity-motivated trading and fund risk-adjusted performance, which questions 
the common finding of fund manager underperformance in previous studies. 
Consistent with Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson and Warther (1996), Edelen 
(1999) finds non-negative market timing performance after controlling for fund flows 
and concludes that mutual funds exhibit negative market timing performance when 
and only when they experience fund flows. 
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The first half of chapter 3 investigates whether mutual fund managers possess market 
timing ability by considering the adverse impact of fund flows. Unlike Edelen (1999) 
and others who use the return-based approach, I evaluate timing ability of mutual fund 
managers by employing the characteristic-timing measure of Daniel et al (1997) which 
uses mutual fund holdings to directly look at whether changes in portfolio weights of 
three stock characteristics, size, book-to-market, and momentum effect, forecast future 
returns. This approach not only allows researchers to better capture the dynamic 
aspects of actively managed portfolios but also avoid the “artificial timing” bias that 
is usually found in return-based measures. By segmenting fund portfolios based on net 
investor flows, my analysis shows that mutual fund managers exhibit significantly 
negative characteristic-timing performance only when they experience significant 
fund inflows.  
Furthermore, I attempt to identify the potential source of this negative timing 
performance when fund managers experience fund inflows. Specifically, I use the 
absolute changes in portfolio styles (i.e., active style drift) as a proxy for fund 
managers’ conviction to make discretionary timing decisions. The rationale is that, 
when experiencing flow shocks, fund managers can choose to proportionally expand 
or reduce current stock holdings to maintain their intended risk exposure and control 
liquidity. Presuming that fund managers have timing ability, they will actively engage 
in style drift towards the three stock characteristics when and only when they have 
strong valuation beliefs about future performance. In contrast, my analysis shows that 
large style bets, which would be expected to be motivated by valuation beliefs, are 
associated with negative characteristic-timing performance. This suggests that inferior 
unconditional timing performance is not entirely driven by the detrimental effects of 
fund flows, but at least partly due to negative timing ability of fund managers. 
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In the second half of chapter 3, I advance the investigation of fund managers’ distinct 
trading skills and test whether observed differential trading abilities might be driven 
by the adverse effect of liquidity-motivated trading by relating the performance of 
mutual fund trades to the motivation for making these trades. Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and others suggest that uninformed trades should underperform informed 
trades that represent fund managers’ valuation beliefs. Thus, any performance metric 
that does not account for funds’ flow-induced trading can yield negatively biased 
inferences regarding fund manager ability (e.g., Edelen, 1999). Using unconditional 
performance, the lack of positive selling performance in Chen et al (2013) studies may 
merely reflect the negative net effect of the cost of liquidity provision and performance 
of fund managers’ selling decisions. In fact, the adverse effect of fund flows on sell 
decisions can be particularly severe. This is because, when experiencing significant 
outflows, fund managers without enough cash reserves have no other options available 
but to sell their assets immediately at fire sale prices (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Zhang, 
2010).  
A more appropriate indicator of fund managers’ skill should be based only on trades 
motivated by valuation beliefs (e.g., Alexander et al, 2007). However fund managers’ 
beliefs are not observable and consequently, the key challenge in the studies on mutual 
fund performance is to identify ex ante valuation-motivated trades. Cohen et al (2011) 
label each manager’s highest estimated alpha holding as his “best idea” and show fund 
managers’ “best idea” generate superior performance. Similarly, Pomorski (2009) 
shows that when multiple funds in the same fund family trade the same stock in the 
same direction, that stock outperforms. In order to separate various trading 
motivations, this chapter follows the approach of Alexander et al (2007) to condition 
trades on the direction and magnitude of concurrent realised net fund flows. The 
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rationale is that fund managers who face severe outflows would buy stocks that are 
perceived to be significantly undervalued and thus a larger proportion of the purchases 
they make in their portfolios are likely to be motivated by valuation beliefs. On the 
other hand, when experiencing significant inflows, fund managers are compelled to 
work off excess cash, and thus a smaller proportion of the purchases in their portfolios 
are likely to be valuation-based ones. Symmetrical intuition applies to fund managers’ 
sales of stocks. 
My analysis reveals that fund managers making purely valuation-based buys generate 
significant characteristic-timing performance but are not able to do so when they are 
compelled to work off excessive cash from investor inflows. On the other hand, fund 
managers appear to have a “striking” ability to sell stocks at the wrong time. Sales of 
stocks are associated with negative and significant characteristic-timing returns, even 
when sells are most likely to be motivated by their valuation beliefs. These results are 
robust when using multivariate regressions to control other mutual fund characteristics 
that might be related to the performance of fund trades. Overall, my findings confirm 
that the observed fund managers’ distinct trading skills, in particular negative selling 
skill, are not driven by the adverse effect of fund flows.  
Most studies on mutual fund performance view fund managers as a homogeneous class 
of professional investors, and to the best of my knowledge, the literature has not yet 
explored whether different groups of fund managers possess different skills. By 
identifying the top 25% of funds in terms of their selling (buying) ability, I provide 
strong evidence to show that, “good sellers” outperform other fund managers when 
selling stocks by a significant average of 1.35% per year and they also significantly 
outperform others when purchasing stocks by an average of 0.87% per year.  On the 
other hand, “good buyers” by construction do exhibit good characteristic-timing 
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performance when adding stocks into their portfolios but they are unable to generate 
superior performance when selling stocks. Furthermore, “good sellers” exhibit a 
statistically and economically significant outperformance of 0.31% per year in 
aggregate characteristic-timing performance, while “good buyers” have no significant 
aggregative performance. These results are consistent with the notion that sell 
decisions are particularly susceptible to behavioural biases and heuristics, and are not 
made in a way as disciplined as buying decisions might be. Moreover, my analysis 
shows that there do exist a small number of skilled fund managers, in particular, those 
who can manage to make sell decisions in a more disciplined way. These fund 
managers are likely to possess general investment ability to be able to generate 
significant outperformance. 
To conclude, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contribute to the literature on mutual fund 
performance. I investigate whether mutual fund managers, a representative group of 
professional investors, exhibit investment abilities, and in particular, whether they 
possess the skill to time risk factors including the size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects. By analysing the changes in portfolio weights of these stock 
characteristics at the individual stock level, I find no evidence of significant aggregate 
characteristic-timing skill but instead a strong persistence of aggregate characteristic-
timing performance in the negative domain. These results suggest that on average fund 
managers do not possess characteristic-timing ability in aggregate but a subset of fund 
managers have poor timing ability that persistently destroys their overall portfolio 
value.  
A number of recent studies such as Edelen (1999) suggest that the perverse tendency 
of fund managers to negatively time the market is mainly driven by the adverse effect 
of liquidity-induced trading. After controlling for fund flows, my results show that 
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mutual fund managers appear to have significantly negative characteristic-timing 
performance when and only when they experience investor inflows. Further 
investigation reveals that when experiencing fund flows, large style bets are associated 
with negative characteristic-timing performance. These results suggest that fund 
managers are not able to make use of the financial flexibility provided by fund inflows, 
but instead, excessive cash holdings acts as a significant drag on fund performance.  
In an attempt to understand why mutual fund managers fail to time risk factors, I 
decompose aggregate characteristic-timing performance into buying and selling 
components. Consistent with Chen et al (2013), my results show that on average 
mutual fund managers appear to exhibit distinct trading abilities. In particular, while 
on average fund managers are able to generate characteristic-timing returns when 
buying stocks, they have a “striking” ability to sell stocks at the wrong time. 
Performance persistence tests confirm that such distinct trading skills are not merely 
due to chance. Fund managers who are successful in buying stocks tend to continue 
generating superior characteristic-timing performance when purchasing stocks, while 
those who are the worst sellers tend to continue to underperform when selling stocks 
in the near term. Further analysis that controls for fund flows confirm that distinct 
trading skills are not driven by the adverse effect of liquidity-induced trades. In 
particular, fund managers appear to exhibit “bad” selling ability, even when most of 
their sales are motivated by valuation beliefs. More interestingly, I find strong 
evidence to show that there exist a small subset of fund managers who specialise in 
making sell decisions (good sellers) who also possess buying skill and exhibit superior 
aggregate performance. However, fund managers who have the best records of buying 
performance (good buyers) exhibit negative selling ability and they are not able to 
outperform others in terms of aggregate characteristic-timing performance. 
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1.3 Fund Manager Overconfidence 
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether and to what extent mutual fund managers are prone 
to self-serving attribution bias and overconfidence. Overconfidence has been the 
subject of much research in the recent finance literature. A large number of studies 
relate managerial overconfidence to decision-making in the context of corporate 
finance, showing that corporate managers who are subject to overconfidence bias tend 
to make value-destroying investment, merger and acquisition, and financing decisions 
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008;, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; and 
Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). There is also an extensive literature investigating 
the potential impact of overconfidence on investors’ investment decisions and trading 
behaviors in the financial market. These studies show that retail investors are prone to 
overconfidence bias. For example, retail investors trade too much, and such excessive 
trading eventually leads to negative returns net of transaction costs (e.g., Odean, 1999; 
Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001, 2002; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009).  
Despite the extensive studies examining overconfidence among corporate managers 
and retail investors, the behavioral finance literature has not yet provided conclusive 
evidence on whether mutual fund managers are prone to overconfidence. In particular, 
due to the fact that mutual fund managers play a dominant role in financial market, 
analysis of the impact of overconfidence on fund manager behaviours and subsequent 
fund performance can be of paramount importance, both to the academic literature and 
the investment industry. 
Financial economics predominantly assumes that economic agents behave with 
extreme rationality. In reality, mutual fund managers are under intense and constant 
competition to outperform peer managers who are equally qualified; they are swamped 
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with incomplete information that is often conflicting and open to competing 
interpretations; they have to be exceptional and they have to believe that they are 
exceptional (Tuckett and Taffler, 2012). In the end, investment decisions are often 
made by relying on subjective judgements and beliefs based on managers’ private 
information which can only be verified with vague and delayed feedback.  
Theoretical papers such as Daniel et al (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) introduce 
self-serving attribution bias into the standard learning models to explain 
overconfidence. This bias states that people tend to attribute good (positive) outcomes 
to their own skills while they blame poor (negative) outcomes to chance (e.g., Hastorf, 
et al, 1970; Miller and Ross, 1975). In a financial context, Gervais and Odean (2001) 
argue that investors learn their own ability from their past successes and failures, and 
self-serving attribution bias leads them to take too much credit for good performance 
but too little responsibility for poor performance and, eventually leads them to become 
overconfident. More specifically, in financial markets where fund managers can only 
observe the quality of their private information through delayed and noisy feedback, 
they are more likely to overestimate their own abilities and revise the precision of their 
private information and own beliefs upward too much after good performance, while 
revising their precision downwards too little after poor performance. These biased 
judgmental processes would lead managers to accumulate unnecessary confidence in 
their abilities over time, eventually resulting in excessive overconfidence.  
A key challenge for any study of investor overconfidence is to come up with a good 
measure of overconfidence. The ideal way of measuring overconfidence may be to 
examine the actual estimates and predictions of investors about their future investment 
performance. However, when it comes to gauging fund manager overconfidence in 
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the real world, researchers have to rely on personal characteristics that have been 
found in the psychology literature to be related to overconfidence, such as gender 
(Lundeberg, et al, 1994; and Prince, 1993) or the behaviours of overconfident 
investors derived from theoretical models. Odean (1998) shows that overconfident 
investors tend to trade more frequently and take greater risk than rational investor 
would do. By analyzing retail investors, Barber and Odean (2001) document a positive 
relationship between overconfidence and portfolio turnover and portfolio risk and 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) show that overconfidence is associated with under-
diversification. Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) use portfolio turnover ratio as the main proxy 
for fund manager overconfidence in their study and find that after good past 
performance fund managers tend to trade more frequently. 
However, the turnover ratio might not be a “clean” overconfidence measure because 
fund managers often have to trade in response to fund flows. An alternative measure 
that may be more appropriate for fund managers is Active Share. Active Share, 
calculated as the sum of absolute deviations from the fund’s benchmark index, is 
introduced as a new measure of active portfolio management by Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) to capture the extent to which a portfolio deviates from its benchmark index. 
On the other hand, it also reflects a fund manager’s (over)confidence in his private 
information. In particular, overconfident fund managers may overweight the precision 
of their private information and concentrate their holdings in stocks where they believe 
that they have an information advantage, potentially leading to excessive deviation 
from their benchmark indices (e.g., high Active Share). Thus, our conjecture is that, if 
mutual fund managers are subject to self-attribution bias and overconfidence, we 
should observe a significantly higher Active Share after good past performance. 
However, if mutual fund managers are truly skilled and are invulnerable to self-
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attribution bias and overconfidence, no significant relationship between past 
performance and subsequent Active Share should be found. 
To investigate whether fund managers are subject to overconfidence bias, chapter 4 
employs Active Share as my main proxy for level of confidence, and examines the 
relationship between past fund performance and fund manager confidence level. 
Specifically, I structure my analysis using piecewise linear regression, which allows 
me to separately estimate the differential effect of past performance on Active Share 
in each of five performance quintiles. By analyzing a large sample of U.S. domestic 
actively managed equity mutual funds, I find a clear U-shaped non-linear relationship 
between past performance of mutual funds and their subsequent Active Share level. 
For fund managers who exhibit performance in the top performance quintile in the 
previous year, the fund’s Active Share positively depends on past performance. The 
effect is statistically and economically significant. There is also a positive relationship 
between past performance and subsequent Active Share level among fund managers 
within the three middle performance quintiles. But the magnitude of the effect is 
dramatically smaller comparing to the top performance quintile. These results suggest 
that fund managers tend to choose a higher level of Active Share following their 
successes and this effect is more pronounced for fund managers with outstanding past 
performance. Consistently, I observe that the best past performers are more likely to 
increase their Active Share level following outstanding performance.  
On the other hand, fund managers who experience very poor past performance are also 
more likely to choose high Active Share. One possible explanation is that these poorly 
performing fund managers may engage in gambling, perhaps in an attempt to raise 
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their positions in the future. Overall, these results strongly support our main hypothesis 
that good past performance leads to overconfidence as reflected in high Active Share. 
Motivated by Bär et al, (2011) who investigate the impact of management structure 
on fund manager behaviors, further tests examine the potential difference in the 
responses to past performance between solo-managed and team-managed mutual 
funds. Consistent with the argument that self-attribution bias is likely to be more 
pronounced among individuals than among teams (Nikolic and Yan, 2014), I find 
evidence to show that solo-managed funds are more likely to have higher Active Share 
level following outstanding performance than their team-managed counterpart. 
More importantly, Chapter 4 directly examines the potential impact of fund manager 
overconfidence on subsequent fund performance. The conjecture is that, if fund 
managers are subject to self-attribution bias and are overconfident, aggressive 
deviations from benchmark indices (e.g., high Active Share) are more likely to be 
driven by managers’ private information which might actually much less precise than 
they think. Such overconfidence-driven actions would lead to sub-optimal portfolio 
allocation and investment decisions and, eventually lead to reduced performance. In 
this scenario, we should observe a negative relationship between Active Share levels 
and subsequent performance among funds belonging to the top Active Share quintile. 
On the other hand, moderate portfolio deviations from benchmark indices are more 
likely to reflect a manager’s normal appropriate confidence level when compared to 
the top Active Share quintile. Fund managers with normal confidence levels assess 
and update their private information in a less biased way and put large weights on their 
private information and smaller weights on other stocks. On this basis, these well 
motivated trading activities should lead to realization of profitable opportunities and 
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better portfolio allocation, which eventually generates better performance. If this is 
true, we should observe a positive relationship between Active Share levels and 
subsequent fund performance for funds within the four quintile groups below the top 
quintile. 
Consistent with the expectation, I find a clear inverted U-shaped relationship between 
confidence level and subsequent risk-adjusted fund performance. In particular, these 
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between confidence level and 
subsequent fund performance among mutual fund managers belonging to the three 
middle quintiles of Active Share, suggesting that moderate confidence level generates 
superior subsequent performance. Strikingly, excessive overconfidence as measured 
by an extremely high Active Share level relative to all other funds in the same segment 
is significantly associated with diminished future performance. The effect is 
economically meaningful: on average overconfident fund managers underperform 
fund managers with normal confidence levels by 27.58 basis points per quarter or 
about 1.09% per year. Furthermore, there is a negative and significant relationship 
between changes in relative level of Active Share and subsequent performance, 
suggesting that on average increases of Active Share that are most likely driven by 
overconfidence bias are associated with deteriorated subsequent returns. Additionally, 
further results show a clear convex relation between confidence level and fund risk 
including performance extremity and performance dispersion. Excessive 
overconfidence is associated with more extreme outcome, higher performance 
dispersion, and therefore a potentially higher downside risk for fund investors. 
Finally, chapter 4 sheds new lights on the determinants of fund flows by exploring 
how investors respond to fund manager overconfidence. In a preliminary analysis, we 
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observe a positive relationship between Active Share and fund flows. However, it is 
difficult to conclude whether this positive relationship is due to investors’ rational or 
irrational responses to fund managers’ confidence level. Investors may rationally 
appreciate active management as one of the essential factors that increases the chance 
of generating excess returns. It is also possible that investors irrationally chase 
excessive active management without thinking of the trade-off between the increase 
profitable opportunities and greater unanticipated risk exposure. 
To deepen the understanding of fund investors’ behaviours, I investigate the 
relationship between fund managers’ psychological attributes such as overconfidence 
and investor flows by interacting past performance and Active Share levels. The 
results are striking. I find strong evidence to show that cash flows into overconfident 
fund managers are more sensitive to good fund performance than cash flows into other 
funds, and that cash outflows are similarly sensitive to poor performance for all fund 
managers. In other words, there is a marked bonus for good performance of 
overconfident managers, as rewarded by higher fund inflows, while there is no 
pronounced penalty for poor performance, compared to other funds. I argue that, in 
financial market with acute information asymmetry, high Active Share, which is most 
likely to be driven by fund manager overconfidence following their outstanding 
performance, can be easily misunderstood by investors as an indicator of fund 
manager’s genuine skills. In particular, investors might falsely interpret good past 
performance of overconfident fund managers as the realization of a fund manager’s 
investment abilities, rather than as a result of luck. On the other hand, investors might 
attribute poor past performance of these fund managers to chance. As a consequence, 
investors irrationally chase overconfident fund managers, flocking to funds with 
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extremely high Active Share when observing good fund performance but failing to 
flee from these funds to the same extent following poor fund performance. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on behavioral biases and heuristics among 
professional investors. While overconfidence has been extensively documented 
among retail investors and corporate executives, evidence on professional investors is 
scarce. There are a few related recent studies investigating overconfidence among fund 
managers. Puetz and Puenzi (2011) report that fund managers trade more excessively 
after good performance. Similar to my study, Choi and Lou (2010) uses Active Share 
as a proxy of overconfidence and uses the sum of a series of positive (negative) past 
portfolio returns as a proxy for confirming (disconfirming) market signals. They find 
evidence to show that fund managers tend to boost their confidence to a larger extent 
after confirming market signals than to decrease confidence after disconfirming 
market signals. Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) apply content analysis on the reports 
managers write to their investors and show that mutual fund managers who generate 
superior past performance become overconfident.  
Furthermore, my study is one of the first attempts to directly link fund manager 
overconfidence and fund performance. The findings that overconfident fund managers 
overweight their private information, and hence deviate too much from their 
benchmark, and consequently underperform have important implications for asset 
pricing and real investment. Moreover, I also document a non-linear relationship 
between confidence level and future performance, which is consistent with Eshraghi 
and Taffler (2012).  
My study also contributes to the literature regarding the effect of team status by 
highlighting significant behavioral differences between solo- and team-managed 
26 
 
funds. In line with the diversification of opinions hypothesis (e.g., Sah and Stiglitz, 
1986, 1991), my results show that solo-managed funds are more likely to be prone to 
overconfidence and associated self-attribution bias, when compared to team-managed 
funds. A closely related work by Bär et al (2011) documents consistent findings that 
team-managed funds behave in a less biased way: they exhibit less extreme investment 
styles, hold less industry concentrated portfolios, and eventually, are less like to 
experience extreme performance outcomes. 
Chapter 4 also contributes to the literature on mutual fund flows. Previous studies 
(e.g., Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tafano, 1998; and Chevalier and Elison, 1997) have 
shown that investors tend to chase fund past performance. I extend their insight by 
linking past performance to fund manager confidence level and find that the 
asymmetric responses to good and poor performance are particularly more pronounced 
among overconfident fund managers. Investors irrationally chase overconfident fund 
managers who actually fail to outperform normal confident fund managers in the 
future. Thus, my findings directly support the “dumb money” effect of Frazzini and 
Lamont (2008) who show that investors tend to send their money to mutual funds 
which hold stocks that do poorly in the long run. 
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Chapter 2 
Do Fund Managers Possess Differential 
Characteristic-Timing Abilities? 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the vast amount of resources fund managers expend and the high management 
fees charged to fund investors, whether fund managers have investment skills or 
talents to deliver exceptional returns to fund investors still remains unclear. In fact, 
prior literature on the performance of actively managed mutual funds paints a 
disheartening picture of active funds on average failing to outperform passive 
benchmarks and failing to add value for fund investors1. In particular, the consensus 
view is that only a small number of fund managers are able to identify and profit from 
mispriced stocks2, if any at all, but little evidence for fund managers’ timing ability. 
Earlier studies such as Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Chang and Lewellen (1984), and 
Henriksson (1984) suggest that significant market timing ability is rare among mutual 
fund managers. The most puzzling aspect of the empirical evidence in most of these 
studies is that the average timing performance across mutual funds is negative and that 
mutual fund managers who exhibit superior market timing ability show negative 
performance more often than positive performance. Using more sophisticated tests, 
                                                          
1 See e.g., Jensen (1968), Friend et al (1970), Lehmann and Modest (1987), Elton et al (1993), Malkiel 
(1995), Carhart (1997), Fama and French (2010) and others. 
2 See e.g., Pástor and Stambaugh (2002), Kacperczyk et al (2005, 2008), Kosowski et al (2006), Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009), Barras et al (2010), Huang et al (2011) and others 
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more recent studies such as Becker et al (1999) and Jiang (2003) still fail to provide 
convincing evidence that funds have superior market-timing ability. 
These studies identify and measure market timing ability by running non-linear 
regressions of realized fund returns against contemporaneous market returns (return-
based measure). One advantage of this return-based approach is the minimal 
information requirements. Researchers only need information on portfolio and 
benchmark returns. However, this approach can provide misleading inference 
regarding market timing ability. First, in the non-linear regression framework, 
spurious timing can arise due to factors other than active timing strategies of fund 
managers. Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) demonstrate that certain dynamic 
trading strategies by mutual funds might give rise to a negative non-linear relationship 
between fund and market returns. These authors also show that the returns of a passive 
portfolio of certain stocks with option-like payoff structure might also have a convex 
or concave relation with market returns. Second, most of these studies assume that 
market timing strategies are implemented in a specific way. Elton et al (2012) argue 
that fund managers might choose to time in a more complicated way. Third, 
Goetzmann, et al (2000) and Bollen and Busse (2001) argue that return-based methods 
employ monthly return information, and thus ignore the active timing and trading 
between observations of fund returns, leading to negatively biased timing ability. 
To overcome these potential problems of return-based measures, recent studies such 
as Jiang et al (2007) and Kaplan and Sensoy (2008) propose alternative market timing 
measures based on mutual fund portfolio holdings (holding-based measure). Using a 
single-index model, these authors find that mutual fund managers have significant 
timing ability, which is opposite to what has been found in prior return-based studies. 
However, Elton et al (2012) show that the positive timing ability identified by the 
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single-index model turns out to be negative timing ability. Overall, there is also little 
empirical evidence to suggest that mutual fund managers are able to time the market 
or exploit time-varying stock characteristics returns. 
Extant work has concentrated on investigating whether mutual fund managers possess 
timing ability by testing the timing performance measured in aggregate. However, 
aggregate performance might not necessarily be a good indicator of the timing skills 
that mutual fund managers really possess: mutual fund managers might be able to 
perform some tasks well, but they might be not good at other tasks. As a result, 
superior performance from positive skill can be cancelled out by poor performance 
from negative skill, which perhaps explains the lack of evidence of fund managers’ 
timing skills documented in the literature.  
One set of potential candidates for such distinct investment skills consists of buying 
and selling abilities. Sell decisions are assumed in traditional finance literature to be 
the other side of the coin to buy decisions, but investment practitioners often find 
themselves tending to have more trouble with sell decisions than they do with buy 
decisions. Norris (2002) expresses concern that behavioural and emotional biases can 
be highly influential in shaping investors’ decisions to sell stocks. The author argues 
that a decision to sell stocks involves changing investors’ minds about the prospects 
of the investments, which can be particularly difficult in the investment world, where 
investors are swamped with incomplete information. The behavioural finance 
literature has suggested that sell decisions are susceptible to behavioural biases and 
heuristics. For example, several earlier studies have shown that retail investors are 
more likely to sell their winning position but they are reluctant to realise their losses 
(e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1999). This is known as the “disposition 
effect”. Researchers find that it is very hard to explain the tendency of selling winners 
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over losers in a rational trading framework (e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 2003). On the 
other hand, a number of behavioural explanations have been suggested such as the 
concavity (convexity) of the value function in the domain of gains (losses) from 
prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Interestingly, a recent survey conducted by Cabot Research and CFA Institute shows 
that mutual fund managers often have to rely on subjective judgment to shape their 
sell decisions, rather than more quantitative or research based methods (Cabot 
Research, 2007). Motivated by these findings, this chapter follows Chen et al (2013) 
in exploring whether mutual fund managers possess differential trading skills, by 
decomposing timing ability in aggregate into different components such as buying and 
selling skills. Chen et al (2013) identify distinct trading skills for a small number of 
“star” growth-oriented mutual fund managers who exhibit significant abnormal fund 
performance estimated by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model with 36-, 60- and 108-
month fund returns history. However, their analysis can be subject to survivorship 
bias. It is unclear whether their results are generalizable to other mutual funds, 
particularly those with average and even below-average historical performance. This 
chapter attempts to complement Chen et al (2013)’s findings by investigating whether 
such distinct buying and selling characteristics-timing abilities exist in a much broader 
sample of all U.S. domestic actively managed equity funds.  
This chapter also contributes to the literature that examines fund manager abilities to 
time markets by investigating whether distinct characteristic timing abilities persist 
over time. In particular, if mutual fund managers have differential trading abilities, 
characteristic-timing performance for buying and selling should remain persistent over 
time. In other words, past performance would be a good indicator of future 
performance. However, if differential characteristic-timing abilities for buying and 
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selling are merely due to chance, past superior (poor) performance may not imply 
superior (poor) performance in the future. 
Furthermore, the majority of prior studies explore timing ability by examining total 
timing performance, which may be misleading concerning fund managers’ timing 
abilities. Since the natural structure of mutual funds can potentially force managers to 
trade for other reasons including tax management and window dressing, a more 
accurate indicator of fund manager skills, if any, should be based only on investment 
decisions made by strong fund manager beliefs or conviction. Using changes in 
portfolio styles through active trading (i.e., active style drift) of Wermers (2012) as a 
proxy for fund manager conviction, this chapter attempts to explore the relationship 
between the strength of fund manager conviction and subsequent characteristic-timing 
performance. If mutual fund managers are truly skilled in timing stock characteristics, 
strong conviction, as reflected in large active style changes in allocation toward equity 
style factors in the portfolios, should be associated with good subsequent 
characteristic-timing performance. However, if large active style drifts were made due 
to factors such overconfidence or gambling behaviour, such active trading decisions 
can be associated with poor subsequent characteristic-timing returns.  
Using the CRSP Mutual Fund Holdings Dataset with a broad sample of 3384 unique 
U.S. actively managed domestic equity funds from September 2003 to December 
2013, I find no evidence of superior stock picking performance in general which is 
consistent with the literature. In particular, I analyse how changes in portfolio holdings 
weights of size, book-to-market, and momentum factors at the individual stock level 
might contribute to overall fund performance. Consistent with Daniel et al (1997) and 
others, my results show that on average, mutual fund managers are not able to 
effectively time the stock characteristics. Sub-period analysis shows that fund 
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managers exhibit negative characteristic-timing ability with an average return of -46 
basis points per year at marginal statistically significance level during the second half 
sub-period from 2009 to 2013. Further results reveal that none of the fund categories 
shows positive overall characteristic-timing ability in any of the time periods in our 
study. Income-oriented mutual funds exhibit negative characteristic-timing skills and, 
in particular, income mutual funds have an average characteristic-timing performance 
of -1.53% per year, statistically significant at the 1% level, during the second half sub-
period. Furthermore, I find that mutual fund managers possess distinct trading 
abilities. In particular, mutual fund managers on average earn characteristic-timing 
returns of 1.42% per year when adding stocks into their portfolios, indicating that fund 
managers possess abilities in the buying domain. However, fund managers exhibit no 
apparent characteristic-timing skills when selling stocks. Instead, selling decisions are 
associated with negative characteristic-timing returns of -1.78% per year, significant 
at the 5% level.  
More importantly, by tracking the subsequent characteristic-timing performance of 
past winners and losers, this chapter finds a strong persistence of aggregate 
characteristic-timing performance in the negative domain, at least over the following 
four quarters, suggesting that mutual fund managers do not possess characteristic-
timing ability in aggregate but instead a subset of fund managers tend to have poor 
timing ability that persistently destroys their overall portfolio performance. This 
chapter also provides evidence that the characteristic-timing performance for both 
buying and selling dimensions are persistent. In particular, mutual fund managers who 
exhibit superior characteristic-timing performance when buying stocks in the past tend 
to continue performing buying tasks well while those who were the worst performers 
for selling stocks tend to underperform in the selling domain for the following quarter. 
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In other words, a small number of mutual fund managers have “hot” hands to buy 
stocks, while another subset of fund managers have “cold” hands to sell stocks in short 
term. 
By segmenting portfolios based on level of active style drift as a proxy for strength of 
fund manager conviction, my results reveal that aggregate characteristic-timing 
returns are not positively related to the strength of conviction in style investments. 
Instead, an inverted U-shaped relationship between fund manager conviction and 
subsequent characteristic-timing performance is observed. In particular, strong fund 
manager conviction, as reflected in most aggressive style bets, is associated with 
diminished subsequent characteristic-timing returns, suggesting that there might be 
more than valuation beliefs in shaping characteristic-timing decisions. A closer look 
by breaking down the aggregate characteristic-timing performance into buying and 
selling components reveals that the characteristic-timing performance when selling 
stocks is negatively related to the strength of conviction, while a non-linear 
relationship for buying ability is found. When mutual fund managers aggressively 
engage in active style drifts, on average stocks purchased are associated with no 
statistically significant subsequent characteristic-timing performance whereas stocks 
sold are associated with statistically and economically significant characteristic-timing 
returns of -2.97% per year, indicating that the poor overall characteristic-timing 
performance from aggressive style bets are mainly driven by negative selling abilities. 
These findings have meaningful implications for investigating fund manager skills and 
for understanding asset management in the real world. My results directly question the 
capability of the traditional performance evaluation approaches employed in the 
literature, which only consider aggregate mutual fund performance to detect fund 
manager abilities. The lack of evidence of overall fund performance documented in 
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the literature might mask the distinct buying and/or selling skills mutual fund 
managers really possess. Moreover, this chapter provides strong empirical evidence to 
support the hypothesis in the behavioural finance that sell decisions are more likely to 
be susceptible to behavioural biases and heuristics.  
More importantly, my findings concerning the relationship between fund manager 
conviction and subsequent performance raise the question of whether professional 
investors such as mutual fund managers, who are often assumed to be informed 
investors in the traditional finance literature, are also prone to behavioural biases and 
heuristics. Fund managers operate in an environment where they are swamped by 
incomplete information, are subject to acute information asymmetry and are under 
intense competition. In the end, they often have to rely on subjective judgment, 
intuition and even “gut feeling”, which can easily expose mutual fund managers to 
behavioural and emotional biases (Tuckett and Taffler, 2012). Surprisingly, little 
attention in the academic literature has been paid to looking at behavioural biases 
among professional investors. One notable exception is Eshraghi and Taffler (2012), 
who provide evidence showing that overconfidence, one of the best known 
psychological attributes that can play havoc with decision making, is associated with 
diminished investment performance. However, the fundamental questions about how 
and through which mechanisms overconfidence can affect fund performance remain 
unclear. It is possible, for example, that negative selling ability can to a large extent 
drive the poor performance of overconfident fund managers because the behavioural 
and emotional factors tend to become even more severe when it comes to sell decisions 
that involves changing established beliefs on current holdings (Norris, 2002). 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the related 
literature on mutual fund timing ability. Section 2.3 describes the performance and 
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fund manager conviction measurements used in this chapter. Section 2.4 describes the 
data source and sample construction. Section 2.5 discusses the results and findings and 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The vast majority of the studies in the literature have concentrated on stock picking 
ability by examining how much better a mutual fund manager can perform compared 
to holding a passive portfolio of stocks with the same risk characteristics3. This bulk 
of the literature ignores whether managers can generate additional performance by 
timing the market as a whole or timing across subsets of the market. A number of 
articles argue that if fund managers can forecast market states, this existence of timing 
ability can lead to incorrect inference about the stock picking skill (e.g., Dybvig and 
Ross, 1985; Elton et al, 2009).  
Given the importance of market timing skills, a number of articles explore whether 
mutual fund managers could actually forecast market states, and therefore take 
advantage of such predictability in their portfolio decisions. Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) argue that if fund managers out-guess market returns, they will hold a greater 
proportion of the market portfolio when the market return is high and a smaller 
proportion when the market return is low. The authors add a quadratic term in the 
CAPM model to test the non-linear relationship between portfolio return and market 
return. However, they find no evidence that fund managers in their sample have 
significant timing ability. 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Elton et al (1996), Gruber (1996), Daniel et al (1997), Carhart (1997), Zheng (1999) and 
others. 
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Based on the basic model of market timing developed by Merton (1981), Henriksson 
and Merton (1981) present both parametric and nonparametric tests for the market 
timing ability of investment managers by assuming that fund managers follow a more 
qualitative approach to time market according to whether the market return is lower 
or higher than the risk-free rate. Using these market timing measures, Henriksson 
(1984) evaluates the market timing performance of 116 open-end mutual funds, and 
their empirical results do not support the hypothesis that fund managers possess 
market timing ability. Chang and Lewellen (1984) and Grinblatt and Titman (1988) 
find similar results. 
Given the “perverse” market timing ability found in earlier studies, Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) argue that the traditional measures are not able to capture the dynamic 
behaviour of returns. These authors modify the classic market timing models of 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) to condition on public 
information and find that negative market timing performance is removed. In addition 
to incorporating public information, Beck et al (1999) further develop conditional 
market-timing models by considering the fund manager’s risk aversion, and again find 
no evidence that mutual funds have significant market timing ability.  
The market timing measures commonly used in the literature are based on non-linear 
regressions of realized fund returns against contemporaneous market returns. If there 
were a non-linear relationship between fund and market returns, this relationship could 
be induced by factors other than active market timing actions. Jagannathan and 
Korajczyk (1986) argue that some commonly used dynamic trading strategies may 
give rise to option-like features in fund returns, which can appear as non-linear 
relations between fund and market returns. Thus, spurious timing ability may be due 
to the “dynamic trading” effect. For example, a fund manager who implements a 
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“positive-feedback” strategy increaseing portfolio exposure to market returns after a 
market run-up would exhibit a positive artificial timing ability. On the other hand, a 
contrarian manager who decreases his market exposure after a market run-up would 
have negative artificial timing ability. Furthermore, the “dynamic trading” effect is 
also related to “interim trading”, which refers to fund trading activities between return 
observation dates in the literature. Goetzmann, et al (2000) use simulations to tests if 
“interim trading” would cause return-based tests to underestimate the market timing 
ability of fund managers. They show evidence that when fund managers engage in 
market timing at a much higher frequency, the traditional return-based models that are 
based on monthly fund returns can lead to negatively biased results with lower power. 
Similarly, Bollen and Busse (2001) perform market timing tests using daily fund 
returns, and find evidence in favour of fund managers’ timing ability for a sample of 
230 domestic equity funds. 
Also, the “passive timing” effect is documented in previous studies for return-based 
measures. Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) demonstrate that a “passive” convex or 
concave relationship between fund returns and market returns might occur due to 
option-like returns of certain stocks, even when fund managers do not actively time 
the market.  This is known as the “passive timing” effect. Together with the “dynamic 
trading” effect, these two effects are often referred to as ‘artificial timing’ in the 
literature. In addition, Elton et al (2012) argue that if fund managers choose to time in 
a more complex manner, timing measures based on non-linear relations between fund 
and market returns may not be able to detect this.  
Jiang et al (2007) propose alternative market timing measures based on quarterly 
mutual fund portfolio holdings. These authors estimate the fund beta as the weighted 
average of the betas of individual stocks in the fund manager’s portfolio, and then 
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investigate the covariance between fund betas and market returns. Jiang et al (2007) 
argue that by using ex ante information on fund portfolio holdings, the holdings-based 
approach is not affected by subsequent trading activities during the holding period (the 
“dynamic trading” effect) and it is also not affected by any contemporaneous non-
linear relationship between individual stock and market returns (the “passive timing” 
effect). Using a sample of 2294 actively managed equity mutual funds, Jiang et al 
(2007) show favourable evidence that fund managers exhibit positive market timing 
ability through active trading, and that the average market timing performance remain 
positive after controlling for macroeconomic variables. Similarly, Kaplan and Sensoy 
(2008) find that although fund managers fail to time their benchmark by changing cash 
holdings in their portfolios, they do exhibit market timing ability. Increases in 
benchmark beta of fund portfolios are positively associated with future benchmark 
excess returns. 
Following these two studies, Elton et al (2012) examine fund managers’ timing ability 
by using several multi-index models, including a two-index model that incorporates 
bond timing, the Fama-French model with a bond index, the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model and a model that considers industry rotations. In addition, the authors use the 
general methodology of Ferson and Schadt (1996) to condition public information in 
their timing models. By investigating monthly holdings of 318 funds, Elton et al 
(2012) confirm that there is positive and statistically significant timing ability when 
using the one-index model, as Jiang et al (2007) and Kaplan and Sensoy (2008) do. 
However, fund managers’ timing ability becomes negative when a multi-index model 
is used. In addition, Elton et al (2012) argue that when fund managers want to change 
their exposure to the market, they often to do so by titling towards large/small stocks 
or growth/value stocks. As a result, when these factor effects are considered in timing 
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models, any misidentified market timing will be removed. Indeed, Chen et al (2013) 
show that growth-oriented funds in their sample invest over 90% of their assets under 
management in the stock market and these mutual funds only adjust overall market 
exposure slightly. 
To address whether fund managers tend to adjust portfolio exposure to factors, Daniel 
et al (1997) propose an alternative holdings-based timing measure, specifically to 
explore whether changes in portfolio weights of size, book-to-market and momentum 
factors can forecast future returns. By examining quarterly holdings of a sample of 
over 2500 mutual funds, the authors find that there is no significant characteristic-
timing performance across all categories of funds in their sample, and the 
characteristic-timing performance is never significantly positive for any subgroup of 
funds in any sample period. This suggests that on average fund managers are not able 
to successfully forecast the time-varying expected returns of style factors. 
Chen et al (2013) argue that one reason previous studies fail to detect timing ability 
is that researchers consider market timing ability or characteristic-timing ability in 
aggregate. Fund managers might possess timing ability in subsets of the market. 
These authors focus on exploring the style-timing skill “star” fund managers might 
possess and to what extent style-timing abilities can explain the superior performance 
of star fund managers. Using a return-based approach, Chen et al (2013) show that 
“star” fund managers possess “growth” timing ability but not market timing ability. 
The “star” fund managers in their sample appear to be able to generate abnormal 
performance from switching stocks in their portfolios along the value/growth 
continuum. Chen et al (2013) further argue that “growth” timing performance 
explains at least 45% of the abnormal returns they find. Consistent with Elton et al 
40 
 
(2012)’s argument, Chen et al (2013) demonstrate that growth timing strategies can 
be easily misidentified as market timing skill.  
More importantly, Chen et al (2013) advocate the characteristic-timing measure of 
Daniel et al (1997) to explore differential fund manager trading skills. These authors 
argue that the characteristic-timing method considers changes in fund holdings at the 
individual stock level, and thus, it can be used to explore for differential fund manager 
trading skills. By focusing on “star” growth-oriented fund managers who exhibit 
superior past performance, Chen et al (2013) break down the characteristic-aggregate 
timing performance into the characteristic-timing returns for buying and selling, and 
show that these “star” fund managers possess positive buying skill and negative sell 
skill. The authors point out that the lack of evidence of mutual fund characteristic 
timing ability might be due to the fact that Daniel et al (1997) and other studies on 
mutual fund timing ability identify and measure timing performance only in aggregate 
terms. However, as discussed earlier, their study is subject to some criticisms. Chen et 
al (2013) use at least 36 months of past monthly fund return data to identify superior 
performing funds. This sample selection procedure not only excludes young mutual 
funds that do not have a sufficiently long return history, but also induces survivorship 
bias. Their analysis might also overestimate the trading skills along both buying and 
selling dimensions because their small group of growth-oriented mutual fund 
managers are more likely to possess genuine skill, rather than luck (Kosowski et al, 
2006). As such, it is unclear whether their results are generalizable to other mutual 
funds, particularly those with average and even below-average historical performance. 
Indeed, Norris (2002) argues that a decision to sell stocks involves changing investors’ 
mind about the prospects of the investments, which can be particularly difficult in the 
investment world, where investors are swamped with incomplete information. Thus, 
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behavioural and emotional bias can play an important role in forming sell decisions. 
In fact, the behavioural finance literature has long recognised that selling decisions are 
particularly susceptible to behavioural biases. For instance, several studies of selling 
behavior in natural and experimental markets provide evidence that investors are more 
reluctant to realize losses than gains (Odean, 1998; Weber and Camerer, 1998). 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) label this phenomenon the “disposition effect”. Working 
with a discount brokerage database, Odean (1998) finds that the retail investors in his 
sample tend to sell winning stocks relative to their purchases prices, rather than losing 
stocks. Evidence of the disposition effect can also be found in other markets such as 
the housing market (Genesove and Mayer, 2001). Genesove and Mayer (2001) show 
that house sellers tend to set an asking price that exceeds the asking price of other 
sellers with comparable houses when the expected selling price is below their original 
purchase price. Odean (1998) and others argue that the disposition effect cannot be 
easily explained within the rational trading framework. First, investors might be 
motivated by tax consideration to sell losers, not winners. Second, such tendency to 
sell winners is not likely due to rational information and beliefs updates because Odean 
(1998) find that the stocks that investors sell outperform the stocks they choose to hold 
on to.  
There are a number of behavioral explanations from the literature. First, investors may 
have an irrational belief in mean-reversion (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Second, 
mental accounting may help explain the disposition effect. In particular, investors tend 
to separate mental accounts for gains and losses in making decisions (Thaler, 1985). 
Third, the disposition effect can be understood with a prospect theory framework. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that people are risk averse towards gains but risk 
seeking toward losses and thus their expected utility function is concave (convex) in 
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the region of gains (losses). Coval and Shumway (2005) show that professional traders 
who have profits (losses) by the middle of the trading day will take less (more) risk 
during the remaining of the day. Fourth, Hirshleifer (2001) argues that self-deception 
theory reinforces this argument because a loss is an indicator of low decision ability. 
People tend to avoid accepting such a signal. 
On the other hand, behavioural biases can lead to the opposite selling phenomenon 
that investors tend to hold winners too long before selling them. One of the behavioural 
explanations is the “endowment effect”, a tendency for people to hold on what they 
already possess rather than to exchange for a better alternative (Knez et al, 1985; 
Kahneman et al, 1991).  
Despite these findings in earlier studies, little empirical work has been done to evaluate 
professional investors’ buying and selling abilities separately. One exception is 
Faugere et al (2004) who argue that the finance literature has concentrated on the buy 
decision, but has been largely silent on the sell decision. The authors point out that it 
is because researchers have no reliable sell discipline criteria to assess the performance 
of sell decisions. By using six sell criteria obtained from the Plan Sponsor Network 
(PSN) database, Faugere et al (2004) examine the impact of sell discipline on monthly 
fund performance and show that the effectiveness of selling discipline is determined 
by overall market conditions. Overall, they demonstrate that the choice of selling 
discipline has a significant impact on portfolio performance.  
Summarizing, most studies in the literature have concentrated on the stock-picking 
ability of mutual fund managers but overlooked the additional performance that might 
be generated by timing ability. A number of the early studies that investigate whether 
mutual fund managers have timing ability are criticized for making strong assumption 
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that fund managers implement timing strategies in a specific way, even though they 
might implement timing strategies in a more complex manner. The return-based 
measures typically employed in the literature are also subject to the “artificial timing” 
effects. Such issues can lead to the incorrect inference about the timing abilities that 
mutual fund managers really possess. On the other hand, holdings-based studies have 
found mixed results regarding fund manager timing ability. Whether fund managers 
or subsets of fund managers have timing ability in aggregate or differential trading 
skills is still open to further research.  
2.3 Methodology 
This section describes the main measures of fund manager skills, including the 
“characteristic-selectivity” measure (CS) for stock-picking ability and the 
“characteristic timing” measure (CT) for timing ability. To calculate these measures, 
I summarise the procedure to construct benchmark portfolios based on Daniel et al 
(1997)’s approach. I also describe the measures of style drift proposed by Wermers 
(2012) as a proxy for fund manager conviction. 
2.3.1 Measuring Fund Performance 
This chapter first calculates the buy-and-hold hypothetical monthly returns that would 
be generated by purchasing the number of shares of each stock held by mutual fund 
(common stocks with share code 10 and 11 in the CRSP universe) on the first day of 
each holding report until the first day of the following holding report.4 The 
hypothetical gross monthly return is defined as:  
                                                          
4 This chapter retrieves all holding reports in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, accounting for the 
irregularity of mutual fund holding reports and update holding weights by using the most recent report 
available. 
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                                                                  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 = ∑ ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1?̃?𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                        (1) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of month t-1, and ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1 is 
the month t return of individual stock j held by fund at the end of month t-1. Following 
Daniel et al (1997), the most recent portfolio holdings available for a fund from the 
CRSP mutual fund holding database are used to estimate the portfolio weights on 
stocks.5 
Following Daniel et al (1997), hypothetical monthly returns are reported as the gross 
returns of mutual funds, and the overall fund performance is decomposed into CS, CT, 
and AS based on a stock characteristic-based approach. This characteristic-based 
approach requires the construction of passive benchmark portfolios that can be 
matched to individual stocks in the mutual fund portfolios with the dimensions of 
market value of equity (size), book-to-market ratio (btm), and momentum effect 
(mom). This chapter constructs passive benchmark portfolios according to the 
procedure detailed in Daniel et al (1997). Briefly, at the end of June each year, the 
common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are categorized into three 
quintile groups based on the individual stock’s size, book to market ratio and prior 
year return and 5 × 5 × 5 sorted characteristic-based portfolios are formed. The 
monthly returns of these benchmark portfolios are calculated as the monthly value 
weighted returns of the stocks in the 125 portfolios. The detailed procedure is 
described in Daniel et al (1997). 
The first component of gross return is the “characteristic-selectivity” attribute (CS). 
The CS measure, is the excess return of a particular stock in portfolio, which is 
                                                          
5 These most recent holdings are usually the holdings at the end of the most recent calendar quarter. 
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calculated by subtracting the return of the matched passive benchmark portfolio from 
the return of individual stocks. The value weighed excess return of all stocks in the 
portfolio gives us the CS measure and a significantly positive time series average of 
CS measure indicates that this mutual fund manager has stock-picking ability that 
outperforms the passive benchmark portfolios. The CS measure is defined formally 
as: 
                                                      𝐶𝑆𝑡 = ∑ ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1(?̃?𝑗,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−1)
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                    (2) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of month t-1, ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1 is the 
month t return of individual stock j held by fund at the end of month t-1, and ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−1
 is 
the month t return of the characteristic-based passive benchmark portfolio that is 
matched to individual stock j according its size, book to market and momentum during 
the month t-1. 
The second component is the “characteristic timing attribute” (CT) of the gross return. 
The CT measure captures the performance generated from the timing abilities of 
mutual fund managers. Daniel et al (1997) argue that fund managers can produce 
performance by changing the portfolio weights on the stock characteristics along the 
dimensions of size, book to market, and momentum if there were trading strategies 
based on these characteristics which have time-varying expected returns. The CT 
performance therefore tests if mutual fund managers have the timing ability to 
correctly allocate and adjust portfolio weights to the different risk factors in aggregate 
over time and it measures the performance that mutual fund managers can generate 
from timing these stock characteristics. The month t of the CT measure is defined as:  
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                                         𝐶𝑇𝑡 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−13?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−13)
𝑁
𝑗=1
                             (3) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of month t-1, ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−13 is the 
portfolio weight on stock j at the end of month t-13, ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−1
 is the month t return of the 
characteristic-based passive benchmark portfolio that is matched to individual stock j 
according to its size, book to market and momentum during month t-1, ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−13
 is the 
month t return of the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio that is matched to stock 
j during month t-13. 
To illustrate the rationale behind the CT measure, suppose that a fund increases its 
weights in high book-to-market stocks at the beginning of the month in which the 
book-to-market effect was unusually strong during that month, the this fund would 
have positive CT performance for that month. A significant and positive time series 
average of the CT measure indicates a superior characteristics-timing ability.  
The third component is the returns generated due to the tendency of mutual funds to 
hold stocks with certain characteristics. The “average style attribute” (AS) measure is 
calculated as: 
                                                         𝐴𝑆𝑡 = ∑ ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−13?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−13
𝑵
𝒋=𝟏
                                         (4) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−13 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of month t-13, and ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−13
 
is the month t return of the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio that is matched 
to stock j during month t-13. 
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2.3.2 Measuring Fund Manager Conviction 
The nature of open-end mutual funds might force fund managers to make investment 
decisions for reasons other than valuation beliefs. To capture the investment skills 
which fund managers really possess, this chapter attempts to identify ex ante which 
investment decisions are more likely to represent fund managers’ conviction (or false 
beliefs) and to evaluate the performance of those decisions. In order to investigate the 
relationship between the strength of fund manager conviction and characteristic-
timing performance, this chapter employs the non-parametric measure of Wermers 
(2012) as the main proxy for fund manager conviction.  
Following Wermers (2012), the total style drift of a managed portfolio in style 
dimension l (where l = size, book-to-market, or momentum) at portfolio reporting date 
q is measured as: 
                                           𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑞?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙 )
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                (5) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑞 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter q and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1 is the 
portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter q-1, while ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙  equals the non-
parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension l at the end of quarter q 
and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙  equals the non-parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension 
l at the end of quarter q-1.  
The total style drift for each fund each quarter can be further decomposed into an 
active style drift that results from active changes in the portfolio through active trades 
of stocks and a passive style drift that results from passively holding stocks with 
changing holding weights and stock characteristics. 
                                                         TSD𝑞
𝑙 = 𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 + 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙                                              (6) 
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Where 𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  measures the change in style dimension l assuming that the manager 
passively hold the portfolio during quarter q-1 to quarter q while 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  measures the 
change in style dimension l through buys and sells of stocks during quarter q-1 to 
quarter q. 
𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  or passive style drift in dimension l during quarter q-1 to quarter q is measured 
as: 
                                                𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′ ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
′ ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙 )
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                (7) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′  denotes the portfolio weight of stock j at the end of quarter q when a 
manager buys and holds the entire portfolio during quarter q-1 to quarter q while ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙  
equals the non-parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension l at the end 
of quarter q and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙  equals the non-parametric style characteristic of stock j in style 
dimension l at the end of quarter q-1.  
The remainder of total style drift is captured by 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  or the active style drift: 
                                                 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑞?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′ ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 )
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                     (8) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑞 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter q while ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′  denotes 
the portfolio weight of stock j of quarter q when a manager buys and holds the entire 
portfolio during quarter q-1 to quarter q and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙  equals the non-parametric style 
characteristic of stock j in style dimension l at the end of quarter q.  
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Total, passive and active style drifts are then aggregated across all three dimensions 
of size, book-to-market and momentum effects for a fund during the period between 
quarter q-1 to quarter q as: 
                                    𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞 = |𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒| + |𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑏𝑡𝑚| + |𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑚𝑜𝑚|                            (9) 
                                    𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞 = |𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒| + |𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑏𝑡𝑚| + |𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑚𝑜𝑚|                          (10) 
                                    𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞 = |𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒| + |𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑏𝑡𝑚| + |𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑚𝑜𝑚|                          (11) 
A non-zero value of active style drift would primarily occur due to active changes in 
portfolio weights of stocks through buys and sells. For example, in the style dimension 
of book-to-market, a fund manager who believes that the book-to-market effect would 
be unusually strong in the following month could allocate more portfolio weight to 
high book-to-market stocks through buying high book-to-market stocks or selling low 
book-to-market ones. 
2.4 Data and Sample 
In this section, I begin by describing my data on mutual funds holdings, their 
characteristics and their returns. I also describe data on individual stocks, including 
price and accounting data. Following this, I present the screening procedure I use to 
select U.S. domestic actively managed equity mutual funds. 
2.4.1 Mutual Fund Holdings Data 
My portfolio holdings data from September 2003 to December 2013 for U.S. actively 
managed domestic equity funds is created by merging the CRSP Survivorship Bias 
Free Mutual Fund Database with the CRSP stock price database. The CRSP Mutual 
Fund Database provides information on monthly fund net returns (RET), monthly total 
net assets (TNA), monthly net assets value (NAV) different types of fees including 
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annual expense ratio and management fee, turnover ratio, investment objectives, first 
offer date and other fund characteristics for each share class of every U.S. open-end 
mutual fund. The CRSP Mutual Fund Database also provides information on reported 
portfolio holdings of mutual funds since September 2003, including the identification 
of portfolios (crsp_portno), holdings report date (report_dt), the effectiveness date of 
the report (eff_dt), stock identification number (permno), number of shares held in the 
portfolio (nbr_shares), and market value of the stocks held (market_val). The holdings 
data in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database is collected both from reports filed with the 
SEC and from voluntary reports generated by the mutual funds themselves. The CRSP 
mutual fund characteristic/returns dataset for each share class of every common 
mutual fund is linked to the holdings dataset of mutual fund portfolios by using the 
map (portnomap) provided by the CRSP mutual fund database. The map dataset 
contains information on the identification of individual share classes (crsp_fundno) 
and their common funds (crsp_portno) over time, as well as other share class 
characteristics including delist date, delist type, and the identification of the acquirer 
share classes and the latest available date for monthly net assets value for target share 
classes.   
2.4.2 Price and Accounting Data 
Data on stock identification, stock return, delist return, share price, trading volume, 
cumulative price adjustment factors, cumulative shares adjustment factors, and shares 
outstanding as well as other stock characteristics are obtained from the CRSP stock 
price database. This CRSP price dataset6 is then merged with the CRSP Mutual Fund 
database by matching stock identification (permno) and holding report date 
                                                          
6 Stock return is adjusted for delist events, share price is adjusted by cumulative price adjustment 
factors, and share outstanding is adjusted by cumulative shares adjustment factors. 
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(report_dt). This chapter estimates mutual fund trades by tracking changes in holdings 
from report to report.  In order to follow changes in stock holdings correctly, the 
number of shares held in portfolios is adjusted by the CRSP cumulative shares 
adjustment factors.7 Data used to estimate book value of equity for stocks in the way 
by Daniel and Titman (1997) are retrieved from Compustat, including shareholders’ 
equity (SEQ), deferred taxes (TXDB), investment tax credit (ITCB), and preferred 
stock (PREF). Industry classifications (SIC) are obtained from the CRSP stock file 
and Compustat whenever available. 
2.4.3 Sample Selection 
This chapter follows and modifies the procedure of Kacperczyk et al (2008) to select 
U.S. domestic equity mutual funds.8 This chapter starts with all mutual fund samples 
in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database universe. Since the focus of the analysis is on 
actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds for which holdings data are most 
complete and reliable, this chapter eliminates balanced, bond, money market, 
international, sector, index, ETF, exchange target, and target date funds as well as 
those funds not invested primarily in equity securities. This screening procedure 
generates a sample of 109054 fund-report observations with a total of 3384 unique 
U.S. domestic equity mutual fund samples from September 2004 to December 2013. 
Appendix A at the end of the thesis provides the detailed screening procedure. 
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the number of domestic equity mutual funds in each year 
along with summary statistics of some fund characteristics. There is a significant rising 
                                                          
7 The CRSP Mutual Fund Holdings Database changed its data source since October 2010. Before 
October 2010, the reported number of shares in portfolio for stock distribution events such as splits is 
already adjusted and therefore we need to re-adjust it back before calculating changes in shares and 
market value of holdings. 
8 This report also follows a note writen by Glushkov and Moussawi (2010) from WRDS on selecting 
actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. 
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trend in the number of funds in our sample, while the average total net assets under 
management (TNA) peaked at $1512 million in the year 2006 and dropped 
dramatically to $ 821 million by almost 50% during the financial crisis. The median 
of total net assets followed the same pattern.  Overall there is an increasing trend in 
both mean and median of fund size but a decreasing trend in expense ratio. On average, 
mutual fund managers appear to hold a similar number of stocks in their portfolio but 
seem to buy and sell fewer stocks per month over time. Turnover ratio peaked in 2009, 
indicating that mutual fund managers traded more frequently along the financial crisis. 
Panel B reports the summary statistics of funds with different investment objectives. 
In particular, Income funds tend to trade much less frequently than other investment 
objective groups and Micro-Cap funds charge investors the highest expense ratio. 
Table 2.2 examines the overall portfolio styles for mutual funds with different self-
declared investment objectives. In order to characterize the investment style reflected 
in the portfolio holdings of different mutual funds, this chapter follows Daniel et al 
(1997) and Wermers (2012) to construct a database that maps each stock-year to the 
quintile numbers (one through five) in each style dimension of the size, the ratio of the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity (book-to-market), and the one-year 
lagged return of the stock (momentum). Quintile number 1 denotes small market 
capitalisation, low book to market or poor prior year return. Quintile number 5 denotes 
large market capitalisation, high book to market or good prior year return. These 
quintile numbers are then assigned to each corresponding stock held by fund portfolios 
during a given quarter and portfolio weighted quintile numbers for each mutual fund 
are calculated for that quarter. To illustrate the procedure, suppose a fund invests 50% 
in small market capitalisation, quintile 1; low book to market, quintile 1 and poor prior 
year return, quintile 1. Simultaneously, this fund invests the other 50% in large market 
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capitalisation, quintile 5; high book to market, quintile 5 and good prior year return, 
quintile 5. The average style of the fund will thus equal 3 for each of market 
capitalisation, book to market and prior year return during that quarter. These style 
numbers for each mutual fund are averaged across all funds in the same market 
segment during the quarter. Finally, the time series average of style numbers along the 
three dimensions are calculated over the sample period from 2004 to 2013. 
As we can be seen from Table 2.2, the full sample of mutual funds has an above 
median size (3.78) and momentum (3.10) and lower book to market (2.88). On 
average, the results for different investment style groups are fairly consistent with their 
self-declared investment objectives. In particular, the micro-cap funds invest heavily 
in small size firms (1.47), growth firms (2.58) and relatively higher momentum stocks 
(3.10). Income funds invest mostly in firms with large size (4.72), higher book to 
market (3.17) and relatively lower momentum factor (2.76). Mutual fund managers 
may possess the ability to time these characteristics and adjust the portfolio exposure 
to these style factors over time in an attempt to exploit time-vary characteristic returns. 
This will cause shift in the portfolio styles away from their target styles or the self-
reported investment objectives. The following sections examine whether mutual fund 
managers have characteristic-timing ability and whether changes in portfolio styles 
result in superior characteristic-timing performance. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Aggregate Characteristic-Timing Performance 
This chapter first reports an overview of fund performance of my sample of U.S. 
domestic equity mutual funds over the 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. Column (2) 
to column (4) of Table 2.3 provide a year-by-year comparison of the average gross 
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returns of all mutual funds in the sample with the average buy-and-hold monthly return 
for the CRSP value weighted and equally weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
portfolios without distribution. Comparisons indicate that at first glance, mutual fund 
managers appear to outperform the two passive portfolios of the CRSP stock universe. 
For instance, the average gross return of mutual funds before any expense and 
commissions is 11.29%, while the value-weighted (equally-weighted) hypothetical 
portfolio of all stocks in CRSP universe is only 7.39% (9.23%) for the period from 
2004 to 2013 in our study. However, this outperformance does not hold when we 
control for the cross-sectional differences in stock returns, due to stock characteristics 
of size, book-to-market and momentum effects by using the Daniel et al (1997) 
performance measures. 
In particular, the last three columns on the right of Table 2.3 report the three different 
performance attributes proposed by Daniel et al (1997). “CS Performance” captures 
the stock picking ability of mutual fund managers by mitigating performance 
generated due to cross-sectional differences in stocks returns attributable to the size, 
book-to-market, and momentum anomalies. Results in Table 2.3 indicate that on 
average mutual fund managers have a negative but insignificant stock selectivity 
ability over the sample period from 2004 to 2013, with statistically insignificant -2 
basis point per year before expense. Yearly results also show that, on average, stocks 
held in mutual fund portfolios could not outperform passive characteristic-benchmark 
portfolios. The CS measure is positive in eight years, but only significantly at the 10% 
significance level in 2005 and 2013, with an average of 1.86% per year and 1.02%, 
respectively, and negative in two years, but neither of them is statistically significant. 
Sub-period results show that CS performance is positive, with an average of 0.78% 
and 0.43% per year, during the periods before and after the recession, respectively, 
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while CS performance is negative, with an average of -2.80% per year during the 
recession. However, none of these values is statistically significant, though the t-
statistic for CS performance before the recession is 1.51. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the consensus view in the literature that on average mutual fund 
managers are not able to outperform their passive benchmarks. Recent empirical 
studies in the U.S. market suggest little or no evidence of superior mutual fund 
performance, but show strong evidence of persistent poor performance.9 
The CT measure is designed to detect any additional performance from successfully 
timing stock characteristics. Overall, we can see that on average, CT performance is -
37 basis points per year but is statistically insignificant with a t-statistic -1.57 from 
2004 to 2013, consistent with the results of Daniel et al (1997). In other words, mutual 
fund managers do not exhibit any characteristic timing skills, but instead, there is weak 
evidence to show that they actually have negative timing performance at a marginally 
significant level. Separate yearly results show that CT measure is negative but 
insignificant in eight years except for year 2008. Sub-period results confirm that there 
is no evidence of timing skills: average CT performance is -42 basis points per year 
but is insignificant with a t-statistic of -1.61 before the recession, while average CT 
performance is -46 basis points per year, statistically significant at 10% level, with t-
statistic of -1.82, after the recession. Fund managers tend to have economically 
significant and negative characteristic-timing performance during expansion period. 
Interestingly, during the recession from December 2007 to June 2009, CT 
performance is only -3 basis points per year, and it is not statistically different from 
zero. The difference in characteristic-timing performance between recession and 
                                                          
9 See e.g., Blake and Timmermann, 1998; Blake et al 1999; Thomas and Tonks, 2001, Cuthbertson et 
al, 2008 
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expansion market conditions is economically meaningful and it is mainly driven by 
the poor performance during the expansion periods. In other words, fund managers 
appear to have some timing abilities, at least showing non-negative characteristic-
timing performance, during the recession. This finding is consistent with Kacperczyk 
et al (2014) who find that fund managers have time-varying skills. Fund managers 
tend to perform stock picking well in expansions and time the market well in 
recessions. 
Table 2.4 reports the CS, CT, and AS performance attribution components for funds 
in different investment categories. Panel A shows that in the analysis of the entire 
sample period on average, CS performance for all mutual fund investment categories 
is never statistically significant, indicating that none of the mutual fund categories on 
average is able to outperform their passive benchmark portfolios. In terms of 
characteristic-timing ability, only Micro-Cap mutual funds exhibit negative and 
statistically significant CT performance, with an average -79 basis points per year, 
while the other investment objectives have negative but insignificant CT performance. 
Sub-period analysis provides strong evidence that no investment category of fund 
managers possesses positive characteristic-timing skills while fund managers in some 
investment categories exhibit positive stock-picking performance in expansions but 
significantly negative performance in recessions. Panel B presents the performance 
results during the first sub-sample period from September 2004 to December 2007. 
Micro-Cap funds exhibit significantly positive CS performance of 2.83% per year but 
significantly negative CT performance of -0.96% per year and Mid-Cap funds also 
exhibit significantly positive CS performance of 1.56% per year but significantly 
negative CT performance of -0.55% per year. All other investment categories do not 
show any significant CS and CT performance. Panel C reports performance during the 
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recession period. None of the CT performance measure for any investment category 
is significantly different from zero. CS performance for all investment categories is all 
negative and only Micro-Cap funds exhibits unsuccessful stock picking performance 
with significant CS performance of -9.47% per year during the recession period. Panel 
D covers the period after the recession and results show that during this period, CT 
performance for Growth and Income funds, Income funds, and Micro-Cap funds are 
all significantly negative but CS performance for Micro-Cap funds is 3.63% per year, 
and is economically and statistically significant. 
To summarize, we find that on average, mutual fund managers exhibit no superior 
investment performance. In particular, mutual fund managers have negative but 
insignificant stock selection ability over our sample period, indicating that fund 
managers are not able to pick stocks that deliver risk-adjusted abnormal performance. 
More interestingly, there is some evidence to show that fund managers appear to have, 
if any, negative characteristic-timing performance. In other words, fund managers tend 
to change the weights on the characteristics of the stocks held in the portfolios along 
the dimensions of size, book to market, and momentum in the wrong way, or at least 
they are not able to exploit the time-varying expected returns of these stock 
characteristics.  
2.5.2 Buying and Selling Characteristic-Timing Abilities 
Although a large number of studies in the literature find that mutual fund managers do 
not possess timing ability, there is no convincing evidence that directly explains why 
mutual fund managers underperform in the domain. Chen et al (2013) point out that 
the traditional CT measure, which is simply calculated by aggregating the 
characteristic timing performance of all holdings, would mask the distinct trading 
skills where the CT performance for buying and selling are calculated separately. 
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To explore distinct trading abilities, this chapter follows Chen et al (2013) to 
decompose aggregate CT performance into different trading components. Specifically, 
for each fund, I measure the changes in number of shares held in each stock from the 
end of quarter t-1 to the end of quarter t for each quarter in the sample period. Increases 
in the number of shares are treated as buys and aggregated to form the buy portfolio 
and decreases are aggregated to form the sell portfolio, for each fund each quarter. 
Additionally, I aggregate stocks with no changes in number of shares between two 
quarters into the passive holding portfolio. This chapter then calculates the 
characteristic-timing performance for each trading portfolio. If a fund’s purchases of 
stocks are associated with subsequent performance above prior average returns from 
stock characteristics, the characteristic-timing performance for the buy portfolio will 
be positive; if sales of stocks are associated with subsequent returns higher than prior 
average returns from stock characteristics, the characteristic-timing performance for 
the sell portfolio will also be positive. Similarly, if passive holdings are effective in 
terms of subsequent performance, the characteristic-timing performance for passive 
holdings will equally be positive. If a fund exhibits positive time series average 
characteristic-timing performance along buying (selling) dimension, this indicates that 
this fund manager possesses superior buying (selling) skill. 
Panel A in Table 2.5 reports the CT performance for buying, selling and passive 
holdings for equity mutual funds during the whole sample period from September 
2004 to December 2013. The second column reveals that whereas no overall 
characteristic-timing ability measured by aggregate characteristic-timing performance 
is found, this masks different skills along buying and selling dimensions. In general, 
mutual fund managers (All Funds) appear to exhibit significant timing ability when 
purchasing stocks. For example, mutual fund managers earn an average return of 
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1.42% per year (t-statistic=1.65) greater than the average across the three 
characteristic styles from their purchases, indicating that mutual fund managers 
possess skills in this domain. When breaking down mutual funds by their investment 
objectives, I find some evidence to show that growth oriented mutual funds (Growth 
and Mid-Cap funds) possess significant timing ability for buying stocks, while income 
oriented mutual funds (Growth & Income and Income funds) exhibit no statistically 
significant characteristic-timing performance when purchasing stocks. The difference 
of buying performance between growth and income funds is economically significant.  
My results show that none of the investment categories of mutual funds earn 
significant characteristic-timing performance from holding the same stocks. This is 
consistent with the literature, suggesting that passive holdings represent fund 
managers’ past investment beliefs and are not useful measures for detecting 
investment ability (e.g., Chen et al, 2000). My findings therefore contribute to the 
literature by showing a similar result in terms of characteristic-timing ability. 
More interestingly, mutual fund managers exhibit poor characteristic-timing abilities 
when disposing of stocks in their portfolios. In general, the stocks mutual fund 
managers sell are associated with subsequent negative characteristic-timing returns of 
-1.78% per year (t-statistic=-1.86). None of the fund investment categories shows 
positive characteristic-timing performance for selling. These results indicate that on 
average, mutual fund managers are not able to generate characteristic-timing 
performance when selling their stocks but instead destroy the characteristic-timing 
performance generated from their buying activities. 
To summarize, our results show that fund managers appear to possess significant 
timing ability over stock characteristics when purchasing stocks. In particular, growth 
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oriented funds have greater stock buying skills than other income oriented funds. We 
also reveal that mutual fund managers seem to systematically fail to time the stock 
characteristic styles when selling stocks. None of the investment categories exhibit 
significant and positive characteristic-timing skills for selling. Also, there is no 
substantial performance variation among different investment objectives. To check the 
robustness of our results, we break our sample in to three different sub-periods, based 
on recessionary environment defined by NBER. Results from the sub-period analysis 
in the remaining of Table 2.5 are broadly similar with what we find in our full sample 
(Panel A). Overall, these findings are consistent with the fundamental asymmetry 
between buy and sell decisions in terms of trading disciplines found in the investment 
community. This chapter also offers empirical support to the theoretical predictions 
from the behavioural finance literature that sell decisions are susceptible to 
behavioural biases and heuristics that might affect investment performance. 
2.5.3 Characteristic-timing Performance Persistence 
To test for persistence of characteristic-timing performance, this chapter first sorts 
mutual funds into five performance quintiles each quarter based on aggregate, buying 
and selling CT measures respectively. We report the average characteristic-timing 
performance of each of the performance quintile portfolios during the formation 
quarter and track the performance over the subsequent four quarters. Panel A in Table 
2.6 summarises the persistence results for aggregate performance while Panel B and 
Panel C present persistence results for trading activities. 
There is weak evidence in Panel A to show that the difference in aggregate 
performance between past winners and losers continues to remain positive in the 
following four quarters after portfolio formation, suggesting that aggregate 
characteristic-timing performance is persistent. Surprisingly, a closer look reveals that 
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such persistence of aggregate performance is mainly driven by the persistence of 
characteristic-timing performance in the negative domain. In particular, losers in 
performance quintile 1 who exhibit the worst characteristic-timing performance (-
7.64% per year) in the formation quarter continue to have negative quarterly 
characteristic-timing performance of -0.87%, -0.46%, -0.87% and -0.75% per year in 
the following four quarters, while the future performance of past winners (7.26% per 
year) turn out to be negative immediately after the formation quarter. These results are 
consistent with recent studies such as Teo and Woo (2001) and Cuthbertson et al 
(2008) who observe strong persistence among poorly performing funds.  
Panel B shows that the characteristic-timing performance when buying stocks is 
persistent. In particular, on average mutual funds in the performance quintile 1 that 
have the worst 𝐶𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑦 performance in the formation quarter have positive 𝐶𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑦 
performance of 1.00%, 1.53%, 1.36%, and 1.41% per year in the subsequent four 
quarters. On the other hand, mutual funds that are particularly successful in buying 
stocks continue to have positive and statistically significant 𝐶𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑦 performance of 
2.39%, 1.85%, 1.94%, and 1.67% per year in the following four quarters. The 
performance difference between past winners and losers remain positive over four 
quarters and the outperformance of past winning funds is a statistically and 
economically significant average of 1.38% per year for at least the following quarter 
Q+1. These results suggest that a small number of fund managers have “hot hands” to 
buys stocks: fund managers who have the best past buying performance continue 
outperform those who display the worst buying ability in near term.  
Similarly, results in Panel C report that mutual fund managers seem to have 
persistently bad characteristic-timing ability for selling. Mutual funds with the lowest 
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𝐶𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 performance in the quintile formation quarter display negative performance of 
-2.83%, -2.28%, -2.56%, and -2.14% per year while mutual funds with highest past 
𝐶𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 performance exhibit negative performance of -1.44%, -1.90%, -1.55%, and -
1.74% per year during the following four quarters. Past losers continue to 
underperform past winners by a statistically significant amount of 1.43% in quarter 
Q+1. This underperformance is also economically meaningful. These results suggest 
that there is a small number of mutual fund managers who exhibit “icy hands” in 
selling stocks in short term. 
Overall, this chapter documents the strong persistence of aggregate characteristic-
timing performance in the negative domain over the following four quarters, indicating 
that mutual fund managers do not possess characteristic-timing ability in aggregate 
but instead a subset of fund managers tend to have poor timing ability that persistently 
destroys portfolio value. I also find strong evidence to show that characteristic-timing 
performance along both buying and selling dimensions is persistent in near term. In 
particular, mutual fund managers who exhibit superior characteristic-timing 
performance when buying stocks in the past tend to continue performing buying tasks 
well, while those who were the worst performers in selling stocks tend to 
underperform in the sell domain in short term. Extreme positive (negative) 
performance for selling (buying) is due to good (bad) luck. These results reinforce our 
main hypothesis that mutual fund managers have distinct trading skills. 
2.5.4 Fund Manager Conviction and Characteristic-Timing Performance 
The final tests examine the relationship between fund manager conviction and 
subsequent characteristic-timing performance. If mutual fund managers are skilled, 
strong fund manager conviction, as reflected in large style changes in allocation 
toward equity style factors in the their portfolio, should be associated with superior 
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subsequent characteristic-timing performance. However, if large style drifts were 
made due to other reasons such as overconfidence or gambling behaviour, we might 
find a non-linear or negative relationship between the strength of fund manager 
conviction and subsequent characteristic-timing returns. To capture the effect of fund 
manager conviction on subsequent performance, I employ active style drift as our main 
proxy for fund manager conviction, which allows us to precisely measure change in 
portfolio style through active trading. At the end of each quarter, mutual funds in our 
sample are ranked and are divided into quintile groups based on the level of active 
style drifts. I evaluate and analyse subsequent fund performance for each of the 
portfolios conditioning on the strength of fund manager conviction.  
Table 2.7 shows that large active style drift is not associated with superior performance 
from stock picking (CS performance). When funds engage into aggressive style drift 
(Top 20%), on average they earn an insignificant 0.07% characteristic-timing return 
per year, while those who have little style drift to their portfolio (Bottom 20%) have 
an insignificantly negative -0.07% return per year. There is no significant difference 
in the CS performance between these two quintiles. 
My results concerning characteristic-timing ability show that no quintile groups of 
active style drift exhibits positive characteristic-timing returns (CT performance). This 
is consistent with my main findings: mutual fund managers in general lack the timing 
ability to correctly allocate portfolio weights across the three style factors. More 
importantly, aggregate characteristic-timing performance is not increasingly related to 
the strength of fund manager conviction. Instead, Table 2.7 shows that  mutual funds 
in the top (bottom) quintile underperform those who experience moderate active style 
drift by -0.49% (-0.41%) with t-statistic of -1.67 (-1.95), which reveals a strong 
inverted-U relationship between fund manager conviction and subsequent 
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characteristic-timing performance. In particular, most aggressive active style drift 
(Top 20%) is associated with statistically and economically significant but negative 
aggregate characteristic-timing returns of -0.66% per year (t-statistic=-2.31). In other 
words, strong fund manager conviction is associated with diminished subsequent 
characteristic-timing returns, suggesting that there might be more than valuation 
beliefs in shaping characteristic-timing decisions. On the other hand, the least active 
style drifts are also associated with significantly negative characteristic-timing 
performance of -0.57% per year (t-statistic=-1.80), which is consistent with the 
expectation that small active style drifts represent weak fund managers’ beliefs about 
future performance. 
By breaking down aggregate performance into buying and selling components, I find 
that large style bets are associated with insignificant characteristic-timing performance 
for buying but negative returns when selling stocks. In particular, although mutual 
fund managers who have the strongest conviction tend to exhibit a positive 
characteristic-timing return of 2.01% per year when buying stocks, this characteristic-
timing performance is not statistically different from zero. Large standard errors 
indicate that there are significant cross-sectional variations of characteristic-timing 
returns for fund managers who choose to engage in large style drifts. However, on 
average these fund managers are also unable to outperform those who belong to the 
bottom quintile of active style drifts when adding stocks into their portfolios. On the 
other hand, sale of stocks in the top quintile of portfolios with the highest levels of 
active style drift actually generates a poor characteristic-timing return of -2.97% per 
year (t-statistic=-1.87) and these fund managers underperform those who exhibit the 
least style drift in terms of selling characteristic-timing performance, by a statistically 
and economically significant amount of -1.98% per year, suggesting a clear negative 
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relationship between fund manager conviction and the characteristic-timing 
performance when selling stocks. It is also interesting to note that purchases of stocks, 
in portfolios with moderate style drift, are able to generate positive and significant 
characteristic-timing returns, enough to offset the damage caused by poor selling 
ability. 
To conclude this section, these results reinforce the main hypothesis of this chapter 
that mutual fund managers are not able to generate performance form exploiting time-
varying expected returns of the three factor styles, by showing that aggregate 
characteristic-timing performance is not increasing in strength of fund manager 
conviction measured by the level of active style drift. In contrast, a strong inverted-U 
relationship between fund manager conviction and subsequent characteristic-timing 
performance is found. Large active style drifts, that should contain stronger fund 
managers’ beliefs on future performance, are associated with negative aggregate 
characteristic-timing performance. A closer look reveals that such underperformance 
is mainly driven by poor selling ability. These results suggest that there are more than 
valuation beliefs in shaping fund managers’ characteristic-timing decisions, in 
particular sell decisions.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter re-examines whether mutual fund managers, a representative group of 
professional investors, exhibit investment abilities, and in particular, whether they 
possess the skill to produce performance from adjusting portfolio exposure to the risk 
factors including the size, book-to-market and momentum effects. Consistent with 
Daniel et al (1997) and others, I find no evidence of significant aggregate 
characteristic-timing skill. Further results reveal a strong persistence of aggregate 
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characteristic-timing performance in the negative domain, which again indicates that 
mutual fund managers do not possess characteristic-timing ability in aggregate but 
instead a subset of fund managers tend to have poor timing ability that persistently 
destroys overall portfolio value. 
In an attempt to explain such underperformance from characteristic-timing decisions, 
this chapter disaggregates overall characteristic-timing performance into different 
trading components. Consistent with Chen et al (2013), my results show that in general 
mutual fund managers possess positive characteristic-timing ability when buying 
stocks but negative trading ability when selling stocks. Performance persistence tests 
confirm that these distinct trading “skills” are driven by systematic factors. Mutual 
fund managers who were successful in buying stocks tend to continue generating 
superior characteristic-timing performance when purchasing stocks, while those who 
were the worst sellers tend to remain underperformed when disposing of stocks in near 
term. In other words, there are a small number of mutual funds exhibiting “hot hands” 
(“icy hands”) in buying (selling) stocks. Overall, I argue that, the lack of evidence on 
superior general performance masks differential trading “skills”. 
By segmenting portfolios on the basis of active style drift as a proxy for fund manager 
conviction, I find a clear inverted U-shaped relationship between the strength of fund 
manager conviction and subsequent characteristic-timing performance. In particular, 
strong conviction as reflected in aggressive active style drift is associated with poor 
subsequent characteristic-timing performance. A closer look reveals that the negative 
aggregate characteristic-timing performance is mainly driven by poor selling 
activities. 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Mutual Fund Samples 
The table below reports the summary statistics of a total of 3384 unique U.S. domestic equity mutual fund samples from September 2004 to December 2013. The mutual 
fund data with self-reporting investment objectives including Growth, Growth & Income, Income, Micro-Cap, Small-Cap, and Mid-Cap are obtained from the merged CRSP 
mutual fund holdings databases and CRSP mutual fund characteristics databases in CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Database. CRSP investment objective variable 
(crsp_obj_cd) is used to filter U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from the CRSP mutual funds universe in CRSP mutual fund database. The mutual funds are broken down 
by the CRSP investment objectives, including growth, growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap. Total number of funds is the total number of unique 
mutual funds that exist during the sample periods. Avg number of stocks is the times series average of cross-sectional average of the number of unique stocks held by mutual 
funds during the sample periods. Avg number of buys and sells are the time series average of cross-sectional average of changes in shares of stocks held by mutual funds 
between holdings reports. Avg TNA is times series average of cross-sectional average of total net assets under management of mutual funds. Avg Flow is time series average 
of cross-sectional average of estimated percentage change in TNA adjusted for investment return and mutual fund mergers. Avg Turnover is time series average of cross-
sectional average of mutual fund turnover ratio. Avg Exp is time series average of cross-sectional average expense ratio of mutual fund. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics of all mutual fund samples over time and Panel B reports the summary statistics of mutual fund with different investment objectives. 
  
Total 
Number of 
Funds 
Avg Number 
of Stocks 
Avg Number 
of Buys 
Avg Number 
of Sells 
Avg TNA (in 
$ Million) 
Median TNA 
(in $ Million) 
Avg Flow 
(%/Month) 
Avg Turnover  
(%/Year) 
Avg Exp Ratio 
(%/Year) 
Panel A: Summary statistics of all mutual fund samples over time 
2004 1360 126.94 53.59 45.01 $1,327.63 $178.00 7.24 89.54 1.34 
2005 1459 120.09 47.73 45.53 $1,354.98 $197.80 5.56 86.17 1.29 
2006 1479 112.61 43.43 41.69 $1,512.18 $224.40 3.95 86.13 1.28 
2007 1638 114.71 41.90 41.88 $1,483.71 $202.20 2.63 91.09 1.25 
2008 2046 115.75 39.24 41.19 $821.48 $124.40 0.31 88.76 1.19 
2009 2022 122.04 41.56 42.21 $1,059.28 $162.75 1.89 100.46 1.20 
2010 2727 109.65 34.06 36.67 $1,097.55 $210.40 3.05 90.41 1.18 
2011 2612 103.05 30.49 30.80 $1,011.80 $201.85 1.57 83.66 1.16 
2012 2577 117.82 30.74 34.32 $1,105.19 $218.70 1.19 79.77 1.12 
2013 2454 120.80 32.59 34.14 $1,502.37 $321.85 7.29 72.94 1.10 
Panel B: summary statistics of mutual fund with different investment objectives 
All 3384 115.90 38.15 37.87 $1,217.94 $205.20 7.25 87.19 1.22 
Growth 1529 100.48 33.76 33.51 $1,933.87 $254.50 10.89 92.59 1.22 
Growth&Income 576 103.45 33.22 35.74 $1,332.02 $181.00 4.68 71.76 1.11 
Income 191 78.90 25.74 21.00 $1,508.81 $317.60 14.48 48.60 1.09 
Micro-Cap 50 111.93 31.05 37.32 $187.91 $101.65 2.71 92.92 1.66 
Small-Cap 679 170.93 55.23 53.59 $843.47 $233.75 1.55 89.91 1.29 
Mid-Cap 470 113.35 37.99 37.66 $728.33 $201.60 5.99 97.00 1.24 
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Table 2.2 Stock Characteristic (Style) in Fund Portfolio 
This table reports the average characteristic (or style) for funds in different investment objective groups. 
For each year, each of the stock held by each mutual fund are identified into three characteristics, 
namely market capitalization, book-to-market and prior year return. They are classified into 1 to 5 
depending on the quintile benchmark portfolio. Size classified as 1 denotes small stock; book to market 
classified as 1 denotes stock with low book to market; momentum classified as 1 denotes stock with 
low prior year return. For each quarter, the portfolio weighted average benchmark portfolio number is 
computed for each mutual fund. These fund average benchmark portfolio numbers are averaged across 
all funds for each year and each category. 
 Average Size Quintile 
Average Book-to-
Market Quintile 
Average Momentum Quintile 
All Funds 3.78 2.88 3.10 
Micro Cap 1.47 2.58 3.41 
Small Cap 2.53 2.74 3.27 
Mid Cap 3.95 2.69 3.14 
Growth 4.50 2.84 3.12 
Growth and Income 4.64 3.09 2.97 
Income 4.72 3.17 2.76 
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Table 2.3 Mutual Fund Performance in Aggregate, All Samples 
This table below reports the average buy-and-hold monthly return for the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices value weighted and equally weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ portfolio without 
distribution and equally weighted portfolio of all mutual funds existing during the years with a self-
declared investment objectives of growth, growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and 
mid-cap over time from 2004 to 2013. The gross return is estimated based on the monthly returns 
of the holdings of mutual funds before management fees and commissions. The CS performance, 
the CT performance, and the AS performance are calculated as Daniel et al (1997). Specifically, 
the CS performance is measured as the difference between the time t return of the portfolio held at 
time t-1 and the time t return of the time t-1 matching benchmark portfolio. The CT performance 
is calculated as the difference between the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of 
stocks held at time t-1 and the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of stocks held 
at time t-13. The AS performance is the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of 
stocks held at time t-13. The time series average of annualized monthly returns and t-statistics are 
presented below (t-statistics in parentheses). 
Year CRSP VW CRSP EW 
Gross 
Return 
CS 
Performance 
CT 
Performance 
AS 
Performance 
2004 39.86% 73.82% 28.96% 0.67%     -1.15%** 28.58% 
    (0.72) (-2.27)  
2005 5.77% 4.40% 17.89%   1.86%* -0.45% 15.63% 
    (1.99) (-1.06)  
2006 14.28% 17.28% 10.54% -1.46% -0.58% 12.53% 
    (-1.51) (-1.31)  
2007 5.78% -4.53% -2.40% 0.55% -0.05% -2.82% 
    (0.33) (-0.09)  
2008 -37.97% -42.53% -36.99% 2.95%   1.54%* -39.02% 
    (1.36) (1.79)  
2009 31.10% 65.88% 41.87% -6.30% -1.74% 51.99% 
    (-1.37) (-1.20)  
2010 17.20% 24.91% 30.50% 0.75% -0.22% 29.35% 
    (0.80) (-0.67)  
2011 -1.78% -9.39% 6.09% 0.17% -0.03% 5.84% 
    (0.19) (-0.05)  
2012 13.54% 14.78% 17.38% 0.52% -0.69% 17.30% 
    (0.59) (-1.29)  
2013 27.66% 28.58% 34.38%   1.02%* -0.86% 33.24% 
    (1.72) (-1.31)  
2004-2007 11.35% 10.89% 12.99% 0.78% -0.42% 12.17% 
    (1.51) (-1.61)  
2007-2009 -23.68% -18.00% -15.84% -2.80% -0.03% -13.04% 
    (-0.80) (-0.03)  
2009-2013 16.60% 18.11% 21.46% 0.43%   -0.46%* 21.06% 
    (1.08) (-1.82)  
2004-2013 7.39% 9.23% 11.29% -0.01% -0.37% 11.44% 
    (-0.01) (-1.57)  
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 2.4 Mutual Fund Performance in Aggregate, by Investment Objectives 
This table below reports the average buy-and-hold monthly return for the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices value weighted and equally weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ portfolio without 
distribution and equally weighted portfolio of all mutual funds existing during the years with a self-
declared investment objectives. The mutual funds are broken down by the CRSP investment 
objectives, including growth, growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap. Panel 
A reports average mutual funds’ performance during the whole sample period from 2004 to 2013. 
In order to examine the difference of mutual fund performance for time-varying market conditions, 
Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D presents the average performance of mutual funds for sub-sample 
periods from September 2004 to December 2007, from December 2007 to June 2009, and from 
June 2009 to December 2013. The gross return is estimated based on the monthly returns of the 
holdings of mutual funds before management fees and commissions. The CS performance, the CT 
performance, and the AS performance are calculated as Daniel et al (1997). Specifically, the CS 
performance is measured as the difference between the time t return of the portfolio held at time t-
1 and the time t return of the time t-1 matching benchmark portfolio. The CT performance is 
calculated as the difference between the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of 
stocks held at time t-1 and the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of stocks held 
at time t-13. The AS performance is the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of 
stocks held at time t-13. The time series average of annualized monthly returns and t-statistics are 
presented below (t-statistics in parentheses). 
Objective Gross Return CS Performance CT Performance AS Performance 
Panel A September 2004-December 2013 
All 11.29% -0.01% -0.37% 11.44% 
  (-0.01) (-1.57)  
Growth 10.67% 0.07% -0.28% 10.69% 
  (0.11) (-0.95)  
Growth&Inco
me 
9.89% -0.26% -0.58% 10.71% 
  (-0.60) (-1.61)  
Income 9.86% -0.21% -0.66% 10.72% 
  (-0.27) (-1.43)  
Micro-Cap 12.19% 1.00%     -0.79%** 12.19% 
  (0.85) (-1.98)  
Small-Cap 12.97% -0.15% -0.40% 13.09% 
  (-0.15) (-1.12)  
Mid-Cap 12.48% 0.21% -0.20% 12.12% 
    (0.23) (-0.74)   
Panel B September 2004-December 2007 
All 12.99% 0.78% -0.42% 12.17% 
  (1.51) (-1.61)  
Growth 12.73% 0.03% -0.49% 12.32% 
  (0.96) (-1.39)  
Growth&Inco
me 
11.90% 0.24% -0.38% 11.94% 
  (0.50) (-0.73)  
Income 11.56% -0.01% 0.22% 11.20% 
  (-0.04) (0.36)  
Micro-Cap 13.15%     2.83%**  -0.96%* 10.27% 
  (2.08) (-1.91)  
Small-Cap 13.27% 0.99% -0.24% 11.68% 
  (1.55) (-0.78)  
Mid-Cap 15.09% 1.56%**       -0.55%*** 13.36% 
    (2.01) (-3.03)   
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Table 2.4 continued 
Objective Gross Return CS Performance CT Performance AS Performance 
Panel C December 2007-June 2009 (Recession) 
All -13.04% -2.80% -0.03% -13.04% 
  (-0.80) (-0.03)  
Growth -16.57% -1.79% 0.41% -15.14% 
  (-0.60) (0.33)  
Growth&Income -17.06% -2.45% 0.05% -14.85% 
  (-1.17) (0.04)  
Income -16.33% -1.67% -0.05% -14.78% 
  (-0.45) (-0.03)  
Micro-Cap -17.06%     -9.47%** -0.05% -7.66% 
  (-2.15) (-0.03)  
Small-Cap -13.47% -4.60% -0.96% -7.90% 
  (-0.89) (-0.51)  
Mid-Cap -15.71% -2.75% 0.06% -12.88% 
    (-0.59) (0.05)   
Panel D June 2009-December 2013 
All 21.46% 0.43%   -0.46%* 21.06% 
  (1.08) (-1.82)  
Growth 20.63% 0.37% -0.37% 20.28% 
  (0.68) (-1.06)  
Growth&Income 19.78% 0.18%     -0.95%** 20.49% 
  (0.57) (-2.35)  
Income 19.60% 0.14%       -1.53%*** 21.05% 
  (0.18) (-2.77)  
Micro-Cap 25.77%       3.63%***    -0.92%** 21.73% 
  (3.05) (-2.08)  
Small-Cap 23.88% 0.65% -0.32% 22.75% 
  (1.13) (-1.14)  
Mid-Cap 22.47% 0.29% -0.04% 21.60% 
    (0.46) (-0.14)   
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
Note: recession during the financial crisis is defined by NBER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Table 2.5 Mutual Fund CT Performance for Buying, Sizing, and Selling 
This table below reports the characteristic-timing attributes of all mutual funds The mutual funds 
are broken down by the CRSP investment objectives, including growth, growth & income, income, 
micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap. Panel A reports the average performance of mutual funds 
during the whole sample period from 2004 to 2013. Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D presents the 
average performance of mutual funds for sub-sample periods from September 2004 to December 
2007, from December 2007 to June 2009, and from June 2009 to December 2013. The aggregate 
CT performance (CT) is calculated as the difference between the time t value-weighted return of 
benchmark portfolio of stocks held at time t-1 and the time t value weighted return of benchmark 
portfolio of stocks held at time t-13. The aggregate CT performance is decomposed into three 
components for buying, sizing, and selling, based on the changes in shares held between two 
reports. 𝐶𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑦 measures the monthly characteristic-timing performance at time t when mutual funds 
increase holdings of stocks at time t-1; 𝐶𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  measures the monthly characteristic-timing 
performance at time t when mutual funds remain the same holdings of stocks at time t-1; 𝐶𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙  
measures the monthly characteristic-timing performance at time t when mutual funds decrease 
holdings of stocks at time t-1. The time series average of annualized monthly returns and t-statistics 
are presented below (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 All Funds Growth 
Growth 
&Income 
Income Micro-Cap Small-Cap Mid-Cap 
Panel A September 2004-December 2013 
     CT -0.37% -0.28% -0.58% -0.66%   -0.79%* -0.40% -0.20% 
 (-1.57) (-0.95) (-1.61) (-1.43) (-1.98) (-1.12) (-0.74) 
𝑪𝑻𝒃𝒖𝒚   1.42%*   1.39%* 1.02% 0.86% 1.48% 1.67%  1.69%* 
 (1.65) (1.71) (1.41) (1.54) (1.43) (1.58) (1.77) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 -0.02% 0.06% -0.04% -0.20%   -0.37%* -0.15% 0.09% 
 (-0.24) (0.62) (-0.30) (-0.75) (-1.89) (-1.29) (0.76) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍   -1.78%*     -1.73%**     -1.57%**     -1.48%** -1.95% -1.94%   -1.96%* 
 (-1.86) (-1.89) (-2.14) (-2.30) (-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.84) 
Panel B September 2004-December 2007 
     CT -0.42% -0.49% -0.38% 0.22%   -0.96%* -0.24%   -0.55%*** 
 (-1.61) (-1.39) (-0.73) (0.36) (-1.91) (-0.78) (-3.03) 
𝑪𝑻𝒃𝒖𝒚     2.08%**     2.15%**     1.80%**     1.33%** 1.71% 2.16% 2.36%* 
 (1.97) (2.21) (2.23) (2.07) (1.16) (1.54) (1.84) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.26% -0.30% -0.07% 0.16% 
 (0.43) (0.42) (0.32) (0.93) (-1.27) (-0.76) (1.49) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍     -2.53%**   -2.67%***   -2.23%***     -1.41%** -2.47% -2.35%     -3.02%** 
 (-2.2) (-2.58) (-2.71) (-2.05) (-1.26) (-1.48) (-2.21) 
Panel C December 2007-June 2009 (Recession) 
     CT -0.03% 0.41% 0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.96% 0.06% 
 (-0.03) (0.33) (0.04) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.51) (0.05) 
𝑪𝑻𝒃𝒖𝒚 -2.29% -2.56% -2.29% -1.13% -1.34% -2.10% -2.24% 
 (-0.64) (-0.75) (-0.73) (-0.51) (-0.32) (-0.48) (-0.59) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.01% 0.12% 0.23% 0.12% -0.09% -0.41% 0.08% 
 (0.04) (0.34) (0.38) (0.10) (-0.11) (-0.69) (0.15) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍 2.24% 2.88% 2.18% 0.86% 1.41% 1.48% 2.23% 
 (0.52) (0.72) (0.68) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.47) 
Panel D June 2009-December 2013 
     CT   -0.46%* -0.37%     -0.95%**   -1.53%***     -0.92%** -0.32% -0.04% 
 (-1.82) (-1.06) (-2.35) (-2.77) (-2.08) (-1.14) (-0.14) 
𝑪𝑻𝒃𝒖𝒚     2.28%**    2.29%**     1.66%**     1.23%**     2.34%**     2.68%**     2.63%** 
 (2.39) (2.52) (2.06) (1.77) (2.00) (2.31) (2.38) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 -0.07% 0.05% -0.22%     -0.65%**     -0.52%** -0.12% 0.04% 
 (-0.72) (0.33) (-1.21) (-2.39) (-2.44) (-1.02) (0.28) 
𝑪𝑻𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒍   -2.64%***   -2.65%***   -2.40%***   -2.36%***     -2.74%**     -2.84%**     -2.64%** 
 (-2.62) (-2.63) (-2.98) (-3.40) (-2.11) (-2.39) (-2.41) 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.6 Mutual Fund Characteristic-Timing Performance Persistence 
This table presents the persistence of mutual fund characteristic-timing performance. The aggregate 
CT performance (CT) is calculated as the difference between the time t value-weighted return of 
benchmark portfolio of stocks held at time t-1 and the time t value weighted return of benchmark 
portfolio of stocks held at time t-13. The aggregate CT performance is decomposed into three 
components for buying, and selling, based on the changes in shares held between two reports. 𝐶𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑦 
measures the monthly characteristic-timing performance at time t when mutual funds increase 
holdings of stocks at time t-1while 𝐶𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙  measures the monthly characteristic-timing performance 
at time t when mutual funds decrease holdings of stocks at time t-1. At the end of each quarter, all 
existing mutual funds are divided into five quintiles based on the average monthly aggregate, buying, 
and selling characteristic-timing performance. The characteristic-timing performance for the 
formation quarter and subsequent four quarters are reported. All returns are annualized monthly 
returns. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are computed based on two-way clustered 
standard errors.  
Current 
Quarter 
Performance 
Quintiles 
Quarters 
Q+0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4 
Panel A: Aggregate CT Performance 
q1 (Loser)       -7.64%***     -0.87%*** -0.46%     -0.87%***     -0.75%*** 
 (-16.25) (-2.74) (-1.37) (-3.46) (-3.03) 
q2       -2.80%***     -0.48%**   -0.45%*     -0.64%**   -0.50%** 
 (-12.46)        (-2.33) (-1.90) (-3.04) (-1.96) 
q3     -0.44%** -0.35% -0.34% -0.30% -0.37% 
 (-2.23) (-1.58) (-1.52) (-1.50) (-1.49) 
q4       1.99%*** -0.21%   -0.46%* -0.25% -0.23% 
 (7.13) (-0.75) (-1.95) (-0.94) (-0.98) 
q5 (Winner)       7.26%*** -0.10% -0.41% -0.09% -0.15% 
                                                                                                                                                (12.74) (-0.24) (-1.32) (-0.25) (-0.58) 
q5-q1       16.02%***   0.77%* 0.05%   0.78%*     0.61%** 
 (15.78) (1.72) (0.1) (1.84) (2.31) 
Panel B: Buying CT Performance 
q1 (Loser)       -5.69%*** 1.00% 1.53% 1.36%   1.41%* 
 (-4.69) (0.99) (0.76) (1.44) (1.73) 
q2 -0.94% 1.17%   1.25%* 1.24%   1.27%* 
 (-1.28) (1.52) (1.74) (1.54) (1.73) 
q3     1.23%**   1.32%**   1.29%*   1.44%* 1.16% 
 (1.91) (1.96) (1.79) (1.95) (1.56) 
q4       3.71%***     1.56%**   1.48%*     1.52%**   1.40%* 
 (5.40) (2.10) (1.91) (2.07) (1.71) 
q5 (Winner)       10.00%***     2.39%**   1.85%*     1.94%** 1.67% 
 (9.39) (2.42) (1.85) (2.1) (1.58) 
q5-q1       16.54%***   1.38%*  0.31% 0.58% 0.26% 
 (12.87) (1.68) (0.56) (0.99) (0.48) 
Panel C: Selling CT Performance 
q1 (Loser)       -10.05%***     -2.83%***     -2.28%**     -2.56%**   -2.14%* 
 (-9.40) (-2.69) (-2.13) (-2.57) (-1.83) 
q2       -4.16%***     -1.89%**     -1.80%**     -2.04%**   -1.71%* 
 (-5.65) (-2.37) (-2.12) (-2.45) (-1.85) 
q3     -1.60%**   -1.54%*     -1.67%**     -1.70%**     -1.61%** 
 (-2.27) (-1.94) (-2.08) (-2.04) (-1.93) 
q4 0.84% -1.51%   -1.65%*   -1.58%*   -1.60%* 
 (1.02) (-1.80) (-2.01) (-1.80) (-1.97) 
q5 (Winner)       6.06%*** -1.44%   -1.90%* -1.55%   -1.74%* 
 (4.21) (-1.28) (-1.88) (-1.45) (-1.92) 
q5-q1       17.74%***   1.43%*  0.38% 1.02% 0.42% 
 (13.02) (1.71) (0.68) (1.59) (0.77) 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.7 The Performance of High vs. Low Style Drift 
This table below presents the subsequent gross return, the CS performance, the CT performance, and 
the AS performance following different levels of active style drift. The gross return is estimated based 
on the monthly returns of the holdings of mutual funds before management fees and commissions. The 
CS performance, the CT performance, and the AS performance are calculated as Daniel et al (1997). 
Specifically, the CS performance is measured as the difference between the time t return of the portfolio 
held at time t-1 and the time t return of the time t-1 matching benchmark portfolio. The CT performance 
is calculated as the difference between the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of stocks 
held at time t-1 and the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of stocks held at time t-13. 
The AS performance is the time t value weighted return of benchmark portfolio of stocks held at time 
t-13. At the end of each quarter, all existing mutual funds with self-declared investment objectives 
including growth, growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap are ranked and divided 
into five quintiles based on the level of active style drift. Then average measures of performance 
calculated for each of quintile groups of fund portfolio at the end of each month. The time series average 
of annualized monthly returns and t-statistics are presented below (t-statistics in parentheses). 
Active Style Drift 
Quintiles 
Gross Return     CS Performance CT Performance AS Performance 
Top 20% 10.89% 0.07%     -0.66%** 11.54% 
 - (0.09) (-2.31) - 
2nd 20% 11.66% 0.04% -0.23% 11.64% 
 - (0.07) (-0.88) - 
Mid 20% 11.32% 0.35% -0.16% 11.00% 
 - (0.61) (-0.59) - 
4th 20% 10.84% -0.28% -0.24% 11.22% 
 - (-0.52) (-0.79) - 
Bottom 20% 10.68% -0.07%   -0.57%* 11.15% 
 - (-0.14) (-1.80) - 
Top-Bottom 20% 0.21% 0.13% -0.08% 0.39% 
 - (-0.28) (0.26) - 
Top-Mid 20% -0.43% -0.28%   -0.49%* 0.54% 
 - (0.66) (-1.67) - 
Bottom-Mid 20% -0.64% -0.42%   -0.41%* 0.15% 
 - (-1.31) (-1.95) - 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.8 The Characteristic-Timing Performance of High vs. Low Style drift 
for Buying and Selling 
This table below presents the subsequent the CS performance and the CT performance following 
different levels of active style drift. The CS performance and the CT performance are calculated as 
Daniel et al (1997). Specifically, the CS performance is measured as the difference between the time t 
return of the portfolio held at time t-1 and the time t return of the time t-1 matching benchmark portfolio. 
The CT performance is calculated as the difference between the time t value weighted return of 
benchmark portfolio of stocks held at time t-1 and the time t value weighted return of benchmark 
portfolio of stocks held at time t-13. The aggregate CT performance is decomposed into three 
components for buying, sizing, and selling, based on the changes in shares held between two reports. 
CTBuy measures the monthly characteristic-timing performance at time t when mutual funds increase 
holdings of stocks at time t-1; CTSell measures the monthly characteristic-timing performance at time t 
when mutual funds decrease holdings of stocks at time t-1. At the end of each quarter, all existing 
mutual funds with self-declared investment objectives including growth, growth & income, income, 
micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap are ranked and divided into five quintiles based on the level of active 
style drift. Then average measures of performance calculated for each of quintile groups of fund 
portfolio at the end of each month. The time series average of annualized monthly returns and t-statistics 
are presented below (t-statistics in parentheses). 
Active Style Drift Quintiles Aggregate CT  CTBuy CTSell 
Top 20%     -0.66%** 2.01%   -2.97%* 
 (-2.31) (1.34) (-1.87) 
2nd 20% -0.23%   1.7%*     -2.18%** 
 (-0.88) (1.91) (-2.21) 
Mid 20% -0.16%   1.23%*   -1.31%* 
 (-0.59) (1.72) (-1.72) 
4th 20% -0.237%   1.03%*     -1.22%** 
 (-0.79) (1.88) (-2.01) 
Bottom 20%   -0.57%* 0.48%     -1.00%** 
 (-1.80) (1.11) (-2.05) 
Top-Bottom 20% -0.08% 1.52%   -1.98%* 
  (0.26) (1.39) (-1.72) 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Chapter 3 
Good Buyers and Good Sellers? :  
Fund Manager Trading Motivations and 
Characteristic-Timing Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
Open-end equity mutual funds provide investment expertise, well diversified equity 
positions and a great deal of liquidity to their clients. Retail fund investors can actively 
buy and redeem fund shares without paying a large premium for immediate liquidity 
needs. However, this provision of low cost liquidity can force fund managers to make 
uninformed trading in response to fund flows.1 The literature has theoretically 
indicated that liquidity-motivated trading can have a significant adverse effect on fund 
performance, when liquidity-motivated trading is considered in a rational expectations 
framework.2 In particular, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggest that in a rational 
expectation world with costly information production, equilibrium can be attained 
only when liquidity-motivated traders sustain losses to informed traders to compensate 
the informed traders’ cost of information processing. These theoretical models predict 
that fund managers who are forced to engage in a material volume of liquidity-driven 
                                                          
1 See e.g., Chordia (1996), Edelen (1999), and Nanda et al (2000). 
2 See e.g., Grossman (1976); Hellwig (1980); and Verrcecchia (1982). 
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trading will inevitably experience underperformance, even if these fund managers are 
informed. 
Nevertheless, the majority of empirical studies in the prior literature overlook the fact 
that open-end mutual fund managers often engage in flow-induced trading, and thus 
the conventional analysis used in these studies can yield misleading inferences 
regarding fund manager skill. Indeed, by using a conditional benchmark that control 
for the time varying expected market returns, Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson 
and Warther (1996) show that the “perverse” market timing ability for mutual fund 
managers is removed. Given the positive correlation between aggregate fund flows 
and time varying expected market returns, these authors suggest that fund flow is the 
source of negative market timing performance documented in the literature. Edelen 
(1999) is the first attempt to directly examine the potential impact of fund flows on 
performance at individual fund level and the author finds a negative relationship 
between volume of liquidity-motivated trading and fund risk-adjusted performance, 
which questions the common finding of fund manager underperformance in previous 
studies. After controlling for the adverse effect of fund flows, Edelen (1999) finds 
favourable evidence for fund managers when compared to standard performance tests. 
These studies, however, are subject to some criticisms. First, the number of funds in 
their studies is relatively small (at most 166) when compared to other studies on fund 
performance. Second, these studies employ the return-based regression approach of 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981). This return-based 
approach is subject to the “artificial timing” bias that might arise when the non-linear 
relationship between fund returns and market return can be induced by factors other 
than active marking timing actions (e.g., Jagannathan and Korajczyk, 1986). This 
approach also implicitly assumes that fund managers tend to time the market in a 
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specific way but in practice this is not necessarily true since fund managers can 
implement timing strategies in a more complicated way. Third, these studies examine 
the effect of fund flows on fund performance in aggregate, and thus they are not able 
to condition timing performance on the direction and magnitude of fund flows.  
This chapter attempts to address these criticisms and to advance the investigation of 
the effect of fund flows on fund performance and trading decisions. The number of 
firms in my dataset is more than twenty times the number in the dataset used by Ferson 
and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Warther (1996), and Edelen (1999). There are 3384 
unique actively managed mutual funds in my sample from 2003 to 2009, obtained 
from the CRSP Mutual Fund Holdings Database. I address the model mis-specification 
issue by using the “characteristic-timing” performance (CT) of Daniel et al (1997). 
The CT measure directly looks at whether changes in portfolio weights of size, book-
to-market and momentum factors forecast future returns, which allows researchers to 
avoid the biases in the return-based approach.  
In the first half of this chapter, I consider the potential adverse effect of fund flows on 
fund performance by segmenting fund portfolios based on net realised fund flows. The 
hypothesis that fund flows have an adverse effect on fund performance finds strong 
support and the common conclusion of underperformance changes when consideration 
is given to the liquidity provision of mutual funds. This chapter shows, mutual fund 
managers exhibit significantly negative characteristic-timing performance only when 
they experience significant fund inflows. In a further refinement, mutual funds within 
each flow quintile are sorted and categorised into another 5 quintile groups, on the 
basis of fund manager conviction to make discretionary timing decisions (i.e., active 
style drift). The rationale is that fund managers’ portfolios can diverge from their 
target exposure to the three stock characteristic styles due to unanticipated fund flows. 
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However, fund managers can proportionally expand or reduce current stock holdings 
to maintain their intended risk exposure and control liquidity. They will actively 
engage in style drift towards the three stock characteristics when and only when they 
have strong valuation beliefs about future performance. In this case, one should 
observe a positive relationship between the magnitude of style bets and style-timing 
performance when experiencing fund flow shocks. Strikingly, this chapter reveals that 
when fund managers experience significant inflows, large style bets measured by 
active style drift are associated with an average negative characteristic-timing return 
of -1.76% per year (t-statistic=-2.78). A weaker relationship is also found for fund 
managers who face significant outflows. These results suggest that the inferior timing 
performance is not entirely driven by the detrimental effects of fund flows, but at least 
partly due to negative timing ability of fund managers. Overall, this chapter shows that 
fund managers on average are not able to time risk factors. 
Given the fact that the liquidity providing role of mutual funds can cause fund 
managers to act as uniformed liquidity traders, existing studies that do not account for 
funds’ flow-induced trading activities can yield negatively biased inferences regarding 
fund managers’ ability (e.g., Edelen, 1999; Alexander et al, 2007). For instance, by 
examining a sample of “star” growth oriented mutual funds, Chen et al (2013) show 
that superior performing fund managers exhibit significant timing ability when buying 
stocks but negative performance when selling stocks. However, one major limitation 
of Chen et al (2013)’s study is that the authors give no consideration to liquidity-
induced trades potentially imposing significant indirect trading costs. Thus, the lack 
of positive unconditional selling performance in Chen et al (2013)’s study can merely 
reflect the negative net effect between cost of liquidity provision and characteristic-
timing return of fund managers’ selling decisions. In fact, the adverse effect of fund 
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flows on sell decisions can be particularly severe because when experiencing 
significant outflows, fund managers without enough cash reserves have no other 
options available but to sell their assets immediately at fire sale prices (Coval and 
Stafford, 2007; Zhang, 2010). Thus, whether and how far differential trading abilities 
can be driven by the adverse effect of liquidity-motivated trading remains unclear.  
The second half of this chapter continues the investigation of fund managers’ distinct 
trading skills by relating the performance of mutual fund trades to the motivation for 
making these trades. In order to separate valuation-based trades from liquidity-
motivated trades, this chapter follows the approach of Alexander et al (2007) to 
condition trades on the direction and magnitude of concurrent realised net fund flows. 
The rationale is that fund managers who face severe outflows would buy stocks that 
are perceived to be significantly undervalued and thus a larger proportion of the 
purchases they make in their portfolios are likely to be motivated by valuation beliefs. 
On the other hand, when experiencing significant inflows, fund managers are 
compelled to work off excess cash, and thus a smaller proportion of the purchases in 
their portfolios are likely to be valuation-based ones. Symmetrical intuition applies to 
fund managers’ sales of stocks. If mutual fund managers have characteristic-timing 
ability, valuation-based purchases (sales) should have higher characteristic-timing 
returns than liquidity-based purchases (sales) would have. 
Indeed, my results indicate that the performance of mutual fund trades is significantly 
related to the motivation behind fund managers’ trading decisions. Valuation-
motivated buys are associated with subsequent characteristic-timing returns of 1.90% 
per year (t-statistics=2.19), while liquidity-induced purchases are associated with no 
significant characteristic-timing performance, suggesting that fund managers are not 
able to time stock characteristics from their buying activities when compelled to work 
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off excessive liquidity from investor inflows. On the other hand, valuation-motivated 
sales significantly outperform liquidity-driven sales by an average of 0.69% per year 
at the 5% significance level. However, valuation-motivated sales, which should purely 
represent fund managers’ beliefs about future stock performance, are still associated 
with negative characteristic-timing returns of -1.57% per year (t-statistics=1.94), 
which is consistent with the expectation that fund managers are not able to generate 
characteristic-timing performance from their selling decisions. These results are robust 
when using multivariate regressions to control for other mutual fund characteristics 
that might be related to the performance of fund trades. Further investigation focusing 
on fund trades at the individual stock level shows consistent findings that valuation-
based trades outperform liquidity-driven trades by a statistically and economically 
significant amount.  
Most studies on mutual fund performance view fund managers as a homogeneous class 
of professional investors, and to the best of my knowledge, the literature has not yet 
explored whether different groups of fund managers possess different skills. A group 
of fund managers might specialize in buying decisions and another group of fund 
managers might be expert at selling decisions, or a small subset of fund managers 
might successfully perform both buying and selling tasks. In particular, since selling 
decisions are susceptible to behavioural biases and heuristics, fund managers who can 
manage to make sell decisions in a more disciplined and research-based way may be 
more likely to possess general investment ability. This idea leads this chapter to 
identify skilled fund managers using an approach that is different from the typical 
approach that is based on total fund performance in the literature. Specifically, I 
identify the top 25% of funds who have best historical records of characteristic-timing 
returns when selling stocks as “good sellers”. I then regress characteristic-timing 
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performance from buying activities on a “good sellers” indicator to investigate if these 
fund managers can successfully perform both buying and selling tasks and generate 
superior aggregate performance. Similarly, I select the top 25% of mutual fund 
maangers in terms of their characteristic-timing ability when buying stocks and 
determine if these “good buyers” have significant selling performance. 
This chapter provides strong evidence to show that different groups of fund managers 
possess different skills. After controlling for fund characteristics and time fixed 
effects, “good sellers” outperform other mutual funds when selling stocks, by a 
significant average of 1.35% per year and they also significantly outperform other 
fund managers when purchasing stocks by an average of 0.87% per year. On the other 
hand, “good buyers” exhibit superior characteristic-timing performance when adding 
stocks into their portfolios. There is a statistically and economically significant 
outperformance of 3.75% per year. This is true by construction. Strikingly, this group 
of “good buyers” insignificantly underperforms other funds by an average of 0.13% 
per year when selling stocks. Furthermore, “good sellers” exhibit a statistically and 
economically significant outperformance of 0.31% per year in aggregate 
characteristic-timing performance, while “good buyers” have no significant 
aggregative performance. Overall, these results indicate that there are a small number 
of mutual fund managers who possess both buying and selling abilities. More 
interestingly, my findings are consistent with the notion that sell decisions are 
particularly susceptible to behavioural biases and heuristics, and are not able to be 
made as disciplined as buying decisions would be.  
This chapter is closely related to a number of recent studies looking at the structure of 
open-end mutual funds such as Chordia (1996), Edelen (1999) and Nanda et al (2000). 
These studies argue that one of the major services mutual fund managers offer is to 
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provide liquidity to fund investors, but this provision of liquidity imposes significant 
indirect trading costs on mutual funds, as reflected in the negative relationship between 
fund performance and investors flows. While Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson 
and Warther (1996) suggest that negative market timing is attributable to fund flows, 
Edelen (1999) provides direct evidence to show that the common finding of negative 
performance at open-end mutual funds is driven by the costs of liquidity-induced 
trading. This chapter complements their findings with direct evidence that liquidity 
trades have an adverse effect on fund performance by looking at characteristic-timing 
returns using the holdings of a large sample of mutual funds.  
Edelen (1999) measures the adverse effect of fund flows in aggregate and suggest that 
fund managers exhibit negative timing ability when they have to deal with flows. My 
results make an incremental contribution over and above Edelen (1999)’s findings by 
showing that the adverse effect of fund flows on timing performance arises mainly in 
the case of significant fund inflows. Mutual fund managers in my sample exhibit 
negative timing performance only when experiencing significant fund inflows. In 
particular, large style bets made by fund managers who have significant inflows are 
associated with significant underperformance. These results suggest that fund 
managers are not able to make use of the financial flexibility provided by fund inflows, 
but instead, excessive cash holdings act as a significant drag on fund performance, 
which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis that managers tend to use their 
free cash flows to invest in negative NPV projects, which is well documented in 
corporate finance literature.3 
                                                          
3 See e.g., Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), and others. 
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By considering the detrimental effect of flow-induced trading on performance, this 
chapter provides strong evidence that directly supports the conclusion that fund 
managers have distinct trading skills in terms of their characteristic-timing ability. 
First, although the academic literature recognises that liquidity-induced trades are 
costly, there are few empirical studies that directly investigate the costs of liquidity 
provision on actual fund trades. One notable exception is Alexander et al (2007) who 
place emphasis on fund managers’ stock picking ability and show that valuation-
motivated trades outperform liquidity-driven trades. This chapter contributes to the 
literature by showing that trade motivation also matters for characteristic-timing 
ability, even after controlling for fund characteristics and time fixed effects. Second, 
my results show that fund managers appear to exhibit significantly negative 
characteristic-timing performance from their selling decisions, even when most of 
these sales are motivated by fund managers’ valuation beliefs. Third, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by showing that a small subset of fund managers who 
specialise in making sell decisions (good sellers) also possess buying skill and exhibit 
superior aggregate performance. However, those who have the best record of buying 
performance (good buyers) exhibit negative selling ability. My results suggest that the 
performance deriving from fund managers’ selling activities is a more powerful 
indicator of fund manager skills. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes recent 
studies investigating mutual fund flows and the relationship between mutual fund 
flows and fund manager timing ability. Section 3.3 describes the related methodology 
used in the paper. Section 3.4 presents the data source and sample construction. 
Section 3.5 shows the results and discusses the findings and Section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
This section first reviews recent empirical studies that investigate the relationship 
between fund performance and investors flows. I then briefly review selected 
theoretical studies on rational expectation models for trading and the implication of 
these models for fund investors’ behaviours and fund performance. Lastly, I review 
empirical studies that investigate the impact of fund flows on fund performance. 
The mutual fund industry is a natural laboratory to study the behaviours of individual 
investors who trade fund shares and the behaviour of mutual fund managers who 
compete with their peer managers for investor inflows. The majority of previous 
studies in the literature place emphasis on understanding the relationship between 
individual investors’ fund flows and fund characteristics. In particular, one of the most 
salient findings is the response of fund investors to mutual fund performance. A 
number of early papers demonstrate a general positive linear relationship between 
fund flows and performance of individual funds (e.g., Spitz, 1970; Smith, 1978). Patel, 
Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1991) report a positive linear relationship between a 
funds’ annual dollar growth and both its size and ranked performance using raw 
returns. Kane, Santini, and Aber (1991) detect a similar positive relationship between 
quarterly percentage growth and fund performance measured by excess returns, 
Sharpe ratios and Jensen’s alphas.  
Later studies advance the investigation and call attention to a potential non-linear 
relationship between past fund performance and investor flows. For example, Ippolito 
(1992) finds that the effect of past performance on fund growth is greater for funds 
that generate positive excess returns using the market model, compared to those that 
have negative abnormal returns. The author argues that allocating monies to past 
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winner funds is rational investor behaviour in financial markets with acute information 
asymmetry. By using piecewise linear regression, Sirri and Tufano (1998) directly 
examine differential investor responses to past fund performance relative to other 
funds in the same market segment, and confirm that fund flows are sensitive to 
historical performance but the sensitivity is non-linear: investors appear to rush into 
funds with high prior performance, but fail to flee from funds that have performed 
poorly. 
This convex performance-flow relationship can potentially create fund manager 
incentives to take action to maximise their own benefits at the expense of fund 
investors. For example, Chevalier and Elison (1997) document the fact that superior 
performance attracts more cash flow into funds, while poor returns do not lead to a 
symmetrically adverse consequence. These authors take this non-linear performance-
flow relationship further, to explain the tendency of fund managers to alter the 
riskiness of their portfolios. 
Given this performance-flow relationship, it is entirely natural to ask whether fund 
investors have ability to identify superior performing funds. There is a line of research 
on the relationship between fund flows and subsequent fund performance. Despite the 
poor aggregate returns to the mutual fund industry, Gruber (1996) argues that new 
money flowing into the industry must be able to outperform existing assets, and the 
author finds that fund investors exhibit fund-selection skill and investors’ money is 
“smart” enough to flow into those funds that have a better chance of superior 
subsequent performance. This “smart money” effect also finds strong support from 
Zheng (1999), who examines a large sample of 1826 funds from 1970 to 1993. Zheng 
(1999) finds that fund managers who receive higher fund inflows perform significantly 
better than those who experience outflows. Sapp and Tiwari (2004) demonstrate the 
87 
 
“smart money” effect is explained by stock return momentum over the short term. 
Opposite to the “smart money” effect, Frazzini and Lamont (2006) use mutual fund 
flows as a measure of individual investor sentiment and show that high sentiment 
predicts low future performance at the individual stock level. These authors report that 
investors tend to direct their money to mutual funds which invest in stocks that do 
poorly over the subsequent few years, and they argue that investor flows are “dumb 
money” and retail investors significantly reduce their wealth in the long run by actively 
reallocating their money across mutual funds. This “dumb money” effect dominates 
at longer horizons. 
Another large body of recent studies pays attention to the implications of fund flows 
for asset pricing. For instance, Coval and Stafford (2007) show that mutual fund 
managers tend to expand their existing holdings when experiencing capital inflows but 
sell down their position to fulfil redemption requests, and they find that such flow-
driven trading can drive individual stock prices temporarily away from fundamental 
value. Lou (2012) proposes a flow-based mechanism to explain well-known empirical 
patterns of return predictability, including short term fund performance persistence, 
the “smart money” effect, and stock price momentum. Persistent investor inflows 
drive past winning funds to collectively invest new capital into their existing holdings 
(particularly past winning stocks), while outflows force past losing funds to 
collectively liquidate their positions (particularly past losing stocks). In the end, 
predictable price pressure from fund flows leads past winning stocks to keep 
outperforming past losing stocks, and thus past winning funds to continue to 
outperform past losing funds. Similar to other work investigating stock price pressure 
from investor flows, these studies express the concern that flow-induced trading can 
adversely affect fund performance.  
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Indeed, the literature has theoretically shown that liquidity-motivated trading can have 
a significant adverse effect on fund performance, when liquidity-motivated trading is 
considered in a rational expectation framework.4 In particular, Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) construct a model in which the market is not perfect: prices do not perfectly 
reflect the underlying information, so that those who invest resources in collecting 
information can receive compensation. In other words, the authors suggested that in a 
rational expectation world with costly information acquisition, equilibrium can be 
attained only when liquidity-motivated traders sustain losses to informed traders to 
compensate the informed traders’ cost of information processing. Thus, fund managers 
who are forced to engage in a material volume of liquidity-driven trading will 
inevitably experience underperformance, even if these fund managers are informed. 
A number of empirical studies question the common findings of mutual fund 
underperformance in the literature. For example, Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
demonstrate that by using a conditional benchmark that controls for time-varying 
expected market returns, “perverse” market timing is removed. Ferson and Warther 
(1996) further this and document a positive correlation between aggregate fund flows 
and lagged instruments for time-varying expected market returns, indicating that 
negative market timing is attributable to fund flows. However, none of these studies 
directly examines the relationship between market-timing performance and fund 
flows. 
Edelen (1999) argues that one reason early studies fail to detect the market timing 
ability of fund managers is that  their analysis gives no consideration to the fact that 
fund managers provide investors with a great deal of virtually free liquidity that can 
                                                          
4 See e.g., Grossman (1976); Hellwig (1980); and Verrcecchia (1982). 
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impose substantial indirect costs on fund performance. By examining 166 open-end 
mutual funds from 1985 to 1990, Edelen (1999) show that after controlling for the 
adverse effect of flow-induced trading, mutual fund managers do add value to 
portfolios by about one and one-half percent per year. More interestingly, based on 
the positive relationship between aggregate fund flows and market returns found by 
Warther (1995) and Edelen and Warner (1998), Edelen (1999) argues that such a 
positive correlation between fund flows and market returns can give rise to the 
negative market timing documented in the literature. To investigate the link between 
market timing performance and the volume of fund flows, Edelen (1999) adds an 
additional market-timing regressor that interacts with fund flows in the traditional 
market timing models of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton 
(1981), and finds that the interactive regressor explains all of the negative market 
timing relationship, indicating that fund managers exhibit negative market timing 
ability when and only when they experience fund flows. 
Based on the insight that liquidity-induced trades have an adverse effect on fund 
performance, a recent work by Alexander et al (2007) relate the performance of mutual 
fund trades to their motivation. These authors show strong evidence that valuation-
motivated trades have significantly higher benchmark-adjusted returns then liquidity-
motivated trades More importantly, Alexander et al (2007) provide a more powerful 
test of mutual fund managers’ ability to value stocks by controlling for the motivation 
of their trades. They argue that if trading motivation matters in terms of subsequent 
performance, a more accurate indicator of mutual fund managers’ abilities should be 
based on the trades that are made based on their beliefs about future stock 
performance, not for other reasons. 
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To summarise, it is now widely accepted that retail fund investors view historical fund 
performance as an important signal of fund manager investment skills, and thus tend 
to rush into funds with good past performance and fail to flee from funds with poor 
past performance. There is a large body of studies in the literature that seeks to 
understand this convex performance-flow relationship and its implication for fund 
manager behaviour and asset pricing. Recent papers point out that mutual fund 
managers provide a great deal of liquidity to fund investors, and researchers argue that 
this provision of liquidity can impose significant indirect trading costs on fund 
managers. This calls attention to the common finding of fund manager 
underperformance documented in the literature, because the conventional analysis 
ignores the adverse effect of liquidity-induced trades and therefore might lead to an 
incorrect inference about fund manager skills. However, little attention to date has 
been paid to examining the direct effect of fund flows on fund trade performance.  
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Measuring Characteristic-Timing Performance 
The “characteristic timing” measure of Daniel et al (1997) allows researchers to 
capture fund performance driven by fund managers’ ability to time the three different 
investment styles of size, book-to-market, and momentum. Unlike factor-based 
methods, this characteristic measure of timing performance directly looks at whether 
changes in the relative portfolio weights of these styles can forecast future returns. The 
CT for month t measure is defined as:  
                                       𝐶𝑇𝑡 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−13?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−13)
𝑁
𝑗=1
                            (1) 
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where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−1 is the portfolio weight of stock j at the end of month t-1, ?̃?𝑗,𝑡−13 is the 
portfolio weight of stock j at the end of month t-13, ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−1
 is the month t return of the 
characteristic-based passive benchmark portfolio that is matched to individual stock j 
according its size, book to market and momentum during the month t-1, ?̃?𝑡
𝑏𝑗,𝑡−13
 is the 
month t return of the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio that is matched to stock 
j during month t-13. To illustrate the rationale behind the CT measure, suppose that a 
fund increases its weight in high book-to-market stocks at the beginning of the month 
in which the book-to-market effect is unusually strong, then this fund would have 
positive CT performance for that month. A significant positive time series average of 
the CT measure of a fund indicates superior characteristic-timing ability by this fund.  
This characteristic-based approach requires the construction of passive benchmark 
portfolios that are matched to individual stocks in the mutual fund portfolios with the 
dimensions of market value of equity (size), book-to-market ratio (btm), and 
momentum effect (mom). This paper constructs passive benchmark portfolios 
according to the procedure detailed in Daniel et al (1997). Briefly, at the end of June 
each year, the common stocks listed from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are 
categorized into three quintile groups based on individual stock size, book to market 
ratio and prior year return and consequently 5 × 5 × 5 sorted characteristic-based 
portfolios are formed. The monthly returns of these benchmark portfolios are 
calculated as the monthly value weighted returns of the stocks in the 125 portfolios. 
The detailed procedure is provided in Daniel et al (1997). 
3.3.2 Measuring Buying and Selling Performance 
Chen et al (2013) point out that the traditional CT measure, which is simply calculated 
by aggregating the characteristic timing performance of all holdings, would mask the 
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distinct characteristic timing ability of buying and selling. This chapter follows Chen 
et al (2013) in decomposing the aggregate CT performance into different trading 
components. Specifically, for each fund, I measure the changes in number of shares 
held in each stock from the end of quarter t-1 to the end of quarter t for each quarter 
in the sample period. Increases in the number of shares are treated as buys and 
aggregated to form the buy portfolio, and decreases are aggregated to form the sell 
portfolio, for each fund each quarter. This chapter then calculates the characteristic-
timing performance for each trading portfolio. 
3.3.3 Estimating Fund Flows 
Following prior literature (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison 1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998), 
net investor flow of individual fund share class i at time t is estimated as: 
                        𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
                     (2) 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total net assets for individual fund share class i at time t; 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is 
the gross return before expense ratio for individual fund share class i at time t; 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
is the increase in total net assets for individual fund share class i at time t due to fund 
mergers. Since the CRSP Mutual Fund Database does not provides the exact date on 
which fund mergers occur, this paper follows Lou (2012) and uses the last net asset 
value (NAV) report date as the initial estimate of the merger date and in order to avoid 
the obvious mismatches generated by this initial estimate, this paper matches a target 
individual share class to its acquirer from one month before its last NAV report date 
to five months later, a total matching period of 7 months. Then the month in which the 
acquirer has the smallest absolute percentage flow, after subtracting the merger, is 
assigned as the merge event month. After adjusting for mutual fund mergers, monthly 
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estimated net flows for all share classes belonging to their common fund are summed 
to obtain the total fund level monthly estimated flow. Monthly fund flows during the 
corresponding quarter are then aggregated into the quarter flow. This paper assumes 
that investor inflows and outflows take place at the end of each quarter, and investors 
reinvest their dividends and capital appreciation distributions in the same fund. 
3.3.4 Measuring Trade Motivation 
To measure trade motivation, this paper follows Alexander et al (2007) and divides 
fund manager trading activities into different types and track the characteristic-timing 
performance of trades, based on the various motivations driving them. Specifically, 
for each fund i, trade in stock j made by the fund manager is estimated as the change 
in the number of shares held in stock j between two consecutive reports from time t-1 
and time t in the sample period and trade dollar volume for each stock j is calculated 
by multiplying each change by the appropriate stock price which is the average daily 
closing stock price between the two consecutive report dates when the trade is assumed 
to occur. Trades associated with increased number of shares are treated as buys and 
then summed to obtain total purchase volume 𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡for fund i at time t and trades 
associated with decreased number of shares are aggregated to form the total sell 
volume 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 for fund i at time t. Buy flow score (𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡) and sell flow score (𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 
that are used as proxies for trade motivation are defined respectively as: 
                                                        𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
                                         (3) 
                                                         𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
                                        (4) 
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where 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated net investor flow into/out of fund i during quarter t, 
and 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is fund i total net assets under management at the end of quarter t-1. This 
paper follows Alexander et al (2007) in dividing the time series of portfolios of each 
fund’s holdings that existed during the sample period into five quintiles. The 𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 
metric assigns buy portfolios of funds with high total buy dollar volume and high 
investor outflows to the top quintile, BF1, and buy portfolios with low total buy dollar 
volume and high investor inflow to the bottom quintile, BF5. This ranking procedure, 
according to Alexander et al (2007), deals appropriately with possible serial and cross-
sectional trading patterns and correlations that might be present in the holdings data 
and therefore could bias results in unexpected ways. 
BF1 refers to  cases where  despite a need to raise cash to meet investors outflows, 
mutual funds will only purchase stocks that are strongly believed to be undervalued, 
which infers that a large proportion of the buys in these buy portfolios are likely to be 
motivated by valuation considerations. On the other hand, BF5 refers to those cases 
where mutual fund managers might be forced to invest the excess cash from large 
investor inflows into stocks that are not perceived to be undervalued, and therefore a 
small proportion of buys in these buy portfolios are likely to be valuation motivated. 
Similarly, 𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑡 assigns sell portfolios with high total sell dollar volume with high 
investor inflows when a large proportion of sells in these sell portfolios are likely to 
be driven by valuation motivation to the top quintile, SF1, and sell portfolios with low 
total sell dollar volume with high investor outflows when a small proportion of sells 
in these sell portfolios are likely to be driven by valuation motivation to the bottom 
quintile, SF5 
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For illustration purposes, consider an example of the two scenario used by Alexander 
et al (2007) where a fund holds total net assets of $100 million at the beginning of two 
quarterly report dates. During the quarter of the first report, the fund undergoes net 
outflows of $10 million and purchase $5 million worth of stocks, while during the 
quarter of the second report, this fund experiences inflows of $15 million and buys 
$10 million worth of stocks. The 𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 metric assigns the higher score of 0.15 = [5 - (-
10)] / 100 to buy portfolios for the first report that are more likely to have a larger 
proportion of valuation-motivated trades, while it assigns a lower score of -0.05 = (10 
- 15) / 100 for the second report which has a larger proportions of liquidity-motivated 
trades. Symmetrical intuition also applies to the 𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑡 metric. 
3.3.5 Measuring Active Style Drift 
The characteristic-timing measure is designed to see whether, and by how much 
mutual fund managers are able to generate additional performance by increasing (or 
decreasing) portfolio weights on stock characteristics along the dimensions of size, 
book to market, and momentum when trading strategies focused on these stock 
characteristics are most profitable (or unprofitable). However, the characteristic-
timing measure is not able to reflect how and to what extent mutual fund managers 
adjust their portfolio weights across these three different characteristics. In particular, 
characteristic-timing performance can be generated from passively holding the same 
stocks in portfolios over time because of fund managers’ preference for certain overall 
stock characteristics, or from active engagement in chasing stock characteristics when 
they become profitable, or even from aggressive style drift from one equity style 
category to another one. 
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In order to investigate the relationship between style drift and characteristic-timing 
performance, this chapter employs the non-parametric measure developed by 
Wermers (2012) which allows us to identify the style characteristics of each stock held 
by mutual funds over time and to track the difference in overall stock style, in each of 
the three dimensions of size, book-to-market and momentum, in mutual fund portfolio 
holdings between two periods. 
The total style drift of a managed portfolio in style dimension l (where l = size, book-
to-market, or momentum) at portfolio reporting date is measured as: 
                                            𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑞?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙 )
𝑁
𝑗=1
                             (5) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑞 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter q and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1 is the 
portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter q-1, while ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙  equals the non-
parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension l at the end of quarter q 
and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙  equals the non-parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension 
l at the end of quarter q-1.  
The total style drift can be further decomposed into active style drift that results from 
active changes in the portfolio through trades of stocks, and passive style drift that 
results from passively holding stocks with changing holding weights and stock 
characteristics: 
                                                      TSD𝑞
𝑙 = 𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 + 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙                                                   (6) 
where 𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  measures the change in style dimension l assuming that the manager 
passively hold the portfolio during quarter q-1 to quarter q while 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  measures the 
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change in style dimension l through buys and sales of stocks during quarter q-1 to 
quarter q. 
𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  or passive style drift in dimension l during quarter q-1 to quarter q is measured 
as: 
                                             𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′ ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
′ ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙 )
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                   (7) 
where ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′  denotes the portfolio weight of stock j of quarter q when a manager buys 
and holds the entire portfolio during quarter q-1 to quarter q, while ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙  equals the non-
parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension l at the end of quarter q 
and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞−1
𝑙  equals the non-parametric style characteristic of stock j in style dimension 
l at the end of quarter q-1.  
The remainder of total style drift is captured by 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙  or the active style drift: 
                                                 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑙 = ∑(?̃?𝑗,𝑞?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 − ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′ ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙 )
𝑁
𝑗=1
                                     (8) 
Where ?̃?𝑗,𝑞 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter q while ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
′  denotes 
the portfolio weight of stock j at the end of quarter q when a manager buys and holds 
the entire portfolio during quarter q-1 to quarter q and ?̃?𝑗,𝑞
𝑙  equals the non-parametric 
style characteristic of stock j in style dimension l at the end of quarter q.  
Total, passive and active style drifts are then aggregated across all three dimensions 
of size, book-to-market and momentum effects for a fund during the period between 
quarter q-1 to quarter q as: 
                                   𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞 = |𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒| + |𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑏𝑡𝑚| + |𝑇𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑚𝑜𝑚|                             (9) 
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                                   𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞 = |𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒| + |𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑏𝑡𝑚| + |𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑚𝑜𝑚|                          (10) 
                                 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞  = |𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒| + |𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑏𝑡𝑚| + |𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑞
𝑚𝑜𝑚|                          (11) 
A non-zero value of active style drift would primarily occur due to active changes in 
portfolio weights of stocks through buys and sells. For example, in the style dimension 
of book-to-market, a fund manager who believes that the book-to-market effect would 
be unusually strong for the following month could allocate a higher portfolio weight 
to high book-to-market stocks by purchasing high book-to-market stocks or selling 
low book-to-market stocks in his portfolios. 
3.4 Data and Sample 
My sample uses several data sets. I begin with the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. The CRSP mutual fund 
database provides information on monthly fund net returns (RET), monthly total net 
assets (TNA), monthly net assets value (NAV), different types of fee including annual 
expense ratio and management fee, turnover ratio, investment objectives, first offer 
date and other fund characteristics for each share class of every U.S. open-end mutual 
fund. The CRSP Mutual Fund Database also provides information on reported 
portfolio holdings of mutual funds since September 2003, including the identification 
of portfolios (crsp_portno), holdings report date (report_dt), the effectiveness date of 
the report (eff_dt), stocks identification code (permno), number of shares held in the 
portfolio (nbr_shares), and market value of the stocks held (market_val). Holdings 
data are collected both from reports filed with the SEC and from voluntary reports 
generated by the mutual funds themselves. The CRSP mutual fund 
characteristic/returns dataset for each share class of every common mutual fund is 
linked to the holdings dataset of mutual fund portfolios by using the map (portnomap) 
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provided by the CRSP mutual fund database. The map dataset contains information 
on the identification of individual share classes (crsp_fundno) and their common funds 
(crsp_portno) over time, as well as other share class characteristics including delist 
date, delist type, and the identification of the acquirer share classes and the latest 
available date for monthly net assets value for the target share classes. 
Following the literature on mutual fund performance, the focus of my analysis is on 
the actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds for which the holdings data 
are most complete and reliable and therefore, this paper eliminates balanced, bond, 
money market, international, sector, index, ETF, exchange target, and target date 
funds as well as those funds not invested primarily in equity securities. This screening 
procedure generates a sample of 109054 fund-report observations with a total of 3384 
unique U.S. domestic equity mutual fund samples from September 2003 to December 
2013. Summary statistics relating to my sample of funds are presented in Table 3.1. 
I use the CRSP/Compustat stock-level database, which provides data on stock 
identification, stock return, delisting return, share price, trading volume, cumulative 
price adjustment factors, cumulative shares adjustment factors, and shares outstanding 
as well as other stock characteristics. To estimate stock equity value using the 
approach of Daniel and Titman (1997), I also obtain shareholders’ equity (SEQ), 
deferred taxes (TXDB), investment tax credit (ITCB), and preferred stock (PREF). 
3.5 Empirical Findings 
3.5.1 Fund Behaviours in Response to Investor Flows 
The structure of open-end mutual funds forces fund managers to trade in response to 
fund flows. First, an important role of open-end mutual funds is to provide liquidity to 
investors. Fund managers are required by law to pay a proportional share of the net 
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asset value of the fund to each investor who chooses to redeem their investment. 
Second, since fund managers’ compensation depends on their ability to track and beat 
their benchmark portfolios (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), 
they have strong incentives to trade to counteract flow shocks so that they can maintain 
the efficient fraction of equity investment in their portfolios.  
To investigate the trading behaviours of mutual funds in response to investor flows, 
this chapter divides mutual funds into quintiles according to their net realised flows. 
Table 3.2 summarises mutual fund trading and style drift behaviours in response to 
investor flows. Panel A reports average past fund performance, cash holdings and 
numbers of stocks in portfolios by flow quintiles. Panel B and Panel C present fund 
trading behaviours in response to realised fund flows. In particular, Panel B takes the 
fraction of a given fund’s position that is initiated, expanded, reduced, or eliminated 
during the given quarter and average these value across mutual funds within each flow 
quintile. Panel C reports the absolute changes in fund portfolio’s style quintile number 
along the three stock characteristics of size, book-to-market, and momentum through 
buying and selling (i.e., active style drift). 
A variety of interesting patterns emerge from Panel A in Table 3.2. First, mutual funds 
experience a wide range of quarterly flows. Funds in the top quintile experience an 
average outflow of -9.26% while funds in the bottom quintile experience inflows of 
14.7%. Second, funds that experience heavy outflows had only average past returns of 
5.5% while those that attract heavy inflows exhibited past returns of 12.17%. This is 
consistent with the finding in the literature, namely that in general well performing 
mutual funds are rewarded by investor inflows while poorly performing mutual funds 
are penalised to experience investor redemptions. Third, mutual funds in the bottom 
quintile (heavy inflows) hold 50% more cash (4.05% vs. 2.61%) than those in the top 
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quintile (heavy outflows), which is consistent with the notion that these funds will 
have more flexibility in their trading. Surprisingly, the final column in Panel A 
indicates that mutual funds that experience significant flows appear to be less 
diversified than funds with more moderate flows in terms of number of stocks held in 
their portfolios. In particular, mutual funds experiencing heavy inflows (outflows) 
hold a total of 104.40 (110.88) stocks in their portfolios while mutual funds 
experiencing median flows hold a total of 120.12 stocks. 
Panel B presents fundamental evidence on the response of fund managers to fund 
flows. Consistent with the expectation that mutual funds experiencing significant 
outflows have no choice but have to sell some of their holdings to meet redemption 
requirements, mutual funds in the top quintile (heavy outflow) are far more likely to 
reduce or eliminate current positions than funds experiencing inflows. On average, 
these funds reduce or eliminate 52% of their existing positions, whereas mutual funds 
in the bottom quintile only reduce or eliminate 20% of its existing positions. Perhaps, 
more interestingly, mutual funds experiencing inflows are more likely than other funds 
to expand their existing positions. For instance, funds in the bottom quintile increase 
44% of their existing holdings which is more than triple the rate for funds that are not 
experiencing inflows. It is also surprising that mutual funds that experience extreme 
investor flows are more likely to initiate new positions and eliminate existing 
positions, compared to funds with moderate flows. 
Panel C shows that on average, mutual funds experiencing extreme outflows (inflows) 
actively drift a total of 0.25 (0.21) quintile units in the three stock characteristics of 
their portfolios through trading. Specifically, managers in the top quintile who 
experience heavy outflows move 0.06 quintile units in their size characteristic, 0.09 in 
book-to-market, and 0.10 in momentum, while managers in the bottom quintile who 
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experience heavy inflows move 0.05 quintile units in their size characteristic, 0.07 in 
book-to-market, and 0.09 in momentum. These results indicates that mutual fund 
managers are far more likely to engage into active style drift across all three stock 
characteristics when they are experiencing extreme investor flows. 
Overall, my results show that fund managers who experience significant outflows 
appear to be much more likely to reduce or eliminate their existing holdings, whereas 
those who receive substantial fund inflows are far more likely to expand their existing 
holdings. Moreover, both groups of fund managers engage in large active style drifts. 
These findings suggest that fund flows can be highly influential in  shaping fund 
managers’ trading decisions and that an adjustment in the fund performance measure 
to account for the potentially adverse effect of fund flows is important to achieve an 
unbiased, or at least less biased assessment of fund manager skills. 
3.5.2 Do Investor Flows Act as Drag of Characteristic-Timing Performance? 
Given the abnormal trading behaviours in response to fund flows observed in Table 
3.2, one might naturally ask whether, and to what extent, fund flows affect fund 
performance. In the context of timing performance, consider a mutual fund manager 
who initially holds some target efficient portfolio in terms of level of risk exposure 
toward the three stock characteristics. Unanticipated fund flows would then force this 
fund manager make trades that could his fund portfolio to shift away from his initial 
efficient target portfolio. When experiencing fund outflows, fund managers often have 
to sell some of their existing holdings to fulfil investor redemption requirements. In 
extreme cases, they can also be forced to engage in fire sales (Coval and Stafford, 
2007). These liquidity-driven sales can move fund portfolios away from fund 
managers’ intended exposure to style factors because fund managers might need to 
sell down their liquid positions to avoid a high liquidity premium. On the other hand, 
103 
 
despite the need to maintain an efficient fraction of equity investment in their 
portfolios, fund managers who have fund inflows have more flexibility in their trading: 
they can accumulate cash for cash redemption needs; they can postpone their equity 
investment decisions; and they can immediately open new positions or expand their 
current holdings. If fund managers can take advantage of the financial flexibility 
provided by investor flows, one should observe better, at least not worse performance 
by those fund managers with fund inflows compared with those who experience 
significant outflows. 
In contrast with expectations, Table 3.3 shows that mutual fund managers who 
experience heavy investor inflows (NF5) exhibit statistically and economically 
significant characteristic-timing returns of -0.85% per year (t-statistic=-2.86), while 
those who have heavy investor outflows exhibit no characteristic-timing performance. 
The difference in characteristic-timing performance between NF1 and NF5 is 
significantly positive 0.78% per year (t-statistic=2.80) with this difference driven by 
the underperformance of mutual funds that experiencing heavy inflows. Moreover, no 
mutual fund investment objective subgroups exhibits any characteristic-timing 
performance when experiencing heavy outflows while all subgroups exhibit negative 
characteristic-timing performance when facing heavy inflows. In particular, income 
mutual funds appear to have the worst performance when they face extreme investor 
inflows.  
In a further refinement, mutual fund portfolios within each flow quintile are sorted and 
categorised into another 5 quintile groups based on their active style drift at the end of 
each quarter. SD1 refers to portfolios which engage in large active style drift and SD5 
refers to the portfolios which engage in small style drift. The rationale is that when 
facing investor flows, fund managers could simply proportionally adjust current 
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holdings to minimise the impact of inflow shock to portfolio risk exposure and control 
liquidity. They will engage in active style drift along the three stock characteristics by 
buying (selling) stocks, when and only when they strongly believe that these stocks 
will have good (poor) future characteristic-timing performance. In other words, 
managers who strongly believe that certain stock characteristics would have superior 
future performance will make active style changes moving their portfolio equity style 
factors from one category to another over the quarter. But managers who need to 
control for liquidity will make smaller adjustments across the three characteristics. If 
this is the case, one should observe that the portfolios with high level of active style 
drift when experiencing heavy unanticipated flows have better subsequent 
characteristic-timing performance. However, if these style bets are motivated by 
reasons other than valuation beliefs, a negative relationship should be observed.  
Table 3.4 reports aggregate characteristic-timing performance results for mutual fund 
portfolios categorized by active style drift and concurrent investor flows. The first 
three rows and three columns of each panel report results from two way sorting on net 
investor flows and active style drift. The fourth row and fourth column present results 
from one-way sorting only on active style drift and net investor flows, respectively. 
The fifth row and fifth column report the difference between the extreme investor flow 
and active style drift quintiles. 
Consider now the upper left-hand corner of Panel A where we find NF1/SD1 (i.e., 
large active style drift concurrent with heavy outflows), the fund portfolios that should 
reflect managers’ strong beliefs about the future performance of certain stock 
characteristics. Inconsistent with the expectation, NF1/SD1 exhibits a negative but 
marginally significant -0.92% characteristic-timing return per year. Similarly, as we 
move down to NF5/SD1 (i.e., large active style drift concurrent with heavy inflows), 
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reflecting the large style bets of mutual fund managers when they have financial 
flexibility. These portfolios are associated with economically and statistically 
significant characteristic-timing returns of -1.76% per year (t-statistics=-2.78). These 
results therefore provide evidence for the competing hypothesis that active timing 
decisions might be motivated by reasons other than valuation beliefs, such as 
overconfidence. 
Small style drifts could be simply motivated by the need to control liquidity. When 
fund managers face heavy outflows, they could proportionally reduce their existing 
holdings to raise cash. These sales are more likely to be driven by liquidity needs, and 
thus are less likely to reflect managers’ valuation beliefs. Consistent with my 
expectation, NF1/SD5 (i.e., small active style drift concurrent with heavy outflows) 
shows a statistically and economically insignificant -0.02% characteristic-timing 
return per year. Similarly, fund managers could proportionally expand their holdings 
when experiencing significant inflows. NF5/SD5 (i.e., small active style drift 
concurrent with heavy inflows) exhibits a negative statistically significant -0.90% 
characteristic-timing return per year. I interpret these results as consistent with no 
significant characteristic-timing ability. 
To summarise, this chapter shows that fund flows have an adverse effect on fund 
characteristic-timing performance. By conditioning portfolios on the direction and 
magnitude of fund flows, mutual fund managers appear to exhibit significantly 
negative characteristic-timing performance only when they experience significant 
fund inflows. Inconsistent with Simutin (2014) who argue that financial flexibility 
allows fund managers to satisfy redemption requests and capture investment 
opportunities quickly, my results suggest that fund managers seem to be not able to 
take advantages of the financial flexibility provided by fund inflows. Instead, 
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excessive cash holdings from fund inflows impose a significant drag on characteristic-
timing performance. This argument is confirmed by the results of further investigation 
conditioning portfolios based on the magnitude of active style drifts as a proxy for 
fund manager conviction. Large style bets that should reflect the strong valuation 
beliefs when managers have excess cash from investor flows are associated with 
significantly negative characteristic-timing returns. Overall, this chapter extends the 
insight of Edelen (1999) and provides evidence that the “perverse” timing ability is 
not entirely driven by the adverse effect of fund flows, but at least partly due to fund 
managers’ negative timing ability. Furthermore, these surprising results are consistent 
with the free cash flows hypothesis that is well documented in the corporate finance 
literature. Free cash flow hypothesis suggests that firms’ managers tend to use free 
cash flows to finance low-return projects (e.g., Jensen, 1986). 
3.5.3 Does Trade Motivation Relate to Characteristic-Timing Performance? 
3.5.3.1 Conditioning on Motivation Score 
Chen et al (2013) document that mutual fund managers exhibit distinct trading skills 
by decomposing their aggregate characteristic-timing performance into buying and 
selling components. Their study, however, gives no consideration to the fact that fund 
managers provide a great deal of liquidity to investors and that this provision of 
liquidity forces fund managers to engage in costly trading. Thus, the inference 
regarding fund manager trading skills in their study can be significantly negatively 
biased. One might naturally ask whether negative characteristic-timing performance 
when selling stocks is driven by liquidity-induced sales. This sub-section attempts to 
address this question. 
To increase the test power of the standard characteristic-timing performance measure, 
I separate fund managers’ motivations for trading by conditioning fund purchases and 
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sales on the motivation score metrics of Alexander et al (2007). Intuitively, the flow-
based motivation score metric assigns a higher score to buy (sell) portfolios of funds 
that are more likely comprised of larger proportions of valuation motivated purchases 
(sales). This approach has several advantages over realised net fund flows. First, 
motivation score metrics not only consider realised net investor flows between two 
quarters, but also capture total trading volume from buying and selling actives during 
the corresponding period. Second, the ranking procedure based on motivation score 
breaks down possible serial and cross-sectional trading patterns and correlations that 
might be present in the stock holdings data and therefore could bias results in 
unexpected ways (Alexander et al, 2007).  
Panel A of Table 3.5 provides evidence that buying characteristic-timing ability is 
strongly related to trade motivations. Consistent with the expectation that mutual fund 
managers (All Funds) possess positive buying skill, in the case of BF1 (i.e., large total 
purchase volume concurrent with heavy outflows), buy portfolios that have the highest 
proportion of valuation-motivated buys show a statistically and economically 
significant characteristic-timing return of 1.90% per year higher than the average 
across the three different characteristic styles. When moving down the rows from BF1, 
one can observe generally decreasing returns because buy portfolios are characterized 
by a decreasing proportion of valuation-motivated buys and an increasing proportion 
of liquidity-induced buys. In particular, in the case of BF5 (i.e., low total purchase 
volume concurrent with heavy inflows), buy portfolios that consist of the highest 
proportion of liquidity-driven buys exhibit no statistically significant characteristics-
timing returns. As expected, valuation-motivated buys outperform liquidity-driven 
buys (BF1-BF5) by an average of 0.93% per year, statistically significant at the 1% 
level. While this pattern holds for all investment categories, there is some evidence to 
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show that income oriented mutual funds appear to have lower characteristic-timing 
returns from their valuation-motivated purchases. 
In Panel B, the results for sell portfolios are organised in the same ways as for the buy 
portfolios. Consistent with mutual fund managers (All Funds) having negative selling 
skill, SF1 (i.e., high total stock sales concurrent with high inflows), sell portfolios that 
have the highest proportion of valuation-motivated sales have a statistically and 
economically significant characteristic-timing return of -1.57% per year. On the other 
hand, in the case of SF5 (i.e., low total stock sales concurrent with high outflows), the 
sell portfolios that have the highest proportion of liquidity-driven sales show an 
average characteristic-timing returns of -2.24% per year, significant at the 5% level. 
The difference between valuation-motivated sales and liquidity-driven sales (SF1-
SF5) is statistically and economically significant at 0.69% per year. This suggests that 
despite lacking selling ability in general, trade motivation still matters in terms of 
subsequent characteristic-timing performance. The remaining columns in Panel B 
demonstrate a similar story, namely that none of the investment categories exhibits 
positive selling skill and that valuation-motivated sales outperform liquidity-induced 
sales. 
3.5.3.2 Multivariate Regression Evidence 
In this section, I further extend my analysis of fund manager trading skills using 
multivariate regressions. This approach differs from the above portfolio approach in 
three major respects. First, a multivariate regression framework can simultaneously 
control for mutual fund characteristics that might be related to trade motivations or/and 
fund manager trading performance. Second, fund managers might be motivated to 
trade due to other reasons, such as for tax management and window-dressing purpose. 
According to the mutual fund tournament literature, these trades typically occur before 
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the fiscal year end. Regression analysis can effectively control these effects by 
introducing year-end dummy variables. Third, the portfolio approach aggregates 
mutual funds of similar trade motivation scores into quintile groups, while the 
regression approach allows researchers to take advantage of the rich panel structure to 
directly look at individual mutual funds. 
I begin with sorting fund-month observations for each fund based on motivation scores 
for purchase (BF) and divide these observations into high, mid and low motivation 
score subgroups. An indicator variable, 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑖 , is constructed to capture the 
purchases that are the most likely to be motivated by valuation beliefs, and the other 
dummy variable 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑖 is used to identify liquidity-induced purchases. This 
procedure is repeated for selling skills. I test the hypothesis that trade motivations are 
related to subsequent characteristic-timing performance by estimating the following 
fixed effect panel data regression model separately for buying and selling skills: 
𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑖 
where 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 denotes either 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 or 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔; 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1
𝑖  is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the mutual fund i is categorised as being more likely to be 
motivated by valuation beliefs at time t-1, and zero otherwise;  𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑖  is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the mutual fund i is categorised as being more likely 
to be motivated by liquidity needs at time t-1, and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1
𝑖  is 
mainly a vector of lagged fund-specific control variables, including age (natural 
logarithm of age in years since first offer date, log(AGE)), size (natural logarithm of 
total net assets under management in millions of dollars, log(TNA)), expense ratio (in 
percent per year, Expenses), turnover rate (in percentage per year, Turnover), 
percentage flow (the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 
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𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1, Flow), management fee (in percentage per year, Fee) and fund style 
characteristics along the size, book-to-market and momentum dimensions (in quintile 
number, size, btm, and momentum). To mitigate the impact of outliers on my estimates, 
I winsorize Flow and Turnover at the 1% level. I demean all these control variables so 
that the constant 𝑎0 measures the performance of trades when fund managers are 
“normally” motivated, and 𝑎1 indicates how much skills increase when fund managers 
are motivated by valuation beliefs, while 𝑎2 indicates how much skills decrease when 
fund managers are motivated by liquidity needs. In addition to these control variables 
mainly from Kacperczyk et al (2014), I also include two variables to control the effect 
of the financial crisis (defined by the NBER, Recession) and the fourth calendar 
quarter (4th Quarter). The latter is motivated by Alexander et al (2007) and others 
working in tournament literature who argue that there is the possibility that some 
trades may be motivated by tax management or window-dressing reasons which 
typically occur just before the fund’s fiscal year end. 
Table 3.6 examines the variation in buying and selling skills based on trade 
motivations. Column (1) to Column (3) show the coefficients on trade motivation from 
the panel regression using the characteristic-timing returns of buy portfolios as the 
dependent variable. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients on both motivation 
indicator variables are consistent with the previous analysis based on the trade 
motivation quintile portfolios across all three model specifications. For example, in 
Column (3), valuation-motivated purchases are associated with 7 basis points per 
month or approximately 0.85% per year higher returns than others purchases while 
liquidity-driven purchases are associated with 4.7 basis points per month or 0.56% per 
year lower returns than others purchases, after controlling for fund-specific 
characteristics and time fixed effects. The effects of trade motivation on subsequent 
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performance are economically and statistically significant. Likewise, Column (4) to 
Column (6) reports that valuation-motivated sales outperform other sales by an 
average of 4.3 basis points per month or 0.52% per year, while liquidity-induced sales 
substantially underperform other sales by a statistically and economically significant 
12 basis points per month or about 1.43% per year. Again, signs and magnitudes of 
the coefficients are consistent with previous portfolio analysis. 
3.5.3.3 Conditioning on Motivation Score and Trade Size 
Another test of managers’ timing ability is attainable by studying their individual stock 
trades. Trades within each motivation score categorized portfolio are further split into 
another 5 quintile groups on the basis of their dollar volume. Alexander et al (2007) 
argue that large trades are more likely to be driven by valuation motivation, whereas 
small trades are more likely to be liquidity motivated. The rationale is that fund 
managers would want to buy a relatively large amount of stocks that they believe are 
undervalued, but they are more likely to make smaller-size purchases when dealing 
excess liquidity from unanticipated investor inflows. Similarly, fund managers would 
want to sell a relative large amount of stocks when they no longer believe that these 
stocks are attractive while they might spread the smaller-size sales across the stocks 
in their the portfolios to meet investor redemption requests. 
Panel A of Table 3.7 summarizes characteristic-timing performance for buy portfolios 
categorized by net investor flows and trade size. Stocks mutual fund managers 
purchase in the BF1/TS1 group (i.e., large buys concurrent heavy outflows) are 
associated with subsequent significantly positive characteristic-timing returns of 
1.61% per year. Moving down the rows from BF1 to BF5 and across the columns from 
TS1 to TS5, generally decreasing trends of characteristic-timing returns are reported 
as these portfolios are characterised by a decreasing proportion of valuation-
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motivated, but an increased percentage of liquidity-motivated buys. Difference of 
characteristic-timing performance between large buys (TS1) and small buys (TS5) is 
1.45% per year in the group where buys are most likely valuation-motivated. This 
difference goes down to 0.58% per year in the group of lowest valuation-motivated 
buys. A similar pattern holds when the difference in characteristic-timing performance 
between valuation-motivated buys and liquidity-motivated buys is conditional on 
trade size. The difference between the two extreme groups: BF1/TS1, which contain 
the highest proportion of valuation-buys, and BF5/TS5, which have the highest 
proportion of liquidity-motivated buys, is statistically and economically significant 
with characteristic-timing returns of 1.56% per year. These results are consistent with 
previous findings that fund managers possess positive buying skill, and that valuation-
based purchases outperform liquidity-driven purchases. 
Panel B presents the subsequent characteristic-timing returns of fund managers’ sells, 
which are categorized by the SF metric and trade size. Characteristic-timing 
performance for selling in the category SF1/TS1 (i.e., large sells and high total sales 
concurrent with heavy inflows) is statistically significant but negative or -0.87% per 
year. There is a decreasing trend in characteristic-timing performance for sell 
portfolios characterised by the decreasing proportions of valuation-motivated sells and 
increasing proportions of liquidity motivated sells from SF1 to SF5. Difference 
between the category SF1/TS1 and SF5/TS1 is significantly positive or 1.91% per year, 
indicating that even though mutual fund managers have negative characteristic-timing 
selling ability, trade motivation still matters.  
However, when moving across columns from large sells (TS1) to small sells (TS5), an 
increasing trend of characteristic-timing performance is observed, which is 
inconsistent with the expectation that large sells that are more likely to be motivated 
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by valuation beliefs should outperform small sells. Instead, within any net investor 
flow category from SF1 to SF5, large sells tend to underperform small sells in terms 
of subsequent characteristic-timing returns. When experiencing heavy investor 
outflows, mutual fund managers appear to exhibit significantly negative characteristic-
timing returns of -2.73% per year from large sells (SF5/TS1), while insignificant but 
positive characteristic-timing performance of 0.03% per year from small sells 
(SF5/TS5). The difference between these two groups is statistically and economically 
significant. I interpret this finding as consistent with the notion that mutual fund 
managers have negative timing ability when selling stocks. Large bets when selling 
stocks might be more likely to reflect other reasons than valuation beliefs, such as 
behavioural bias. 
Overall, by segmenting trades based on the motivation for making them, I find 
evidence that trade motivations are strongly related to subsequent trade performance.  
In particular, valuation-motivated trades significantly outperform liquidity-induced 
trades, and this pattern holds for both buying and selling dimensions. However, fund 
managers appear to exhibit negative selling ability even when they are highly 
motivated by valuation beliefs, which directly supports and extends the argument of 
Chen et al (2013) who show that in general mutual fund managers exhibit poor selling 
characteristic-timing abilities. These findings are robust when using a multivariate 
regression approach to control for fund characteristics and time fixed effects. 
3.5.4 Are there managers who possess both good buying and good selling skills? 
Findings reported thus far show that mutual fund managers on average possess 
apparent buying skill but exhibit negative selling skill which is consistent with Chen 
et al (2013). By conditioning on trade motivations, further evidence does not improve 
this unfavourable finding regarding selling ability. Instead, valuation-based sales are 
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associated with significantly negative subsequent characteristic-timing returns, 
indicating that on average fund managers exhibit negative selling skill even when 
these sales are motivated by valuation beliefs. However, such underperformance in 
general does not necessarily mean that no mutual fund managers possess good selling 
skills. Most studies in the literature on mutual fund performance treat fund managers 
as a homogeneous class of professional investor, and have not yet explored whether 
one group of fund managers is better at buying and another group of fund managers 
specialise in selling, or that a small subset of managers can perform both buying and 
selling well. 
To examine whether different groups of fund managers possess different skills, I begin 
by testing the prediction that the same mutual funds that exhibit good selling skills 
display good buying skills. Since valuation-motivated trades are more likely to reflect 
the true trading skills of fund managers, I first identify “good sellers”, those mutual 
funds with superior selling ability when they are most likely to be motivated by 
valuation beliefs. To achieve this, for each fund, I divide all fund-month observations 
into three subsamples according to motivation scores for selling (SF). Within the 
subsamples of fund-month observations that are mostly likely to have the highest 
proportion of valuation-motivated sales (high motivation score), I select fund-month 
observations that are in the highest 25% of the 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡
𝑖 distribution. Then, an indicator 
variable Top (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}) is formed to identify those managers who have the best 
record for valuation-motivated selling, which is equal one for the 25% of funds with 
the highest fraction of observations (months) in that group, relative to the total number 
of observations for that fund in the high motivation score subsample. Next I estimate 
the following pooled panel data regression model: 
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𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑐2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑖 
Where 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 denotes either 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 or 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑇𝑜𝑝 denotes either “good sellers” 
or “good buyers”, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 is a vector of previously defined control variables. The 
coefficient of interest is 𝑐1. 
Table 3.8 summarises the pooled panel data regression estimates with different model 
specifications. Column (3) shows that on average “good sellers” are significantly 
better at characteristic-timing when selling stocks than all other funds, after controlling 
for fund characteristics and other time effects. The coefficient of the indicator variable 
𝑇𝑜𝑝 is statistically and economically significant. This is true given the way “good 
sellers” are identified. When mutual fund managers are highly motivated by valuation 
beliefs, 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 is 11.2 basis points per months or 1.35% higher for “good sellers” 
than for the remaining funds. The main point of Table 3.8 is that the same “good 
sellers” are on average also better at 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 when they are motivated by valuation 
beliefs. Column (6) presents the positive coefficient on the indicator variable 𝑇𝑜𝑝, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect is also economically 
meaningful. 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 is 7.2 basis points per month or 0.87% per year higher for the 
same “good sellers” than for all other funds. In sum, these results suggest that there 
are a small number of mutual fund managers who possess selling skill and also exhibit 
positive buying skill.  
I repeat the above analysis procedure for “good buyers” who are the funds in the top 
25% of the buying skill distribution. In Table 3.9, Column (3) shows that on average 
“good buyers” are significantly better at buying stocks than all other funds, after 
controlling for fund characteristics and other time effects, which follows the 
construction of the “good buyer” set of funds. These successful buyers exhibit 30.7 
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basis points per month or 3.75% per year higher characteristic-timing performance 
when buying stocks based on valuation beliefs. Strikingly, these “good buyers” are 
not able to outperform the other funds when selling stocks. This result is evident from 
the negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on 𝑇𝑜𝑝 in column (6). Overall, it 
is very interesting to see that “good sellers” who by construction are good at selling 
ability also possess good buying ability, while “good buyers” who by construction are 
significantly successful at characteristic-timing when buying stocks are not able to 
outperform all other funds when selling stocks. In other words, “good sellers” are also 
“good buyers” but “good buyers” are not “good sellers”. 
If the same “good sellers” are able to time stock characteristics well when buying and 
selling stocks in their portfolios, then these fund managers should also outperform 
unskilled funds in terms of aggregate characteristic-timing, whereas “good buyers” 
who are good at buying but are not capable of selling might not be able to exhibit 
superior aggregate characteristic-timing ability. To investigate this, I estimate the 
above pooled panel data regression with aggregate characteristic-timing performance 
as dependent variables for “good sellers” and “good buyers” separately. Consistent 
with expectation, Column (3) of Table 3.10 shows that aggregate characteristic-timing 
performance is 2.6 basis points per month or 31.2 basis points per year higher for 
“good sellers” than all other funds, which is statistically significant at the 1% level 
after controlling for fund characteristics and time effects. Column (6) shows that the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑜𝑝 for “good buyers” is economically and statistically insignificant, 
indicating that on average “good buyers” exhibit no aggregate characteristic-timing 
ability. These results indicate that there are a small number of mutual fund managers 
that possess timing abilities, and the superior characteristic-timing performance is 
mainly attributed to their selling skills. 
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These findings are robust to changing the cut-off levels for inclusion in the 𝑇𝑜𝑝 
portfolio and using an alternative way to identify “good sellers” or “good buyers” by 
conditioning on trade motivation based on net investor flows. The main findings that 
good sellers are also good buyers but good buyers are not necessarily good seller and 
that good sellers possess superior aggregate characteristic-timing ability hold. 
To summarise, I find strong evidence to suggest that there are a small number of 
mutual funds in my sample that possess both good buying and selling skills in timing 
stock characteristics along the size, book-to-market, and momentum dimensions. By 
estimating panel data regressions of characteristic-timing performance on the indicator 
variable for “good sellers”, my results reveal that “good sellers”, namely mutual fund 
managers who by construction have the best performance record for selling, also have 
superior characteristic-timing performance when buying stocks compared with all 
other funds, after controlling for fund characteristics and time effects. However, there 
is no evidence to show that “good buyers” who by construction are good at buying 
exhibit superior characteristic-timing performance when selling stocks than all other 
funds. Furthermore, “good sellers” exhibit superior aggregate characteristic-timing 
performance, while “good buyers” do not have outperformance. I interpret this as 
being consistent with the behavioural finance literature which shows that sell decisions 
are particularly difficult because they are more likely to be susceptible to behavioural 
biases and heuristics, even for mutual fund managers who are skilled at buying. Fund 
managers who are good at the difficult task of selling stocks perhaps possess genuine 
investment talents so that not only do they outperform other funds when buying stocks, 
but they also exhibit superior aggregate characteristic-timing performance. 
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3.5.5 The Characteristics of Good Sellers 
Table 3.11 summarises the fund characteristics of “good sellers” in comparison with 
the remaining funds. Several interesting differences emerge. First, “good sellers” are 
younger than other fund managers in my sample. Second, they have less assets under 
management, suggestive decreasing returns to scale at the fund level (e.g., Berk and 
Green, 2004). Third, “good sellers” appear to charge higher expenses and management 
fees to fund investors, perhaps reflecting higher rents to their customers for their 
superior skills. Fourth, they exhibit higher portfolio turnover, indicating that these 
mutual funds are more active than other funds. Fifth, they tend to hold portfolios with 
a smaller number of stocks, and therefore, tend to be somehow more concentrated. 
Finally, they are more likely to actively engage in style drift, suggesting that their 
superior characteristic-timing performance comes from active style drift along the 
size, book-to-market, momentum dimensions. In sum, in line with previous studies 
that find there does exist a subset of skilled managers, “good sellers” seem to be 
younger, manage smaller funds and are more active as measured by turnover ratio, 
diversification, and active style drift than all other funds, but they also charge higher 
expenses and management fees to compensate for their superior skills. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Previous return-based studies on the timing ability of mutual fund managers may be 
questioned on the basis of the strong assumption made that managers implement 
timing strategies in a specific way. The documented negative timing ability in these 
studies can be potentially caused by the “artificial timing” of non-linear option-like 
returns from managers’ dynamic trading strategies. Furthermore, without considering 
the adverse effect of investor flows, the timing ability of fund managers can be 
underestimated.  
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This chapter therefore aims to overcome these estimation issues in most previous 
studies by evaluating the timing ability of mutual fund managers using the 
characteristic-timing measure of Daniel et al (1997). By segmenting fund portfolios 
based on net investor flows, my analysis contributes to the literature by revealing that 
mutual fund managers appear to have significantly negative characteristic-timing 
performance when and only when they experience investor inflows. In a further 
refinement, my results show that large style bets, which should reflect the strong 
valuation beliefs, as measured by active style drift measure of Wermers (2012), are 
surprisingly associated with significantly negative characteristic-timing returns of -
1.76% per year, when managers experience investor inflows. These results suggest 
that negative characteristic-timing performance is not entirely driven by fund flows 
but at least partly due to fund managers’ poor timing ability. 
Existing literature on timing skill of fund managers has concentrated on looking at 
whether mutual fund managers have timing ability by testing aggregate timing 
performance, which   might not necessarily be a good indicator of the timing skills 
that mutual fund managers really possess. Chen et al (2013) decompose aggregate 
characteristic-timing skill into buying and selling abilities and find that “star” growth 
oriented fund managers have good buying skill but bad selling skill. Motivated by 
Alexander et al (2007), this chapter goes further and explores whether trade 
motivations are related to differential buying and selling performance. By 
conditioning trades on the motivation for making them, my results shows that 
valuation-motivated trades are associated with higher subsequent characteristic-timing 
performance than liquidity-driven trades. Perhaps more interestingly, stocks sold by 
managers who have excess liquidity following significant investor inflows, which are 
expected to have a higher proportion of valuation-motivated sales, are on average still 
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associated with statistically significant and negative characteristic-timing returns of -
1.57% per year. These results suggest that average managers seem to be unable to 
generate positive characteristic-timing performance when selling stocks, even when 
these sales are valuation-motivated. Thus, this chapter finds evidence that strongly 
supports and reinforces the findings of Chen et al (2013), which is restricted to a small 
number of “star” growth oriented mutual funds. 
This chapter further investigates the possibility of whether there is a group of fund 
managers that specializes in selling, while another group of managers is particularly 
good at buying, or the same group of managers can perform both tasks well. I find 
strong evidence that there are a small number of mutual funds in my sample that 
possesses both good buying and selling skills to time stock characteristics along the 
size, book-to-market, and momentum dimensions. Results reveal that “good sellers”, 
those fund managers who have the best performance records for selling, also show 
superior characteristic-timing performance when buying stocks compared with all 
other funds. However, there is no evidence to show that “good buyers” exhibit any 
superior characteristic-timing performance when selling stocks over and above all 
other funds. Furthermore, “good sellers” exhibit significant aggregate characteristic-
timing performance, while “good buyers” do not outperform other funds in aggregate. 
Comparing fund specific characteristics with other funds, “good sellers” appear to be 
younger, smaller and more active in managing their portfolios in terms of turnover 
ratio, diversification, and active style drift than all other funds, but they also tend to 
charger higher expenses and management fees to compensate for their superior skills. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Mutual Fund Samples 
The table below reports the summary statistics of a total of 3384 unique U.S. domestic equity mutual 
fund samples from September 2004 to December 2013. The mutual fund data with self-reporting 
investment objectives including Growth, Growth & Income, Income, Micro-Cap, Small-Cap, and Mid-
Cap are obtained from the merged CRSP mutual fund holdings databases and CRSP mutual fund 
characteristics databases in CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Database. CRSP investment objective 
variable (crsp_obj_cd) is used to filter U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from the CRSP mutual funds 
universe in CRSP mutual fund database. The mutual funds are broken down by the CRSP investment 
objectives, including growth, growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap. Total 
number of funds is the total number of unique mutual funds that exist during the sample periods. Avg 
number of stocks is the times series average of cross-sectional average of the number of unique stocks 
held by mutual funds during the sample periods. Avg TNA is times series average of cross-sectional 
average of total net assets under management of mutual funds. Avg Flow is time series average of cross-
sectional average of estimated percentage change in TNA adjusted for investment return and mutual 
fund mergers. Avg Turnover is time series average of cross-sectional average of mutual fund turnover 
ratio. Avg Exp is time series average of cross-sectional average expense ratio of mutual fund. Panel A 
reports the summary statistics of all mutual fund samples over time and Panel B reports the summary 
statistics of mutual fund with different investment objectives. 
  
Total 
Number 
of 
Funds 
Avg 
Number 
of 
Stocks 
Avg TNA 
(in 
$ Million) 
Median 
TNA (in 
$ Million) 
Avg Flow 
(%/Month) 
Avg 
Turnover  
(%/Year) 
Avg Exp 
Ratio 
(%/Year) 
Panel A: Summary statistics of all mutual fund samples over time 
2004 1360 126.94 $1,327.63 $178.00 7.24 89.54 1.34 
2005 1459 120.09 $1,354.98 $197.80 5.56 86.17 1.29 
2006 1479 112.61 $1,512.18 $224.40 3.95 86.13 1.28 
2007 1638 114.71 $1,483.71 $202.20 2.63 91.09 1.25 
2008 2046 115.75 $821.48 $124.40 0.31 88.76 1.19 
2009 2022 122.04 $1,059.28 $162.75 1.89 100.46 1.20 
2010 2727 109.65 $1,097.55 $210.40 3.05 90.41 1.18 
2011 2612 103.05 $1,011.80 $201.85 1.57 83.66 1.16 
2012 2577 117.82 $1,105.19 $218.70 1.19 79.77 1.12 
2013 2454 120.80 $1,502.37 $321.85 7.29 72.94 1.10 
Panel B: summary statistics of mutual fund with different investment objectives 
All 3384 115.90 $1,217.94 $205.20 7.25 87.19 1.22 
Growth 1529 100.48 $1,933.87 $254.50 10.89 92.59 1.22 
Growth&Income 576 103.45 $1,332.02 $181.00 4.68 71.76 1.11 
Income 191 78.90 $1,508.81 $317.60 14.48 48.60 1.09 
Micro-Cap 50 111.93 $187.91 $101.65 2.71 92.92 1.66 
Small-Cap 679 170.93 $843.47 $233.75 1.55 89.91 1.29 
Mid-Cap 470 113.35 $728.33 $201.60 5.99 97.00 1.24 
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Table 3.2 Mutual Fund Behaviors in Response to Investor Flows 
This table reports how quarterly mutual fund holdings changes conditional on actual investor flows. 
Net flow is estimated investor flows as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. Panel A reports the net flow, prior 12-month fund returns, cash holdings and number of stocks 
held by mutual funds averaged across all funds in the decile. Panel B reports for the average fund the 
fraction of positions that were initiated, expanded, reduced and eliminated. Panel C reports the active 
style drift from Wermers (2012) calculated as the changes in quintile number along size, book-to-
market, and momentum dimensions. 
Net flow 
quintiles 
Net flow 
Prior fund 
return 
Average cash/tna 
Avg number 
of stocks 
      Panel A 
1 -9.29% 5.50% 2.61% 110.88 
2 -2.38% 8.00% 2.47% 113.55 
3 -0.08% 11.09% 2.39% 120.12 
4 0.69% 11.84% 2.89% 118.85 
5 14.70% 12.17% 4.05% 104.40 
Net flow 
quintiles 
Initiated Expanded Reduced Eliminated 
Panel B      
1 0.14 0.13 0.38 0.14 
2 0.09 0.15 0.30 0.09 
3 0.06 0.16 0.23 0.06 
4 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.07 
5 0.11 0.44 0.10 0.10 
Net flow 
quintiles 
Active style  
drift 
Active size drift   Active btm drift 
Active 
momentum drift 
      Panel C 
1 0.25 0.06 0.09 0.10 
2 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.07 
3 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.05 
4 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.05 
5 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.09 
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Table 3.3 Aggregate Characteristic-Timing Performance, Conditioning on Net 
Flows 
This table reports the aggregate characteristic-timing performance conditioning on net investor flows. 
Net investor flows are calculated as estimated percentage change in TNA adjusted for investment return 
and mutual fund mergers. For each month, mutual funds are divided into five quintiles based on net 
investor flows. The mutual funds are broken down by the CRSP investment objectives, including 
growth, growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap. The t-statistics are presented 
below in parentheses. 
 All Funds Growth 
Growth 
&Income 
Income 
Micro-
Cap 
Small-
Cap 
Mid-Cap 
NF1 -0.07% -0.14%   -0.40%   0.41% -0.32% -0.32%   0.43% 
 (-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.92) (0.57) (-0.58) (-0.94) (1.16) 
NF2 -0.26%  0.09%    -0.93%** -0.63% -0.62%   0.17% -0.13% 
 (-1.04) (0.27) (-2.05) (-0.89) (-1.32) (0.47) (-0.31) 
NF3 -0.18% -0.36%   -0.31%     -0.35% -0.85% -0.04% -0.23% 
 (-0.59) (-1.00) (-0.60) (-0.63) (-1.43) (-0.10) (-0.52) 
NF4  -0.53%  -0.43%     -0.40% -0.81%   -0.78% -0.41%  -0.24% 
 (-1.68) (-1.08) (-0.84) (-1.61) (-1.22) (-1.16) (-0.67) 
NF5  -0.85%***    -0.81%**     -0.87%*   -1.28%* -0.29%  -0.56% -0.37% 
 (-2.86) (-2.07) (-1.94) (-1.88) (-0.49) (-1.68) (-1.09) 
NF1-
NF5 
  0.78%***   0.68%* 0.48% 1.71%*** -0.04% 0.24% 0.80%** 
(2.80) (1.66) (1.10) (2.74) (-0.06) (0.88) (2.31) 
* Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
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Table 3.4 Aggregate Characteristic-Timing Performance, Conditioning on Net 
Investor Flows and Active Style Drift 
This table reports the aggregate characteristic-timing performance conditioning on net investor flows 
and active style drift. Net investor flows are calculated as estimated percentage change in TNA adjusted 
for investment return and mutual fund mergers. Active style drift is calculated following Wermers 
(2012) as the difference of style quintile numbers along size, book-to-market and momentum 
dimensions. For each month, mutual funds are divided into five quintiles based on net investor flows. 
For each of net investor flows portfolio, mutual funds are then divided into quintiles according to active 
style drift. The t-statistics are presented below in parentheses. 
 
SD1           
(Large Drift) 
SD2-SD4 
SD5           
(Small Drift) 
ALL SD1-SD5 
NF1 
(Outflow) 
-0.92% 0.21% -0.02% -0.07% -0.91% 
 (-1.63) (0.64) (-0.05) (-0.23) (-1.32) 
NF2-NF4 -0.04% -0.38% -0.29% -0.30% 0.25% 
 (-0.12) (-1.43) (-0.82) (-1.11) (0.79) 
NF5 (Inflow)       -1.76%***   -0.54%*     -0.90%**       -0.85%*** -0.88% 
 (-2.78) (-1.75) (-2.46) (-2.86) (-1.34) 
ALL     -0.66%** -0.17%   -0.57%* -0.37% -0.08% 
 (-2.31) (-0.70) (-1.80) (-1.57) (-0.26) 
NF1-NF5 0.86%     0.75%**     0.88%**     0.78*** - 
 (1.21) (2.58) (2.50) (2.80) - 
* Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
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Table 3.5 Characteristic-Timing Performance for Buying and Selling Are 
Related to Trade Motivations (1) 
This table reports the characteristic-timing performance for buying and selling, conditioning on 
motivation scores including buy flow score (BF) and sell flow score (SF). Based on Alexander et al 
(2007), the proximities for buying and selling motivation are calculated based on the net investor flows, 
total buying volume and total selling volume. Specifically, buy flow score for fund i at time t is 
measured as the difference between total dollar volume for buying at time t and net investor flows at 
time t, divided by total net assets at time t-1. And sell flow score for fund i at time t is calculated as the 
sum of total dollar volume for selling at time t and net investor flow at time t, divided by total net assets 
at time t-1. For each month, mutual funds are divided into five quintiles based on the buy flow score 
and the sell flow score. The times series average of cross-sectional average of buying and selling 
characteristic-timing performance are reported for all mutual fund samples and sub-samples of different 
investment objectives. The t-statistics are presented below in parentheses. 
 All Funds Growth 
Growth 
&Income 
Income 
Micro-
Cap 
Small-
Cap 
Mid-Cap 
Buying 
BF1 1.90%** 2.04%** 1.76%** 1.66%* 2.02%** 2.21%** 2.27%** 
 (2.19) (2.25) (2.25) (1.95) (1.99) (2.16) (2.12) 
BF2 1.15%* 0.87% 0.77% 1.10%* 1.39% 1.66%** 2.09%** 
 (1.70) (1.45) (1.08) (1.71) (1.54) (2.17) (2.28) 
BF3   0.97%* 0.77%   1.03%* 0.80% 1.00%   1.16%*   1.66%* 
 (1.76) (1.23) (1.72) (1.48) (1.01) (1.79) (1.78) 
BF4 0.93% 0.58% 0.53%   1.14%* 1.00%   1.18%* 1.05% 
 (1.61) (0.96) (1.06) (1.83) (1.09) (1.83) (1.38) 
BF5 0.95% 0.31% 0.97% 0.79% 1.04%   1.58%*   1.80%* 
 (1.16) (0.43) (1.30) (0.84) (0.84) (1.80) (1.93) 
BF1-BF5 0.93%*** 1.70%** 0.78%** 0.86%** 0.96% 0.63%** 0.46% 
 (4.03) (2.49) (2.01) (2.33) (1.47) (2.09) (0.91) 
Selling 
SF1   -1.57%* -1.36%   -1.80%***     -1.67%** -1.11%   -1.62%*   -1.97%* 
 (-1.94) (-1.49) (-2.69) (-2.53) (-0.84) (-1.79) (-1.95) 
SF2   -1.21%*     -1.40%** -0.72%   -0.91%* -1.34%   -1.44%*   -1.25%* 
 (-1.92) (-2.01) (-1.33) (-1.81) (-1.14) (-1.90) (-1.71) 
SF3     -1.45%**   -1.31%*   -1.60%***     -1.36%** -1.32%   -1.32%*   -2.10%* 
 (-2.20) (-1.86) (-2.66) (-2.11) (-1.21) (-1.85) (-1.81) 
SF4     -1.63%**   -1.29%*     -1.76%**     -1.82%**   -1.95%*     -1.93%**     -2.39%** 
 (-2.08) (-1.65) (-2.29) (-2.35) (-1.78) (-2.21) (-2.19) 
SF5     -2.24%**     -2.13%**   -2.36%***     -2.23%** -2.08%     -2.70%**     -2.64%** 
 (-2.16) (-2.00) (-2.68) (-2.14) (-1.57) (-2.13) (-2.10) 
SF1-SF5     0.69%**   0.78%* 0.58% 0.58% 0.99%     1.11%** 0.69% 
 (2.01) (1.80) (1.40) (0.83) (1.13) (2.29) (1.42) 
* Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
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Table 3.6 Characteristic-Timing Performance for Buying and Selling Are 
Related to Trade Motivations (2) 
The dependent variables are the characteristic-timing performance for buy and sell portfolio for mutual 
funds. Valuation is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the mutual fund is identified as 
valuation motivated (high flow score for buying and selling, respectively), zero otherwise; Liquidity is 
an indicator variable equal to one for every month the mutual fund is identified as liquidity driven (low 
flow score for buying and selling, respectively), zero otherwise. log(AGE) is the natural logarithm of 
age in years since first offer date. log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets under management 
in millions of dollars. Expenses is fund expense ratio in percentage per year. Turnover is the fund 
turnover ratio in percentage per year. Flow is estimated investor flows as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. Fee is the fund management fee in percentage per year. 
Size, btm, and Momentum are quintile number of fund style characteristics along the size, book-to-
market and momentum dimensions. All these control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are 
winsorized at 1% level. Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is 
in a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. 4th Quarter is an indicator variable equal to 
one for every month is in the fourth quarter, and zero otherwise. The data are monthly and cover the 
period from 2003 to 2013. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and time. 
 Buying  Selling 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Valuation 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.070***  0.012* 0.030*** 0.043*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  
Liquidity -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.047***  -0.110*** -0.124*** -0.121*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Log(AGE)  0.107*** 0.086***   -0.124*** -0.104*** 
  (0.014) (0.013)    (0.015)  (0.014) 
Log(TNA)  -0.093*** -0.123***   0.104*** 0.136*** 
  (0.007) (0.007)   (0.080)  (0.007)  
Expenses  6.983 -3.421   -5.850 5.223 
  (4.708)  (3.689)   (4.500) (3.540) 
Turnover  0.052*** 0.064***   -0.032*** -0.045*** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)    (0.012) (0.012) 
Flow  0.205*** 0.159***   -0.277*** -0.232*** 
  (0.043)  (0.042)    (0.043) (0.041) 
Fee  -0.019*** -0.015***   0.017*** 0.013** 
  (0.003) (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.006)  
Size  0.110*** 0.107***   -0.136*** -0.129*** 
  (0.028) (0.027)    (0.030)  (0.029) 
btm  -0.065*** -0.052***   0.108*** 0.094*** 
  (0.020) (0.019)   (0.020)  (0.019)  
Momentum  -0.110*** -0.060***   0.115*** 0.062*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)   (0.015)  (0.015)  
Recession   -0.360***    0.388*** 
   (0.011)    (0.012)  
4th Quarter   -0.001    -0.025*** 
   (0.005)    (0.005)  
Constant 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.166***  -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.172*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
Obs 144,926 141,767 141,767  144,926 141,767 141,767 
 
 
127 
 
Table 3.7 Characteristic-Timing Performance for Buying and Selling, 
Conditioning on Flow Score and Trade Size 
This table reports the buying and selling characteristic-timing performance conditioning on flow 
metrics and trade size. Following Alexander et al (2007), the flow metrics for buying and selling 
motivation are calculated based on the net investor flows, total buying volume and total selling volume. 
Specifically, buy flow score for fund i at time t is measured as the difference between total dollar volume 
for buying at time t and net investor flows at time t, divided by total net assets at time t-1. Sell flow 
score for fund i at time t is measured as the sum of total dollar volume for sell at time t and net investor 
flows at time t, divided by total net assets at time t-1. The net investor flows are calculated based on the 
changes total net assets under management adjusted for investment returns and mutual fund mergers. 
For each month, mutual funds are divided into five quintiles based on the buy and sell flow score. For 
each of the buy and selling portfolio, trades are divided into quintiles according to their dollar value. 
The t-statistics are presented below in parentheses. 
 TS1 (Large) TS2 TS3 TS4 TS5 (Small) TS1-TS5   
Panel A Buy       
BF1 1.61%** 1.06%** 0.65%** 0.45%**  0.16%*  1.45%**  
 (1.99) (2.42) (2.11) (2.31) (1.68) (1.97)  
BF2   1.14%*   0.67%*   0.49%* 0.25%   0.12%* 1.01%*  
 (1.85) (1.95) (1.89) (1.38) (1.77) (1.80)  
BF3 0.80%   0.53%*   0.36%*   0.27%* 0.05% 0.75%  
 (1.54) (1.93) (1.70) (1.93) (0.88) (1.56)  
BF4   0.74%*   0.43%* 0.26% 0.15% 0.03%     0.71%**  
 (1.88) (1.94) (1.61) (1.22) (0.45) (2.05)  
BF5    0.64%* 0.30%     0.28%**   0.17%* 0.05%   0.58%*  
 (1.83) (1.56) (2.10) (1.87) (1.15) (1.83)  
BF1-BF5   0.96%*     0.76%**   0.37%*   0.28%** 0.11% -  
 (1.77) (2.55) (1.74) (2.13) (1.26) -  
BF1/TS1-
BF5/TS5 
        1.56%* 
              (1.98) 
Panel B Sell       
SF1     -0.87%**   -0.42%*     -0.35%**     -0.26%**     -0.14%**     -0.73%**  
 (-2.13) (-1.74) (-2.01) (-2.24) (-1.99) (-2.08)  
SF2      -1.11%**   -0.49%* -0.29%   -0.18%* -0.11%     -1.00%**  
 (-2.21) (-1.75) (-1.43) (-1.68) (-1.45) (-2.29)  
SF3   -1.11%*   -0.55%* -0.32% -0.19% -0.10%   -1.02%*  
 (-1.78) (-1.67) (-1.32) (-1.36) (-1.44) (-1.78)  
SF4   -1.32%*   -0.75%*     -0.51%**     -0.29%** -0.10%   -1.24%*  
 (-1.76) (-1.94) (-2.02) (-2.29) (-1.44) (-1.75)  
SF5       -2.73%***       -1.29%***       -0.87%***     -0.44%** 0.03%  -2.76%***  
 (-2.90) (-2.82) (-3.03) (-2.39) (0.44) (-3.03)  
SF1-SF5       1.91%***       0.88%***       0.53%*** 0.17%     -0.17%** -  
 (3.04) (3.11) (3.21) (1.56) (-2.50) -  
SF1/TS1-
SF5/TS5 
      -0.89%** 
              (-2.37) 
* Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
*** Significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
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Table 3.8 Characteristic-Timing Performance of Good Sellers 
The dependent variables are the characteristic-timing performance for buy and sell portfolio for mutual 
funds. Top is the indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose selling performance when sales are 
valuation motivated is in the highest 25th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. log(AGE) is 
the natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net 
assets under management in millions of dollars. Expenses is fund expense ratio in percentage per year. 
Turnover is the fund turnover ratio in percentage per year. Flow is estimated investor flows as the ratio 
of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. Fee is the fund management fee in 
percentage per year. Size, btm, and Momentum are quintile number of fund style characteristics along 
the size, book-to-market and momentum dimensions. All these control variables are demeaned. Flow 
and Turnover are winsorized at 1% level. Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every 
month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. 4th Quarter is an 
indicator variable equal to one for every month is in the fourth quarter, and zero otherwise. The data 
are monthly and cover the period from 2003 to 2013. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
fund and time. 
 Selling  Buying 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Top 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.112***  0.096*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)   (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Log(AGE)  -0.049*** -0.046***   0.218*** 0.205*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.031)  (0.028)  
Log(TNA)  0.067*** 0.083***   -0.145*** -0.186*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)    (0.016)  (0.015)  
Expenses  5.567 11.807***   11.664 -3.353 
  (4.090)  (3.763)    (8.255)  (5.921)  
Turnover  0.004 -0.009   0.098*** 0.111*** 
  (0.019)  (0.018)    (0.023)  (0.022)  
Flow  -0.254*** -0.245***   0.097 0.022 
  (0.048)  (0.046)    (0.092)  (0.090)  
Fee  -0.013 -0.016   -0.016*** -0.013*** 
  (0.014) (0.013)    (0.003) (0.005) 
Size  -0.063 -0.054   0.162*** 0.168*** 
  (0.039)  (0.039)    (0.061)  (0.058)  
btm  0.035 0.025   -0.170*** -0.143*** 
  (0.024)  (0.023)    (0.040)  (0.038)  
Momentum  0.065*** 0.034*   -0.175*** -0.091*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019)    (0.032) (0.031)  
Recession   0.277***    -0.509*** 
   (0.019)     (0.024)  
4th Quarter   -0.079***    -0.084*** 
   (0.008)     (0.011)  
Constant -0.130*** -0.113*** -0.127***  0.143*** 0.145*** -0.265*** 
 (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
Obs 46,868 46,202 46,202  46,676 46,094 46,094 
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Table 3.9 Characteristic-Timing Performance of Good Buyers 
The dependent variables are the characteristic-timing performance for buy and sell portfolio for mutual 
funds. Top is the indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose buying performance when purchases 
are valuation motivated is in the highest 25th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. log(AGE) 
is the natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of total 
net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expenses is fund expense ratio in percentage per 
year. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio in percentage per year. Flow is estimated investor flows as the 
ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. Fee is the fund management fee in 
percentage per year. Size, btm, and Momentum are quintile number of fund style characteristics along 
the size, book-to-market and momentum dimensions. All these control variables are demeaned. Flow 
and Turnover are winsorized at 1% level. Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every 
month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. 4th Quarter is an 
indicator variable equal to one for every month is in the fourth quarter, and zero otherwise. The data 
are monthly and cover the period from 2003 to 2013. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
fund and time. 
 Buying  Selling 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Top 0.315*** 0.310*** 0.307***  -0.020 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)   (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Log(AGE)  0.213*** 0.200***   -0.049*** -0.046*** 
  (0.030)  (0.027)    (0.017)  (0.017)  
Log(TNA)  -0.137*** -0.180***   0.070*** 0.086*** 
  (0.015)  (0.014)   (0.009)  (0.009)  
Expenses  12.035 -2.999   6.332 12.915*** 
  (7.799)  (5.621)    (4.155)  (3.807)  
Turnover  0.079*** 0.091***   0.001 -0.012 
  (0.023)  (0.021)    (0.019)  (0.019)  
Flow  0.068 -0.012   -0.245*** -0.237*** 
  (0.089)  (0.087)    (0.049)  (0.047)  
Fee  -0.017*** -0.013***   -0.015 -0.018 
  (0.003)  (0.005)    (0.015)  (0.013)  
Size  0.164*** 0.172***   -0.067 -0.057 
  (0.060)  (0.057)    (0.040)  (0.040)  
btm  -0. 177*** -0.152***   0.029 0.020 
  (0.039)  (0.037)    (0.025)  (0.024)  
Momentum  -0.173*** -0.090***   0.069*** 0.035* 
  (0.032)  (0.031)    (0.020)  (0.020)  
Recession   -0.512***    0.292*** 
   (0.024)     (0.020)  
4th Quarter   -0.083***    -0.079*** 
   (0.011)     (0.008)  
Constant 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.210***  -0.092*** -0.076*** -0.100*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)   (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)  
Obs 46,676 46,094 46,094  46,868 46,202 46,202 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table 3.10 Aggregate Characteristic-Timing performance, Good Sellers vs. 
Good Buyers 
The dependent variables are the aggregate characteristic-timing performance for top sellers and top 
buyers, respectively. Top is the indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose selling (buying) 
performance when sales (purchases) are valuation motivated is in the highest 25th percentile of the 
distribution, and zero otherwise. log(AGE) is the natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. 
log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expenses 
is fund expense ratio in percentage per year. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio in percentage per year. 
Flow is estimated investor flows as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. Fee is the fund management fee in percentage per year. Size, btm, and Momentum are quintile 
number of fund style characteristics along the size, book-to-market and momentum dimensions. All 
these control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at 1% level. Recession is an 
indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, 
and zero otherwise. 4th Quarter is an indicator variable equal to one for every month is in the fourth 
quarter, and zero otherwise. The data are monthly and cover the period from 2003 to 2013. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and time. 
 Good seller  Good buyer 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Top 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***  0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Log(AGE)  -0.019** -0.024***   -0.019** -0.024*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Log(TNA)  0.010** 0.012***   0.010** 0.013*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Expenses  0.519 1.205   0.486 1.186 
  (1.955) (1.980)   (1.957) (1.982) 
Turnover  0.024*** 0.023***   0.024*** 0.023*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)    (0.008) (0.008)  
Flow  -0.010 -0.010   -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.026)  (0.026)   (0.026) (0.026)  
Fee  -0.000 -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)  
Size  -0.031** -0.025*   -0.031** -0.025* 
  (0.014)  (0.014)   (0.014)  (0.014)  
btm  0.049*** 0.049***   0.049*** -0.049*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.014)  (0.014)  
Momentum  0.003 0.000   0.004 0.000 
  (0.010)  (0.010)    (0.010)  (0.010)  
Recession   0.031***    0.031*** 
   (0.008)     (0.008)  
4th Quarter   -0.035***    -0.035*** 
   (0.005)     (0.005)  
Constant -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.030***  -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.026*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Obs 144,926 141,767 141,767  144,926 141,767 141,767 
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Table 3.11 Fund Characteristics for Good Sellers 
Top is the indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose selling performance when sales are 
valuation motivated is in the highest 25th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. AGE is age 
in years since first offer date. TNA is the total net assets under management in millions of dollars. 
Expenses is fund expense ratio in percentage per year. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio in percentage 
per year. Fee is the fund management fee in percentage per year. ASD is the active style drift calculated 
according to Wermers (2012) as the changes in quintile number of fund style characteristics along the 
size, book-to-market and momentum dimensions. Stock Number is the total number of stock held by 
mutual funds. Top1-Top0 is the difference between the mean values of the groups for which Top equals 
to one and zero, respectively. p-value measure statistical significance of the difference. The data are 
monthly and cover the period from 2003 to 2013.  
 Good seller  Others  Difference 
 
Mean Stdev. 
Media
n 
 Mean Stdev. 
Media
n 
 
Top1-
Top0 
p-
value 
Age 14.65 13.01 11  15.30 12.55 12  -0.65 0.000 
TNA 1397.58 4072.90 246.60  1567.89 6592.69 288.4  -170.31 0.000 
Expenses 1.24 0.45 1.20  1.19 0.37 1.20  0.05 0.000 
Fee 0.73 0.35 0.75  0.71 0.36 0.74  0.02 0.000 
Turnover 105.38 103.13 81.00  73.17 66.29 58.00  32.21 0.000 
ASD 0.27 0.27 0.18  0.19 0.23 0.13  0.07 0.000 
Stock 
Number 
116.96 132.73 82  136.70 172.31 88  -19.74 0.000 
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Chapter 4 
Fund Manager Overconfidence and 
Investment Performance 
4.1 Introduction 
Conventional finance predominantly views mutual fund managers as a class of 
professional investors who gather and process information efficiently and make 
investment decisions in a more rational way than inexperienced investors. The 
majority of research focuses on investigating whether fund managers have specific 
skills, exploring whether particular investment strategies generate superior returns, 
and testing whether the market is efficient. In consequence, little attention has been 
paid to looking at fund managers as human beings who are usually susceptible to 
behavioral biases and heuristics such as overconfidence.  
The nature of professional experience in asset management can easily expose mutual 
fund managers to the risk of becoming overconfident: fund managers are constantly 
under intensive competition to outperform peer managers who are equally qualified; 
they are swamped with incomplete information that is often conflicting and open to 
competing interpretations (Tuckett and Taffler, 2012). In the end, investment 
decisions are often made by relying on subjective judgements and beliefs based on 
managers’ private information which can only be verified with vague and delayed 
feedback. Consequently, fund managers can be particularly susceptible to the self-
serving attribution bias. Previous psychological studies suggest that biased self-
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attribution can leads to individuals to attribute positive outcome to their own skills, 
but attribute bad outcomes to chance (e.g., Hastorf et al, 1970; and Miller and Ross, 
1975). Self-serving attribution bias leads fund managers to falsely attribute good 
investment performance of their investment decisions to their good skills, while 
attributing poor past performance to bad luck. Fund managers become more confident 
after a good past performance, but not less confident to the same extent after a poor 
past performance (e.g., Gervais and Odean, 2001), which eventually leads to 
unnecessarily high level of overconfidence.  
Overconfidence leads individuals to overestimate their abilities and the precision of 
their knowledge (Frank, 1935; Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977). In the 
context of financial markets, overconfident investors tend to overestimate their ability 
to gather and process information and overestimate the precision of their private 
information. This can lead investors to engage in excessive trading activity (Odean, 
1999). Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) find supportive evidence on increased trading 
activities by fund managers following good performance. Similarly, overconfident 
fund managers might overweight their privation information following good 
performance. As a consequence, they might concentrate their holdings in stocks where 
they falsely believe that they have informational advantages, leading to excessive 
deviation from their benchmark indices. Such portfolio allocation decisions driven by 
false beliefs about their investment skills and information precision should eventually 
harm portfolio performance. 
To investigate whether fund managers are prone to overconfidence, this chapter uses 
the sum of absolute deviations from the fund’s benchmark index (i.e., Active Share) 
as a proxy for confidence, and examines the potential relationship between past 
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performance and managerial confidence. By analyzing a large sample of U.S. 
domestic actively managed equity mutual funds, we find a clear U-shaped non-linear 
relationship between past performance of mutual funds and their subsequent Active 
Share level. In particular, we find robust evidence that fund managers become 
overconfident after experiencing outstanding performance, as reflected by the 
considerably high Active Share level of their portfolios in the subsequent period. 
Interestingly, fund managers suffering poor past performance are also more likely to 
choose high Active Share levels in the subsequent period. One possible explanation is 
that these poorly performing fund managers are in effect engaging in gambling, 
perhaps in an attempt to increase the possibility of catching up their positions in the 
future. Consistently, we observe that fund managers are more likely to increase their 
Active Share level following good performance. Overall, these results strongly support 
our main hypothesis that good performance leads to overconfidence as measured by a 
higher Active Share level. Like inexperienced retail investors, fund managers seem to 
falsely attribute good past performance to their own skills. This effect is more 
pronounced among solo-managed funds.  
More importantly, this chapter directly examines the potential impact of fund manager 
overconfidence on subsequent fund performance. Our results show that excessive 
overconfidence, as measured by extremely high Active Share relative to all other funds 
in the same segment, is significantly associated with diminished future performance. 
Interestingly, we also find that fund managers with normal confidence levels as 
reflected by moderate Active Share level deliver superior performance. We argue that, 
moderate Active Share levels might better reflect managers’ normal levels of 
confidence and more rational (i.e., less biased) investment decisions. The evidence is 
consistent with fund managers with “normal” confidence levels assessing and 
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updating the precision of their private information in a more rational way. 
Consequently, it might be rational for them to put larger weights on their private 
information and smaller weights on other stocks from their benchmark indices. These 
well motivated trading activities appear empirically to lead to the realization of 
profitable opportunities and better portfolio allocation, which eventually generates 
better performance. Overall, an inverted U-shaped relationship between confidence 
level of fund managers and their subsequent performance is revealed.  Furthermore, 
there is a negative and significant relationship between changes in Active Share rank 
and subsequent performance, which is consistent with our main conjecture that 
excessive overconfidence is associated with deteriorated subsequent returns. 
Additionally, our results show a clear convex relation between confidence level and 
fund risk including performance extremity and performance dispersion, suggesting 
that excessive overconfidence is associated with more extreme outcome, higher 
performance dispersion, and therefore a potentially higher downside risk. 
This chapter also sheds new light on the determinants of fund flows by looking at how 
investors respond to fund manager overconfidence. The results are striking. When past 
performance is positive, we observe significantly higher fund inflows to overconfident 
managers with an extremely high Active Share than other funds, while fund outflows 
from mutual funds with overconfident managers are not significantly larger than other 
funds when past performance is negative. This indicates that, for overconfident fund 
managers, there is a marked bonus for good performance while there is no pronounced 
penalty for their poor performance comparing to other funds. One possible explanation 
for these responses is that, upon observing good fund performance, investors might 
falsely attribute successes to managers’ investment skills rather than luck while 
attributing their failure to chance. In particular, extreme high Active Share due to fund 
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manager overconfidence, can easily be misunderstood by investors as an indicator of 
their investment skills of fund managers. As a consequence, investors irrationally 
chase overconfident fund managers, flocking to funds with extremely high Active 
Share when observing good fund performance but failing to flee from these funds to 
the same extent following poor fund performance. 
This chapter contributes to four strands of the literature. First, our findings contribute 
to the literature on behavioral biases and heuristics among professional investors. 
While overconfidence has been extensively documented among retail investors and 
corporate executives, evidence on professional investors is scarce. Experimental 
studies suggest that professional investors are more overconfident than inexperienced 
participants (Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Glaser, Langer and Weber, 2010). Few recent 
papers provide empirical evidence as we do showing that professional investors such 
as mutual fund managers are subject to self-serving attribution bias and 
overconfidence. Puetz and Puenzi (2011) report that fund managers trade more 
excessively after good performance. A recent working paper by Choi and Lou (2010) 
uses Active Share as a proxy of overconfidence and uses the sum of positive (negative) 
past performance as a proxy for confirming (disconfirming) market signals. They find 
evidence to show that fund managers tend to boost their confidence to a larger extent 
after confirming market signals than to decrease confidence after disconfirming 
market signals. Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) apply content analysis on the reports 
managers write to their investors and show that mutual fund managers who generate 
superior past performance become overconfident. Additionally, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by highlighting significant behavioral differences between 
solo- and team-managed funds. The extant literature mainly focuses on overall 
performance (Prather and Middleton, 2002, 2006; Chen et al 2004) and Massa, Reuter, 
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and Zitzewitz (2010) focus on the strategic decision of fund houses to disclose the 
names of fund management teams or not and look at the investor reaction. Notable 
exceptions are Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) who were among the first to explore the 
behavioral differences between solo- and team-managed funds and show that team-
managed funds follows less extreme investment styles and hold less industry 
concentrated portfolios, and eventually, are less like to experience extreme 
performance outcomes. 
Second, this chapter contributes to the literature on mutual fund performance. Despite 
the extensive literature examining overconfidence and the potential impact of 
overconfidence among retail investors and corporate managers, there is a limited 
amount of work that looks directly at the role of confidence on subsequent 
performance. This chapter is one of the first attempts to explore the potential non-
linear relationship between confidence level and future performance. A close related 
work by Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) uses content analysis to test whether 
overconfidence is associated with diminished subsequent performance. Similar to our 
findings, these authors provides strong evidence of an inverted U relationship between 
confidence and subsequent performance and they find a trading strategy, based on 
shorting on overconfident funds and going long on normal confident funds generating 
superior returns. 
Third, this chapter contributes to the literature on mutual fund flows. Many investors 
chase funds with superior past performance but fail to flee from poorly performing 
funds (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998 and among others). Investors are also sensitive to 
fund expenses and management fees (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber, Odean, and 
Zheng, 2005) and other documented determinants of fund flows including fund 
138 
 
advertising (Jain and Wu, 2000; Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks, 2015), media coverage 
(Kaniel, Starks, and Vasudevan, 2007), fund attribute (Bollen, 2007), and fund 
manager characteristics (e.g., Wermers, 2003; Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi, 2013; 
Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt, 2015). This chapter contributes to this literature 
by showing for the first time that managerial overconfidence has a significant impact 
on mutual fund flows. Investors appear to irrationally chase overconfident managers. 
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows. In Section 4.2, this 
chapter reviews recent related literature on overconfidence. Section 4.3 describes the 
related methodology used in this chapter. Section 4.4 presents data source and sample 
construction. Section 4.5 shows the empirical analysis and results and Section 4.6 
concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Traditional finance seeks to understand the financial market by predominately 
assuming that economic agents are perfectly “rational” in theoretical models. Under 
this assumption, these agents process information correctly and make decisions in an 
unbiased way to constantly maximize their utility. However, it has become clear now 
that this appealingly simple approach fails to explain asset pricing anomalies and 
individual trading behaviors found in the empirical studies (e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 
2003). Behavioral finance suggests that human beings are not fully “rational” and are 
subject to behavioral bias and heuristics that can potentially affect their information 
processing and decision making. In particular, overconfidence is one of the most 
recognized and documented behavioral attributes in the psychological literature. A 
large number of studies in recent finance literature relates managerial overconfidence 
to decision-making in the context of corporate finance, showing that corporate 
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managers who are subject to overconfidence bias tend to make value-destroying 
investment, merger and acquisition, and financing decisions (e.g., Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005, 2008;, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; and Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 
2011).  
The literature also seeks to investigate the potential impact of overconfidence on 
investors’ investment decisions and trading behaviors in the financial market. Indeed, 
there is ample evidence to show that retail investors are prone to overconfidence bias. 
For example, recent studies document that individual investors trade too much, and 
such excessive trading eventually leads to negative returns net of transaction costs 
(e.g., Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001, 2002; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2009).  
Gervais and Odean (2001) seek to understand and explain overconfidence in a 
dynamic context by the self-serving attribution bias which is a well-established 
behavioral bias in the psychological literature. This bias states that people tend to 
attribute good (positive) outcome to their own skills while they blame poor (negative) 
outcome to chance (e.g., Hastorf, et al, 1970; Miller and Ross, 1975). In a financial 
context, Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that investors learn their own ability from 
their past successes and failures, and self-serving attribution bias leads them to take 
too much credit for their good outcomes but too little responsibility for poor outcomes 
and, eventually leads them to become overconfident. In financial markets where the 
unobserved quality of investors’ private information can only be learned through 
delayed and noisy feedbacks, they are particularly susceptible to the self-serving 
attribution bias and therefore prone to overconfidence. 
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Although institutional investors such as mutual funds play an increasingly dominant 
role in the financial market, there are only few studies that analyze the behaviors of 
these professional investors who can also be susceptible to behavioral biases and 
heuristics such as overconfidence. Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) investigate 
overconfidence among equity mutual fund managers by looking at the relationship 
between past performance and subsequent turnover ratio. Consistent with the 
prediction from the theoretical studies in the behavioral finance literature, these 
authors provide strong evidence to show that fund managers tend to engage in 
excessive trading following good past performance. In particular, they find that 
subsequent turnover ratios are significantly positively related with past performance 
for those managers with performance in the top quintile in the previous year. More 
interestingly, a non-linear relationship between past performance and turnover ratio is 
observed by these authors: past losers are also more likely to have high subsequent 
turnover rates. However, Puetz and Puenzi (2011) do not examine the potential impact 
of overconfidence following good past performance on subsequent performance. 
Choi and Lou (2010) aim to directly investigate whether mutual fund managers are 
subject to the self-serving attribution bias by using Active Share as a proxy for 
confidence. They find a significant positive relationship between the sum of positive 
past performance and the subsequent Active Share level, suggesting that confirming 
public signals as reflected on the sum of positive past performance boots managers’ 
overconfidence. These authors also find that this tendency to self-attribute is 
significantly more pronounced for less experienced managers. Choi and Lou (2010) 
also try to look at the impact of overconfidence on subsequent performance. They 
argue that if managers are subject to the self-serving attribution bias and therefore 
make sub-optimal investment decisions and portfolio allocations, these managers 
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should experience deteriorating future performance. They find evidence to this 
hypothesis by mainly testing the relationship between the sums of positive past 
performance on future performance. Their approach, however, might be problematic. 
The sum of positive past performance can be highly correlated with the overall past 
performance. One might argue that the observed negative relationship between the 
sum of positive past performance and subsequent performance could mainly be driven 
by the fact that superior past performance will eventually revert to mean in the absence 
of skill.  
Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) apply a different approach to examining managerial 
overconfidence by content analyzing the report managers write to their investors. 
Using a range of proxies for overconfidence based on content analysis, they are able 
to show that mutual fund managers who generate superior past performance become 
overconfident, and that excessive confidence is significantly negatively associated 
with subsequent performance. More interestingly, they reveal an inverted U 
relationship between managerial confidence level and subsequent performance. 
Specifically, managers with normal confidence outperform their peer mangers who 
exhibit under- or overconfidence. A trading strategy based on shorting funds managed 
by abnormal overconfident managers and going long in funds with moderately 
confident managers yields economically significant positive risk-adjusted returns. 
There are several recent studies closely related to the overconfidence of professional 
investors. Looking at currency markets, O’Connell and Teo (2009) show that 
institutions tend to increase their risk following gains, and these authors argue that 
such performance-dependent behavior is consistent with overconfidence. Nikolic and 
Yan (2014) investigate the impact of investor overconfidence on firm value and 
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corporate decisions. These authors show that firms with more overconfident 
professional investors are relatively overvalued and these firms issue more equity and 
make more investments. 
Overall, behavioral biases and heuristics that are grounded in the cognitive psychology 
literature have been increasingly applied in financial contexts. In particular, 
overconfidence is viewed in the behavioral finance literature as one of the well-
documented psychological attributes that can be highly influential in shaping decisions 
of economic agents. In fact, Plous (1993) suggests that no bias is “more prevalent and 
more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence” in the field of judgement and 
decision-making. There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature 
investigating how overconfidence among corporate managers and retail investors 
impact corporate decisions and individuals’ trading behaviors. However, there is much 
less, and in general no inconclusive empirical evidence on the effect of overconfidence 
among professional investors. Given the increasing importance of professional 
investors in the financial markets, it is particularly interesting to examine whether 
professional investors who are usually believed to be rational or at least more rational 
than individual investors, are also subject to self-serving attribution bias and 
overconfidence, and whether and to what extent such biases might impact investment 
performance. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Measuring Fund Manager Confidence Level 
A key challenge for any study of investor overconfidence is to find a good measure of 
overconfidence. Researchers have to rely on personal characteristics that are related 
to overconfidence in the psychology literature such as gender (Prince, 1993; 
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Lundeberg, Fox, and Puncochar, 1994) or the behaviors of overconfident investors 
that are predicted from theoretical models. For instance, Odean (1998) shows 
theoretically that overconfidence leads to higher trading activity, larger positions in 
risky assets, more concentrated portfolios and greater risks. Intuitively, the mechanism 
is that overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their private information 
and place too much weight on this information. This eventually leads investors to trade 
too heavily based on their private information. In the context of professional investors, 
an alternative proxy for confidence level is the Active Share of Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009), calculated as the sum of absolute deviations from one’s benchmark index. The 
hypothesis is that, overconfident fund managers overweight stocks in their portfolio 
for which they have access to private information with overestimated precision and 
put too little weight on other stocks and eventually deviate too far from their 
benchmark indices, as reflected in a high Active Share level. 
Essentially, the Active Share gauges how much mutual fund portfolios deviate from 
their benchmark indices. It is defined as the one half of the sum of absolute deviations 
in portfolio weight of a fund portfolio from its benchmark index portfolio: 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 =
1
2
∑|𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥|
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
where 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑
 is the weight of stock j in the fund’s portfolio at time t, and 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the weight of the same stock j in the fund’s benchmark index portfolio 
at time t. Active share is thencalculated as the sum over the universe of all stock assets. 
To intuitively illustrate Active Share, consider a new mutual fund starts to invest 100% 
of its cash into the S&P 500 index and eliminates half of the stocks in the index, and 
re-invests the cash generated into the other half of the stocks. This mutual fund would 
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then only have 50% overlap with its benchmark index, thus generating an Active Share 
of 50%. For a mutual fund with only stock positions and no leverage and short 
positions, the Active Share of this mutual fund will always lie between 0% and 100%.1 
Furthermore, changes in Active share level are calculated as the difference of Active 
Share level between two reports of mutual fund holdings, for the purpose of additional 
tests of managerial overconfidence. 
Although mutual funds are required by the SEC to disclose their self-declared 
benchmark indices in the fund prospectuses after 1998, such data are not available in 
any existing public database. Determining the benchmark index for a large sample of 
mutual funds is no easy task. Petajisto (2013) uses few snapshots of the “primary 
benchmark index” as collected by Morningstar from fund prospectuses. However, this 
approach may not only suffer from limited data on the benchmark in the fund 
prospectus, but can also potentially lead to biased estimation. Mutual funds can 
strategically pick the benchmark index that does not realistically reflect the risk 
exposure of their holdings. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) take a different approach to 
determine the benchmark index for each fund by looking at calculated Active Share 
levels against all available benchmark index and picking the benchmark indices with 
the lowest Active Share as that fund’s benchmark. Following Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) this chapter uses the smallest Active Share (activeshare_min) as the measure 
of active management, and assigns the corresponding best-fit benchmark index 
(index_min) to each fund. 
                                                          
1 Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) argue that an Active Share larger than 60% can be 
viewed as active management. 
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4.3.2 Measuring Fund Performance 
The main performance measure we use is based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model, which controls for risk and style factors including size, book-to-market and 
momentum effects. This chapter estimates the following regression: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where the dependent variable in the model is the monthly return on mutual fund 
portfolio i at time t minus the risk-free rate at time t, and the independent variables are 
given by the returns of four different zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios 
based on excess market return, size, book-to-market ratio and prior performance. 
Specifically, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 denotes the excess market returns over the risk free rate at 
time t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of stocks with small and large 
market capitalization at time t; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of 
stocks with high and low book-to-market ratio at time t; 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the return difference 
between portfolios of stocks with high and low past performance at time t. Using 
monthly observations of fund returns and factors returns in this chapter, we run the 
regression for each fund i and each year and collect the time series of the estimated 
intercept for each fund i as the risk-adjusted performance over time. This chapter also 
estimates the one-factor CAPM alpha and the Fama - French (1993) three-factor alpha 
for robustness tests. The CAPM model uses only the market factor, and the Fama and 
French (1993) approach employs the first three factors in the model above. 
Additionally, this chapter looks at the realization of extreme (good or bad) 
performance outcome by estimating the performance extremity measure that is based 
on Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) who examine the effects of the management 
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structure of mutual funds on subsequent risk taking behaviors and performance 
extremity. For each fund i in each time period t, the performance extremity measure 
is calculated as the absolute difference between a fund’s performance and the average 
performance of all funds in the same market segment at the same time period. These 
numbers are then normalized by dividing them by the average absolute difference of 
all n funds in the corresponding market segment and respective time period: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
|𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡|
1
𝑛
∑ |𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 denotes the performance of fund portfolio i at time period t and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡 
is the average performance of all funds at the same market segment at time period t. 
A higher level of performance extremity measure indicates a more extreme 
performance outcome, either good or bad. After normalizing the performance 
extremity measure, a fund with exact average performance within its market segment 
by construction has a performance extremity of 1 while a fund with extreme 
performance relative to all funds in its market segment would demonstrate a 
performance extremity that is above 1. 
4.3.3 Measuring Fund Flows  
Following prior literature (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison 1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998), 
net investor flow of individual fund share class i at time t is estimated as: 
𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total net asset for individual fund share class i at time t; 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is 
the gross return before expense ratio for individual fund share class i at time t; 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
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is the increase in total net asset for individual fund share class i at time t due to fund 
mergers. Since the CRSP Mutual Fund Database does not provides the exact data on 
which the merger occurs, this chapter follows Lou (2012) using the last net asset value 
(NAV) report date as the initial estimate of the merger date and, in order to avoid the 
obvious mismatches generated by this initial estimate, this chapter matches a target 
individual share class to its acquirer from one month before its last NAV report date 
to five months later, a total of 7 months matching period. Then, the month in which 
the acquirer has the smallest absolute percentage flow, after subtracting the merger, is 
assigned as the merge event month. After adjusting for mutual fund mergers, monthly 
estimated net flows for all share classes belonging to their common fund are summed 
to obtain the total fund level monthly estimated flow. Monthly fund flows during the 
corresponding quarter are then aggregated into the quarter flow. This chapter assumes 
that investor inflow and outflow take place at the end of each quarter, and investors 
reinvest their dividends and capital appreciation distributions in the same fund. 
4.4 Data and Sample 
4.4.1 Data on Mutual Fund Holdings and Returns 
Mutual fund holdings data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings 
database (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum Database), which is based on mandatory 
quarterly reports filed with the SEC and from voluntary reports generated by the 
mutual funds themselves. Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database provides 
information including fund identification (fundno), report date (rdate), file date 
(fdate), stock identification (cusip), and number of shares held (shares). 
The CRSP Mutual Fund Database provides information on monthly fund net returns 
(ret), monthly total net assets (tna), monthly net assets value (nav) different types of 
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fees including annual expense ratio (exp_ratio) and management fee (mgmt._fee), 
turnover ratio (turn_ratio), investment objectives, first offer date (first_offer_dt) and 
other fund characteristics for each share class of every U.S. open-end mutual fund. 
Following the standard procedure in the literature, for funds with multiple share 
classes with the same back-up portfolio, this chapter computes the sum of total net 
assets under management (tna) in each share class to arrive at the total net assets of 
the fund. For monthly net returns, expense ratio and turnover ratio at fund level, this 
chapter estimates the value-weighted average across share classes based on the total 
net assets of each share class. For all other fund variables such as fund name 
(fund_name), first offer date (first_offer_dt), management company name 
(mgmt._name), portfolio manager name (mgr_name), this chapter selects the variables 
from the share class with the highest total net assets and longest history. 
This chapter maps the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database with the 
CRSP Mutual Fund Database by using the MFLINKS Database. The database 
provides the key identification Wharton Financial Institution Center Number (wficn) 
for portflios that can reliably link fund identification in CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
(crsp_fundno) and portfolio identification in the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund 
Holdings Database (fundno). This chapter also tries to correct any matching errors 
after this standard data merging procedure by looking manually at fund names in both 
databases. 
4.4.2 Active Share Data 
Active Share data are obtained from Petajisto’s Website,2 which is the updated main 
data set from Petajisto (2013). To calculate active share, one needs data on portfolio 
                                                          
2 http://www.petajisto.net/data 
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holdings of mutual funds as well as the composition of their benchmark indices. 
Petajisto (2013) includes a total of 19 indices used by mutual funds in the sample 
where the index holdings data are obtained from the index providers. The indices are 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Russell Investment, and Dow Jones/Wilshire Associates, 
including their common large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap indices as well as growth 
and value indices. The detailed description to construct active share dataset can be 
found in Petajisto (2013).  
4.4.3 Stock Price and Accounting Data 
Data on stock identification, stock return, delisting return, share price, trading volume, 
cumulative price adjustment factors, cumulative shares adjustment factors and total 
outstanding shares, as well as other stock characteristics, are obtained from the CRSP 
stock price database. This CRSP price dataset3 is then merged with the Thomson 
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database by matching stock identification (cusip) and 
holding report date (rdate) and file date (fdate). The number of shares held (shares) in 
the portfolios are adjusted by the CRSP cumulative shares adjustment factors. There 
are cases where the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database has already 
adjusted the number of shares held in the portfolio, so in order to track portfolio 
holdings correctly this chapter re-adjusts the number of shares back. Data used to 
estimate book value of equity for stocks as in Daniel and Titman (1997) are retrieved 
from Compustat, including shareholders’ equity (SEQ), deferred taxes (TXDB), 
investment tax credit (ITCB), and preferred stock (PREF). Industry classifications 
(SIC) are obtained from the CRSP stock file and Compustat whenever available. 
                                                          
3 Stock return is adjusted for delist events, share price is adjusted by cumulative price adjustment 
factors, and share outstanding is adjusted by cumulative shares adjustment factors. 
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4.4.4 Sample Selection 
The focus of the analysis is on actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds 
for which the holdings data are most complete and reliable. This chapter follows and 
modifies the procedure of Kacperczyk et al (2008) to select U.S. domestic equity 
mutual funds. This chapter starts with all mutual fund samples in the CRSP Mutual 
Fund Database and the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database universe, 
and then looks at various investment objective codes including Investment Objective 
codes (IOC) from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database, Strategic 
Insight objective codes (si_obj_cd), Weisenberger classes codes (wbrger_obj_cd), 
Lipper classification codes (lipper_class) and CRSP policy codes (policy) taken from 
the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. This chapter requires average equity holdings 
(avrcs) to be at least 70% and the percentage of matched U.S. stock holdings to be at 
least 60%. This chapter also excludes sector funds and funds with total net assets under 
management below $10 million. These selection criteria effectively exclude balanced, 
bond, money market, international, sector funds as well as those funds not invested 
primarily in equity securities. Additionally, this chapter eliminates index, ETF, 
exchange target and target date funds by looking at the name of funds. This screening 
procedure generates a final sample of 80651 fund-quarter observations with a total of 
2740 unique U.S. domestic equity mutual fund samples in the period 1980 to 2009. 
Appendix A provides further details on the sample selection. 
4.4.5 Summary Statistics  
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the equity funds included in our sample. 
Panel A reports the total number of domestic equity mutual funds in each 5-year period 
along with the fund characteristics. Consistent with the literature, the past three 
decades witnesses a tremendous growth in the size of mutual fund industry in terms 
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of number of funds and the average total net assets under management. Despite the 
increasingly important role of mutual funds in financial market, it is interesting to see 
that there is a significant decreasing trend of active management in the industry over 
the sample period. Equity funds average Active Share dropped from 90.5% in 1980 to 
81.7% in 1990, and to 74.0% in 2009, the end of our sample period. Panel B shows 
the time series summary statistics of sample funds categorised by investment 
objectives. Relative to other funds, micro-cap funds exhibit the highest Active Share 
and they have the highest expense ratios, perhaps reflecting the cost of their active 
management style. On the other hand, growth & income funds and income funds were 
much less active in terms of in portfolio stock allocations, and they also tend to trade 
much less than funds in other investment objective groups. 
Table 4.2 reports the detailed summary statistics of Active Share, our main proxy for 
overconfidence, across market segments. It highlights the structural differences in 
Active Share among investment objective categories. In particular, both micro-cap and 
small-cap funds exhibit significantly higher levels of Active Share in terms of mean 
and median value relative to other investment categories. While similar maximum 
values of Active Share across segments are observed, micro-cap and small-cap funds 
exhibit considerably higher level of Active Share for the upper quartile, median and 
lower quartile levels. 
To demonstrate the structural difference of Active Share according to investment 
objective, we also show the distribution of Active Share levels in Figure 4.1. As we 
can see, on average micro-cap and small-cap mutual funds (or aggressive growth-
oriented funds) have a disproportionately very high Active Share level in the range of 
90% to 100%. Almost half of sample funds in this range are from micro-cap and small-
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cap funds. There is also a significant skewness to high Active Share for mid-cap funds. 
In contrast, growth funds and growth & income funds show a more normal distribution 
with mean in the range of 75-80% and 70-75%, respectively. Such significant 
structural variation can potentially lead to false implications about the relationship 
between Active Share and subsequent performance, as portfolios of funds with high 
Active Share merely reflect the exposure to micro-cap and small-cap funds. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Overconfidence and Past Fund Performance 
This chapter examines whether fund managers become overconfident after good past 
performance by using the sum of absolute deviation from the fund’s benchmark index 
(i.e., Active Share) to proxy for fund manager confidence level and relating this to the 
fund’s past performance. The conjecture is that outstanding past performance might 
make fund managers who are subject to self-attribution bias believe that they are better 
skilled at picking stocks than they actually are, which eventually leads to an 
unnecessarily high level of Active Share. Following Cremers and Petajisto (2009), this 
chapter tests for a linear relationship between past performance and Active Share level 
by running a pooled panel regression of Active Share on fund’s past performance and 
other fund characteristics as follows: 
                           𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                   (1) 
where 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the active share level for fund i at quarter t, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the past performance of mutual fund i, one year prior to the current quarter 
t¸ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a vector of control variables relating to fund characteristics in the 
literature. In order to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all 
control variables by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are 
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lagged 1 year due to lack of quarterly data availability. Specifically, this chapter 
includes fund age (natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date), fund size 
(natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars), 
expense ratio (in percentage per year), turnover rate (in percentage per year), manager 
tenure (natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place) and 
the percentage flow (the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1). To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, we follow the standard 
procedure in the literature and winsorise Flow and Turnover at the 1% level. 4 We also 
include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies 
to control segment fixed effects. 
Table 4.3 reports the results of regressions of Active Share level to past performance 
and a variety of fund characteristics from Model (1). Column (1) shows that past 
performance measured as the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha is positively related to 
current Active Share level. The estimated coefficient on past performance is 0.57 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. To rule out the possibility that such positive 
performance-Active Share relationship is driven by other fund characteristics related 
with Active Share, Column (3) introduces a variety of control variables of fund 
characteristics that commonly used in the literature. Surprisingly, the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient on past performance increases to 1.10, statistically significant at 
the 1% level, after controlling for other fund characteristics. These results indicate that 
fund managers tend to have a higher level of Active Share following good 
performance. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients of control variables for 
Model (1) are broadly in line with Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013). 
                                                          
4 e.g., Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2014) 
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In practice, mutual fund managers are more likely to be evaluated based on their 
relative performance compared to the other equity fund managers within the same 
market segment. There are a body of studies in the literature that use an ordinal 
performance measure (performance ranks) to explain investor flows. Their findings in 
general show that good past performance attracts investor flows and more importantly, 
ordinal performance measures explain inflows better than cardinal performance 
measures. Since mutual fund managers are mainly compensated by the amount of total 
assets under management, which is primarily driven by how much flows they can 
attract from the market, they are motivated to compete with their peer managers for 
inflows, and therefore managers are mainly concerned about their relative positions. 
Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) relate turnover ratio to relative performance positions and 
provide evidence that good past performance relative to other peer managers leads to 
a higher turnover ratio. This chapter follows this approach to capture the impact of 
past performance on the confidence level of mutual fund managers, reflected by the 
deviation from their benchmark indices. Specifically, this chapter constructs the 
performance rank of a fund by ordering all funds belonging to a specific market 
segment in each quarter end based on past performance and then assigns a rank number 
to each fund for each quarter. This rank number is normalized to be equally distributed 
between 0 and 1. For each quarter, the fund with best past performance by construction 
has the normalized performance rank of 1 and the fund with the worse past 
performance has the normalized performance rank of 0. Using this performance rank, 
this chapter runs the following regression: 
                      𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                (2) 
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where 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the active share level for fund i at quarter t, 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 is the normalised rank of fund past performance, measured over one 
year period prior to current quarter t¸ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is the vector of control variables 
relating to fund characteristics. 
Table 4.4 summarises the results of the regressions of Active Share on past 
performance rank. Consistent with what we observe in Table 4.3, a higher past 
performance rank relative to all other funds in the same market segment is associated 
with a higher level of Active Share. The estimated coefficients of past performance 
rank are both statistically significantly positive at the 1% significance level, before 
and after controlling for fund characteristics. The coefficient on past performance in 
Column (3) suggests that an increase of past performance rank by 0.2 is associated 
with an increase of Active Share level by about 0.72%, holding all other things 
constant. Overall, consistent with Cremers and Petajisto (2009), there is a general 
positive relationship between past performance and current Active Share level and this 
relationship is statistically significant at the 1% significance level after controlling for 
other fund characteristics, which indicates that fund managers with good past 
performance tend to have higher level of Active Share. However, the relationships 
found in both Model (1) and Model (2) are not economically significant, suggesting a 
potential non-linear relationship between past performance and fund manager 
confidence level.  
The potential non-linear relationship between past performance and Active Share level 
might arise for following reasons: first, it is not surprising to see that only fund 
managers with outstanding past performance are more prone to self-attribution bias 
and believe that they are better than average. Consequently, these overconfident fund 
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managers are more likely to allocate their portfolios’ assets in an aggressive way that 
they might deviate far more from their benchmark indices than others. Neither poor 
performing fund managers, nor those with average past performance would be likely 
to become overconfident. Therefore this chapter expects a positive relationship 
between past performance and Active Share level among very successful fund 
managers with superior past performance. Second, in an attempt to increase the chance 
to catch up their positions, fund managers with poor past performance might be 
motivated to gamble, otherwise they might face career risk. Such a career incentive 
might lead these poorly performing managers to engage in aggressively deviating from 
their target benchmark indices and therefore a negative relationship between past 
performance and the Active Share level for fund managers with poor past 
performance. Third, this chapter expects to find no strong or weaker relationship 
between past performance and the Active Share level for fund managers with average 
performance. Overall, a U-shape relationship between past performance and the 
Active Share level is expected.  
Following Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) who find strong evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between past performance and turnover ratio, this chapter uses two 
alternative modelling approaches to capture the potential U-shape relationship. 
First, this chapter applies the piecewise linear regression approach to estimate 
differential slope coefficients for the impact of past performance on Active Share 
across different ranges of past performance separately. Specifically, three slope 
coefficients are estimated for the bottom past performance quintile, the three middle 
past performance quintile and the top past performance quintile by running the 
following regression: 
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𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1
𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
where: 
𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 = min (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1, 0.2) 
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 = min (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 0.6) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 − (𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) 
and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the active share level for fund i at the quarter t, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
is the vector of control variables relating to fund characteristics. A negative (positive) 
coefficient for the bottom (top) performance quintile is expected while there is no 
directional expectation for the three middle quintiles of past performance. But, we 
should expect a weaker impact of past performance on manager’s confidence level 
reflecting in the Active Share level in terms of absolute value than the other two 
quintile groups. 
Second, this chapter estimates a quadratic relationship between past performance and 
Active Share by modelling past performance in linear and quadratic terms: 
  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1)
2
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡       (4) 
where 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the active share level for fund i at the quarter t, 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 is the normalised rank of fund past performance, measured over one 
year prior to the current quarter t¸ (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1)
2
 is the squared normalized rank 
of fund past performance,  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is the vector of control variables relating to fund 
characteristics. For this quadratic regression, this chapter expects a negative 
coefficient for the linear term and a positive coefficient for the quadratic term, so that 
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the shape of the non-linear relationship between past performance and Active Share is 
confirmed to be U-shape. 
Estimation results for Model (3) are presented in Table 4.5. Our main focus is on the 
coefficient for the impact of past performance on subsequent Active Share level in the 
top performance quintile. The estimated coefficient on 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is positive and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level at all model specifications. In unreported 
analysis, this significant positive relationship between a fund’s past performance and 
its subsequent Active Share level holds irrespective of whether we measure past 
performance using raw fund returns, the one-factor CAPM alpha, or the Fama and 
French (1993) three factor alpha. The coefficients on 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 are typically significant 
at the 1% level. The reported impact of past performance on Active Share is also 
economically significant. Assuming all other effects are constant, there is a 
considerable difference in Active Share level between the very best performing fund 
(rank 1) and a fund at the bottom of the top performance quintile (rank 0.8) of about 
12% (0.60 × 0.2 = 0.12). 
In contrast, the coefficient on 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 suggests that there is an economically and 
statistically significant negative relationship between past performance and 
subsequent performance for the bottom performance quintile. By holding all other 
variables constant, we find a considerable difference in Active Share level between a 
fund at the top of the bottom performance quintile (rank 0.2) and the worst performing 
fund (rank 0) of about -8.6% (−0.43 × 0.2 = −0.086), meaning that funds that 
experience poor past performance tend to engage in gambling by choosing higher 
Active Share level, perhaps in an attempt to increase the chance to catch up their 
positions in the future. Furthermore, estimated coefficient for the three middle 
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performance quintiles is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the 
model specification with controls for other fund characteristics. But the magnitude of 
the effect is dramatically smaller comparing to the top and bottom performance 
quintiles. We only observe a 1.2% increase of Active Share level from the funds at the 
bottom of the middle quintiles to the funds at the top of the middle performance 
quintiles. Table 4.6 reports the results for the quadratic specification of Model (4). As 
expected, we find significant negative coefficients for the linear impact of past 
performance and significant positive coefficients for the quadratic term, which 
therefore confirms the U-shaped relationship between past performance and Active 
Share reported in Table 4.5. 
To investigate whether good past performance is associated with an increase of Active 
Share, we run regressions of changes in Active Share on past performance, using 
piecewise regression approaches. Results from piecewise regressions are presented in 
Table 4.7. A positive and significantly positive relationship between past performance 
and changes in Active Share level is found for fund managers who are in the top 
quintile of past performance while no significant relationship for other lower quintiles 
of past performance, after controlling for fund characteristics. Estimated coefficient 
on 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is positive and it is statistically significant at 1% level regardless of model 
specifications. The effect of past performance on changes in Active Share is also 
economically significant. Holding all other effects constant, there is a considerable 
difference in changes in Active Share level between the very best performing fund 
(rank 1) and a fund at the bottom of the top performance quintile (rank 0.8) of about 
1% (0.049 × 0.2 = 0.0098), suggesting that fund managers tend to increase their 
Active Share levels following outstanding performance. 
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Team managed mutual funds are increasingly popular in the industry in recent years 
(Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi, 2011). A natural question is to look at how the investment 
decisions made by teams differ from those of individuals. The literature provides two 
competing hypotheses on the impact of management structure. The group shift 
hypothesis (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Hogg, Turner and Davidson, 1990; Kerr, 
1992) suggests that individuals make less extreme decisions than do teams, because 
the opinions of team members are likely to shift towards the opinion of the dominant 
person, which eventually leading to aggressive decisions. If this is case, solo managed 
funds might be less likely to be at risk of becoming overconfident after good past 
performance than team managed funds who are prone to group think bias. On the other 
hand, the diversification of opinions hypothesis suggests that teams are more rational 
than individuals (Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 2005) and they make 
less extreme decisions (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986 and 1988). If this is true, one might 
expect that individuals are more likely to be at risk of being overconfident after good 
past performance and of gambling after poor past performance. Recent work by Bär, 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) provides supporting evidence for the diversification of 
opinions hypothesis. They show that team managed mutual funds make less aggressive 
style bets, their portfolios are less industry concentrated, and they achieve less extreme 
subsequent performance. 
Motivated by Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011), this chapter investigates the potential 
difference in responses to past performance between solo managed and team managed 
mutual funds by interacting the performance quintiles with a solo management 
dummy, and adding additional solo management dummies without interaction to 
capture the constant effect between solo and team managed funds. The regression 
model is: 
161 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
𝐿𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
𝑀𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑇𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3
𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3
𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                    (5) 
where 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 if mutual fund i is single-
managed during the period t-1 to t, and zero otherwise. All other explanatory variables 
and control variables are defined before. Under the group shift hypothesis, we should 
observe that solo managed funds act more rationally and are therefore less likely to 
become overconfident after good past performance and to gamble after poor past 
performance. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient is expected for the interaction 
term of bottom (top) performance quintile. Under the diversification opinion 
hypothesis, we should observe that solo managed funds act more irrationally, and 
therefore, a negative (positive) coefficient is expected for the interaction term of 
bottom (top) performance quintile. Model (5) results are presented in Table 4.8. 
The estimated coefficient of the single-managed fund dummy variable 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, meaning that solo managed 
mutual funds on average have a marginal higher Active Share of 1.18% than funds 
managed by a team. More interestingly, the effect of past performance on Active Share 
level interacted with the solo dummy for the top performance quintile is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that solo-managed funds are more 
prone to self-attribution bias and are more likely to be as risk of becoming 
overconfident than team-managed peer funds following outstanding performance, as 
reflected by about 1.93% ((0.0965 × 0.2 = 0.0193) higher Active Share of solo-
managed funds than their team-managed counterparties. For the bottom performance 
quintile, the effect of past performance on Active Share level interacted with the solo 
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dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with 
the view that solo-managed funds are more likely to increase Active Share level after 
bad performance. Overall, these results of significant difference in Active Share 
between solo- and team-managed funds directly support the diversification opinion 
hypothesis which predicts that solo-managed funds are more irrational than team-
managed funds and are more easily subject to behavioral bias. 
For robustness check purposes, we use a fund’s relative position of Active Share level 
to other funds in the same market segment (Active Share rank) as an alternative proxy 
for fund manager confidence level and re-run all the regressions of Active Share rank 
or changes in Active Share rank on past performance using standard linear approach, 
and piecewise and quadratic non-linear approaches. We find consistent results 
showing that fund managers who experience outstanding performance are more likely 
to choose a significantly higher level of Active Share relative to other funds in the 
same market segment, and they are more likely to increase their Active Share rank. 
Furthermore, we test our hypothesis by using the Fama - Macbeth (1973) regression 
method. This approach deals with any potential non-independence of observations by 
analyzing each quarter’s observations separately, and therefore, will produce more 
conservative estimates of coefficient significance levels. In unreported tables, results 
are all robust with regard to the Fama - Macbeth (1973) regression method at similar 
significant levels. Therefore, our findings provide strong evidence to show that mutual 
fund managers are prone to overconfidence following their past successes and such 
tendency appears to be stronger among solo-managed funds. 
To summarize, there is a clear U-shaped non-linear relationship between past 
performance of mutual funds and their subsequent Active Share level. In particular, 
163 
 
fund managers tend to choose a higher Active Share level, and these fund managers 
are also more likely to increase Active Share following their past successes. Such bias 
is more pronounced among solo-managed mutual funds. These findings are consistent 
with our conjecture that fund managers become overconfident after good past 
performance.  
4.5.2 Overconfidence and Subsequent Fund Performance 
Consistent with the prediction from overconfidence models in the literature, our results 
thus far have shown that outstanding past performance of mutual funds leads to 
excessive overconfidence, as reflected in their significantly higher level of Active 
Share and higher tendency to increase Active Share. Drawing on the behavioral 
finance literature, we would expect such sub-optimal investment decisions and 
excessive trading activities caused by overconfidence to   lead eventually to 
deteriorating future performance. Thus, our conjecture is that, if mutual fund managers 
are overconfident and are subject to self-attribution bias following their past successes, 
they might believe that they possess better than average skills. Over time, these 
managers could potentially over-estimate the precision of their private information, 
and therefore engage in excessive trading activities based on these over-estimated 
information. If this is true, we should observe that extremely high levels of Active 
Share will be associated with diminished subsequent performance. 
However, a high level of Active Share might not necessarily be an indicator of 
overconfidence. It is also possible that the observed higher levels of Active Share after 
good past performance reflects optimal portfolio allocation and rational investment 
decisions. After updating the precision of managers’ private information and their true 
skills, it is a rational response for truly skilled managers to put larger weights on their 
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private information, leading to a greater deviation from their benchmark indices. Such 
deviation by rational managers should then, on average, result in better portfolio 
allocation to good stocks and eventually lead to better subsequent performance. Under 
this hypothesis, we should observe high levels of Active Share being associated with 
superior subsequent performance. 
Indeed, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) provide evidence consistent 
with high Active Share predicting superior subsequent performance. Since the 
publication of Cremers and Petajisto (2009), there is an ongoing debate on Active 
Share in the investment community. On one hand, some investment houses support 
Active Share and voluntarily disclose the Active Share level of their portfolios under 
management to the public and their investors while others view Active Share as a 
flawed metric. On the other hand, investors increasingly seem to view Active Share as 
a convenient and flawless indicator of managerial skills to generate future 
performance. The main contribution of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto 
(2013) are to provide a powerful and intuitive tool to assess active management by 
distinguishing active portfolios from passive portfolios and thereby, to justify 
management fee charged to fund investors.  
However, the documented predictive power of Active Share might be over-estimated. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) sort and categorize mutual funds 
into groups based on their level of Active Share and look at the subsequent 
performance of those Active Share groups of mutual funds. Such an approach, without 
taking into account of the characteristics of funds and their corresponding market 
segments, can lead to biased implications. In particular, the distribution of Active 
Share levels are implicitly correlated with the investment objectives of the respective 
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portfolio. By segmenting mutual funds based on their investment objectives, this 
chapter shows that Active Share levels vary structurally across funds’ investment 
objective categories. In particular, on average micro-Cap and small-Cap mutual funds 
(or aggressive growth-oriented funds) have disproportionately very high Active Share 
levels. It is possible that the documented positive relationship between high Active 
Share and superior subsequent performance is primarily attributed to the exposure of 
these aggressive growth-oriented funds. Similarly, a recent report by Fidelity 
Investment (2014) shows the disproportionate numbers of small-Cap funds with very 
high Active Share level comparing to large-Cap funds. A small-cap fund with an 
average Active Share of 80% can be categorized as low Active Share, compared to 
other funds in the same market segment, while a growth & income fund with an 
average Active Share of 80% can be viewed as having high Active Share among its 
peer funds. 
To overcome this structural difference in Active Share level across different 
investment objective categories, this chapter uses a modified approach to assess active 
management by ranking funds within their corresponding market segment based on 
Active Share level. Specifically, for each quarter, this chapter constructs the Active 
Share rank of a fund by ordering all funds belonging to a specific market segment 
according to its Active Share. Each fund is assigned a rank number and this rank 
number is then is normalized so that ranks are evenly distributed between 0 and 1. The 
fund with highest Active Share level within its market segment gets assigned the rank 
1 while the fund with lowest Active Share level within its market segment has the rank 
0. This normalized rank number tells us the relative fund position along the active 
management spectrum compared to all other funds in the same market segment, and it 
also allows us to directly compare funds across different market segments. 
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Although Cremers and Petajisto (2009) apply multivariate regression analysis to the 
linear relationship between Active Share and excess performance controlling for fund 
characteristics, it is possible that they overlook any potential non-linear relationship. 
A potential non-linear relationship between Active Share and subsequent performance 
may arise for the following reasons. First, as we have shown before, fund managers 
with good past performance tend to have significantly higher Active Share, and this 
tendency is significantly more pronounced among the very best performing managers. 
Our conjecture is that, if these fund managers are overconfident and are subject to self-
attribution bias, excess trading and extremely high Active Share levels are more likely 
to be motivated by managers’ private information which might actually be much less 
precise than they think. This would lead to sub-optimal portfolio allocation and 
eventually diminishing performance. If this is the case, we should observe a negative 
relationship between Active Share and subsequent performance among funds in the 
top quintile of Active Share. Second, moderate Active Share levels might better reflect 
managers’ normal levels of confidence and more rational investment decisions. Fund 
managers with normal confidence assess and update their private information in a 
more rational way. Consequently, it is rational for them to put larger weights on their 
private information and smaller weights on other stocks from their benchmark indices. 
In this scenario, these well motivated trading activities should lead to the realization 
of profitable opportunities and better portfolio allocation, which eventually generates 
better performance. If this is true, we should observe a strong positive relationship 
between Active Share and subsequent performance for the four Active Share quintile 
groups below the top quintile. Thus, overall, we expect an inverted U-shaped non-
linear relationship between Active Share and subsequent performance that can be 
masked as the documented positive linear relationship in the literature. 
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To capture the potential relationship between Active Share and subsequent 
performance, this chapter uses three alternative modeling approaches: (1) we apply a 
piecewise linear regression approach; (2) we replace the piecewise linear approach by 
dummies indicating in which decile of Active Share funds the respective fund lies; (3) 
we estimate a quadratic relationship between Active Share and subsequent 
performance by modelling Active Share as linear term and as quadratic terms.  
Applying a piecewise linear regression approach allows us to estimate slope 
coefficients for the impact of Active Share on subsequent performance for different 
quintiles of Active Share separately. Slope coefficients are estimated for the bottom 
quintile, the three middle quintiles, and the top quintile of segment ranks of Active 
Share: 
      𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1
𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡    (6) 
where: 
𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 = min (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1, 0.2) 
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 = min (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1, 0.6) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 − (𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) 
and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes the normalized segment rank of Active share for 
fund i during the period of time t-1 and t, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is the vector of control 
variables relating to fund characteristics. Under the overconfidence hypothesis, we 
expect positive slope coefficients for the bottom quintile and the three middle quintile 
of Active Share and a negative slope coefficient for the top quintile of Active Share. 
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Instead of assuming constant factor loadings across time, this chapter builds on the 
literature by using past data to estimate the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and 
determine the abnormal performance during the subsequent period.5 Specifically, for 
each fund each month, we use 12 months of past monthly fund returns to estimate the 
coefficients of the Carhart (1997) four-factor models and subtract the expected return 
from the realized return to determine the abnormal return of a fund. We then calculate 
quarterly abnormal performance for each fund-quarter observation. This approach 
takes into account possible time variations in the factor loadings of individual funds, 
and avoids sample selection bias that might arise when excluding young funds without 
a long return history. Following Cremers and Petajisto (2009), we run pooled panel 
regressions of fund abnormal performance on all the explanatory variables. In order to 
mitigate the potential endogeneity problem, we lag all control variables by one quarter, 
except the expenses and turnover ratio, which are lagged one year due to data 
availability. Specifically, as before, we include fund age, fund size, expense ratio, 
turnover rate, manager tenure and prior percentage flow and prior performance. To 
mitigate the impact of outliers on our estimates, we winsorise flow and turnover ratio 
at the 1% level. We also include year dummies to capture any time fixed effects and 
market segment dummies to control segment fixed effects in all regressions. To 
correctly account for the dependence of observations in our panel data set, we cluster 
standard errors by fund in all model specifications.  
Estimation results for the Model (6) relating to the piecewise linear regression of the 
abnormal performance based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model on the bottom 
                                                          
5 Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) apply a similar approach to look at the relationship between 
industry concentration of mutual funds and their subsequent abnormal performance. 
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quintile, the three middle quintiles and the top quintile of Active Share rank are 
presented in Table 4.9. First, the impact of Active Share on subsequent performance 
is positive for the bottom quintile of Active Share but the effect turns out to be 
statistically insignificant when including full set of control variables. Second, the slope 
coefficients for the three middle quintiles of Active Share are all positive and 
statistically significant at least at the 1% level with the full set of control variables, 
indicating that there is an economically significant difference in subsequent 
performance between a fund at the top of the middle quintiles of Active Share (Rank 
0.8) and a fund at the bottom of the middle quintiles (Rank 0.2) of 18.75 basis points 
per quarter (= 0.003124 × 0.6 = 0.001875) or 0.75% on an annual basis, holding 
other effects constant. Strikingly, and perhaps more interestingly, the impact of Active 
Share on subsequent performance turns to be statistically negative for the top quintile 
of Active Share. The effect is economically significant: on average funds with the 
highest segment rank of Active Share (Rank 1.0) underperform funds at the bottom of 
the top quintile of Active Share (Rank 0.8) by about 27.58 basis points per quarter (=
−0.01379 × 0.2 = −0.002758) or 1.09% per year. Thus, these results from 
piecewise linear regressions suggests a clear inverted U-shaped relationship between 
Active Share and subsequent performance. This is consistent with our conjecture that 
normal confidence levels of fund managers, as reflected in moderate levels of Active 
Share, are associated with better subsequent performance while excessive 
overconfidence as reflected in extreme high Active Share is significantly associated 
with diminished future investment returns. 
To explore further the relationship of being among the most active funds within the 
market segment to subsequent performance, this chapter applies an alternative 
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approach by replacing the piecewise linear approach by dummies indicating in which 
decile of Active Share funds: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 ∙ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑛(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1
10
𝑛=2
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
where the expression 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑛(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 indicates whether the fund i 
belongs to the segment rank decile n according to its Active Share level during time 
period t-1 to t. For example, 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦10(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 equals to 1, if the 
fund belongs to the top decile within its market segment, i.e. if its segment rank of 
Active Share is between 0.9 and 1.0, and zero otherwise. The lowest decile of Active 
Share rank is the base decile representing mere index “huggers”, and therefore is not 
included in the regression in order to prevent the independent variables to be linear 
dependent. 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑛(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 gives us the excess subsequent 
performance of a fund within Active Share decile n compared to being the lowest 
decile within the same market segment. 
Table 4.10 summarizes the results of running the Model (7) on relating to the impact 
of belonging to a specific Active Share decile within the respective market segment. 
There is a general increasing trend in the magnitude of the coefficients on Active Share 
decile dummy variables from 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 up to 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦7(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1. Estimated coefficients are all positive but only 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦6(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦7(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect of having a normal level of 
confidence, as reflected by moderate Active Share levels, is economically meaningful. 
In particular, in holding other effects constant, the normally confident funds that 
belong to the Active Share decile between Rank 0.6 to Rank 0.7 outperform the funds 
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within the lowest decile of Active Share by 28.18 basis points per quarter, or 1.13% 
on an annual basis. Perhaps, more importantly, we observe a decreasing trend of 
magnitude of the effect of Active Share on subsequent performance. Of particular 
interest, the coefficient of the 10th decile representing the funds with the highest Active 
Share within their segment is statistically and economically insignificant, meaning that 
on average overconfident mutual fund managers are not able to significantly 
outperform their peer managers who are at the lowest rank of Active Share. Overall, 
the results of these dummy variables of Active Share demonstrate a similar inverted 
U-shaped relationship between Active Share and subsequent performance as found in 
the piecewise linear regression: normal confidence generates excess returns in the 
future but excessive overconfidence of fund managers hurts portfolio performance. 
This chapter also applies the quadratic specification as an additional test to confirm 
the non-linear relationship between Active Share rank and subsequent performance: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1)
2
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                               (8) 
where 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes the normalized segment rank of Active share 
for fund i during the period of time t-1 and t, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is the vector of control 
variables relating to fund characteristics. Under the overconfidence hypothesis, we 
expect a positive coefficient on the linear term and a negative estimate on the quadratic 
term. 
Table 4.11 reports the results for the quadratic specification of Model (8). We find 
positive coefficients for the linear impact of Active Share on the subsequent 
performance and negative coefficients for the impact of squared Active Share. Both 
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coefficients are statistically significant. Again, the relationship between confidence 
level of mutual fund managers and their subsequent performance exhibits a clear 
inverted U-shape that is similar to what we find before. 
To further investigate the impact of overconfidence on subsequent performance, we 
include the changes in Active Share rank in the piecewise regression in model (6) with 
Active Share rank and other fund characteristics as control variables. Estimated 
coefficients on changes in Active Share rank are reported in Table 4.12. Our results 
reveal a negative relationship between changes in Active Share rank and subsequent 
performance: increase of Active Share rank is associated with deteriorated subsequent 
risk-adjusted abnormal performance. The coefficients on changes in Active Share rank 
are negative and statistically significant at the 5% significant level in all model 
specifications. The effect is economically meaningful: on average, a 10% increase of 
Active Share rank on average leads to a decrease of subsequent performance by about 
8.4 bp per quarter (= −0.0084 × 0.1 = −0.00084) or 33.6 bp per year.  
To summarize, employing segment rank of Active Share level to proxy for level of 
fund manager confidence, we find a clear inverted U-shaped relationship between 
confidence level and subsequent performance among mutual fund managers. More 
specifically, there is a significant positive relationship between Active Share and 
subsequent performance for mutual funds within the middle quintiles of Active Share 
while a negative and significant relationship for funds within the top quintile of Active 
Share. Such inverted U-shaped relationship is confirmed by estimating regressions of 
subsequent performance on decile dummy variables of the level Active Share and 
estimating quadratic relationship between Active Share and subsequent performance. 
Furthermore, a negative relationship between changes in Active Share and subsequent 
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performance is found. Overall, these results provide strong evidence that excessive 
overconfidence is associated with diminished future performance. 
4.5.3 Overconfidence and Subsequent Fund Risk 
The results thus far show that mutual fund manager overconfidence reflected by 
extreme high Active Share on average is associated with diminished subsequent 
performance. It is also interesting to see if extremely high Active Share would result 
in higher fund risk. 
If fund managers are subject to overconfidence, they might be more likely to engage 
in “irrational” investment strategies that involve sub-optimal portfolio allocation due 
to their belief in their private information with over-estimated precision. Not only are 
their aggressive investments more likely to hurt portfolio performance over time but 
they are also more likely to turn out very poorly in some instances, and very well in 
other instances, perhaps due to luck. Consequently, such strategies by overconfident 
managers can be associated with extreme (good or bad) subsequent performance. In 
other words, very high Active Share may represent an increased chance for potential 
good performance but, more importantly, it may also come with a significantly higher 
chance of suffering severe drawdowns and greater levels of downside risk. To 
investigate this possibility, this chapter calculate the measure of performance 
extremity proposed by Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) and then applies the piecewise 
linear regression of measure of performance extremity on the bottom quintile, the 
middle three quintiles, and the top quintile of segment rank of Active Share. Results 
are presented in Table 4.13. 
Consistent with our conjecture that overconfidence results in more extreme 
performance outcomes, we find positive and statistically significant slope coefficients 
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for the bottom quintile, the middle quintiles, and the top quintile of Active Share rank. 
This shows that the relationship between the segment rank of Active Share and 
performance extremity is positive. However, the slope coefficient for the top quintile 
is about more than three times as large as those for the other quintiles, indicating a 
convex influence of Active Share on performance extremity. Specifically, holding 
other factors constant, mutual funds with the highest segment rank of Active Share 
(Rank 1.0) would experience a significant higher performance extremity in the 
subsequent period than funds at the bottom of the top quintile (Rank 0.8) by about 0.45 
(= 2.267 × 0.2 = 0.453).6 Furthermore, we test whether an increase of Active Share 
rank is associated with an increase of performance extremity by including the changes 
in Active Share rank into the piecewise regression. Consistent with our expectation, 
results in Table 4.14 show that changes in Active Share rank are positively related 
with the performance extremity.  
Overconfident managers might also choose investment strategies that involve 
significantly higher idiosyncratic risk exposure, and thereby significantly higher 
performance dispersion. To investigate this possibility, this chapter measures 
performance dispersion by calculating the standard deviations of residuals from four-
factor module and then applies the piecewise linear regression of performance 
dispersion on quintiles of Active Share rank as before. Results in Table 4.15 show that 
the standard deviation of performance residuals is positively related with Active Share 
rank: the sign of coefficients are all positive and statistically significant. More 
interestingly, the effect is significantly more pronounced among the fund managers 
who choose to have extremely high Active Share rank than others. The magnitude of 
                                                          
6 A similar result is obtained from our quadratic regressions. Estimated coefficients for both the linear 
and quadratic impact of Active Share to performance extremity are positive and statistically significant.  
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the coefficient on the top quintile of Active Share rank is about two (three) times more 
than the low quintile (middle quintiles). Furthermore, our results from Table 4.16 
show that changes in Active Share rank are positively related with performance 
dispersion. These findings are thus consistent with the expectation that mutual fund 
manager overconfidence is associated with greater performance dispersion as a 
measure of risk. 
Overall, we find strong evidence to show that excessive overconfidence comes with 
dramatically higher fund risk. In particular, extremely high Active Share is associated 
with significantly extreme performance outcomes (potentially huge downside risks) 
and dramatically high performance dispersion. Consistent results are found when 
investigating the impact of changes in Active Share on these risk measures. 
4.5.4 Overconfidence and Subsequent Fund Flows 
The consensus view from the literature is that fund inflows are positively related with 
past performance and this relationship is non-linear. However, the literature overlooks 
the possible response of fund investors to active management or fund manager 
overconfidence that has been shown to be associated with deteriorated subsequent 
performance and increasing fund risk. To look at the response of investors to active 
management, this chapter estimates the following regression: 
                     𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                 (9) 
where 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 denotes the percentage flow for fund i over the period t to t-1; 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes the normalized segment rank of Active share for fund 
i during time period t-1 and t; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a vector of control variables relating to fund 
characteristics that determine subsequent investor flows in the literature, including 
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fund age, fund size, expense ratio, turnover rate, and manager tenure. Most 
importantly, this chapter controls for any convex relationship between past 
performance and investor flows by adding past performance in linear and quadratic 
terms. Additionally, we include fund family size (natural logarithm of total net assets 
under management of the funds belonging to the same fund complex), and net total 
inflows to funds’ family and corresponding objective categories. To mitigate the 
impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter winsorises flow and turnover at the 
1% level. This chapter also include year dummies to capture any time fixed effects 
and market segment dummies to control for segment fixed effects, and cluster 
observations by fund to control for observation dependence. 
Table 4.17 shows that the coefficient on Active Share rank is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that in general investors chase Active Share, 
holding all other effects constant. This effect of Active Share on inflows is also 
economically significant. Specifically, a 0.20 higher of segment rank of Active Share 
attracts about 0.22% more investor flows or 2.71 (0.46) million higher for a fund of 
average (median) size. However, it is difficult to conclude that this effect of Active 
Share on future inflows is due to investors’ rational or irrational responses to 
managers’ confidence level. In particular, investors may rationally appreciate active 
management as one of the essential factors that increase the chance of generating 
excess returns. It is also possible that investors may irrationally chase excessive active 
management without thinking of the trade-off between the increased profitable 
opportunities and greater unanticipated risk exposure. High Active Share that is most 
likely due to managers’ overconfidence after their outstanding performance can be 
easily misunderstood by investors as an indicator of managers’ investment skills. If 
investors irrationally respond to fund manager overconfidence, we should observe a 
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more pronounced positive relationship between high Active Share and investor flows. 
To test this conjecture, we estimate the relationship between managers’ psychological 
attributes and investor flows by interacting past performance and Active Share in the 
following regression: 
    𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝 + (𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑁𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑁𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝,𝑁𝑒𝑔
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑃𝑜𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑃𝑜𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝,𝑃𝑜𝑠)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                         (10)      
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑  equals to 1 if fund i belongs to the three middle quintiles of Active Share 
from time period t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝
 equals to 1 if fund i belongs to top 
quintiles of Active Share from time period t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise. These two dummy 
variables are used to capture the constant effect of belonging to a specific Active Share 
quintile on subsequent flows. More importantly, this chapter includes the 6 other 
dummy variables which are Active Share quintiles interacting with past performance 
to capture the differential investors responses to good (positive) and bad (negative) 
past performance of mutual funds belonging to the bottom quintile, the three middle 
quintiles and the top quintile of Active Share. Specifically, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑁𝑒𝑔
 equals to 1 if 
fund i belongs to the bottom quintile of Active Share and has negative past 
performance from time period t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑁𝑒𝑔
 equals to 1 if fund i 
belongs to the three middle quintiles of Active Share and has negative past 
performance from time period t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑁𝑒𝑔
 equals to 1 if fund 
i belongs to the top quintile of Active Share and has negative past performance from 
time period t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑃𝑜𝑠
 equals to 1 if fund i belongs to the 
bottom quintile of Active Share and has positive past performance from time period t-
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1 to t, and 0 otherwise; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑃𝑜𝑠
 equals to 1 if fund i belongs to the three middle 
quintiles of Active Share and has positive past performance from time period t-1 to t, 
and 0 otherwise; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑃𝑜𝑠
 equals to 1 if fund i belongs to the top quintile of Active 
Share and has positive past performance from time period t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise; 
and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is the vector of control variables relating to fund characteristics defined 
as in Model (9). All model specifications includes time and segment fixed effect 
dummies and standard errors are clustered by fund. Results are reported in Table 4.18. 
Consistent with what we find before, investors seem to reward mutual fund managers 
with higher confidence level as reflected in higher Active Share. The effect, however, 
is mainly driven by the tendency of investors to chase funds with the highest Active 
Share. The coefficients on the dummy variables for the top quintile of segment rank 
of Active Share are positive and statistically significant in all model specifications. 
This effect is also economically meaningful.  This suggest that mutual funds belonging 
to the top quintile of Active Share attract significantly higher investor inflows than 
those within the bottom quintile of Active Share by about 0.78%. The dummy 
coefficients for the middle quintiles of Active Share are not statistically significant, 
meaning that there is no significant difference in subsequent investor flows between 
the middle quintiles and the bottom quintile, holdings other effects constant. 
Looking at the coefficients of the six interaction coefficients, we can observe that cash 
inflows to mutual funds within the bottom (middle) quintile of Active Share increase 
about 1.65% (1.97%) for one standard deviation increase of past performance in the 
prior year when the lagged performance is positive while cash inflows to funds within 
the top quintile of Active Share increase about 2.63% for on standard deviation 
increase of prior year performance when the lagged performance is positive. The 
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difference in estimated coefficients between funds within the top quintile and funds 
within the bottom quintile (the middle quintiles) of Active Share is statistically 
significant at the 5% (10%) level, indicating that investors are considerably more 
sensitive to good performance of fund with high Active Share. The heightened 
sensitivity to positive returns is also consistent with what we found before, namely 
that investors appear to chase funds with high Active Share. On the other hand, when 
mutual funds experience negative past performance, cash outflows from funds within 
the bottom (middle) quintile of Active Share increase about 1.32% (1.67%) for a one 
standard deviation decrease of past performance in the prior year. Surprisingly, cash 
outflows from funds within the top quintile of Active Share increase only about 1.37% 
for a one standard deviation decrease of the prior year performance when the lagged 
performance is negative. The difference in estimated coefficients is not statistically 
significant, meaning that investors are similarly sensitive to bad performance among 
mutual funds with different level of Active Share. The results still hold after 
controlling for the potential observation dependence by using the Fama - MacBeth 
(1973) regression. We always find a pronounced asymmetric response of investors to 
the past performance of fund with high Active Share relative to non-high Active Share 
funds. 
Overall, our results confirm the non-linear performance-flow relationship documented 
in the literature (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998), investors chase past mutual fund 
winners but fail to sell past losers to the same extent. More interestingly, such 
asymmetric responses of investors to good and poor past performance are significantly 
more pronounced among funds with high Active Share: there is no pronounced penalty 
for poor (negative) realized performance but a marked bonus for good (positive) 
realized returns by overconfident managers. One possible explanation is that investors 
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might interpret the good past performance as the realization of managers’ investment 
skill (perhaps more likely due to luck) and consequently invest disproportionately 
more into these overconfident managers with high Active Share levels. In contrast, 
they might view poor past performance of such fund managers as the consequence of 
bad luck (perhaps more likely due to overconfidence). If this is true, disproportionately 
high inflows (low outflows) after good (poor) past performance could act as additional 
confirming market signals to overconfident managers, making these managers are 
even more likely to attribute successes to their own skills but failures to external 
factors. As a consequence, overconfident managers are even more likely to 
overestimate their ability to gather and process information: they revise the precision 
of their private information upward too much after positive signals from investors’ 
responses and their past success, and put even larger bets on their private information 
while they inadequately update the precision of their private information downwards 
too little following negative signals, and fail to put a smaller weight on their private 
information. This eventually leads to diminished future performance as we observed 
before. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine overconfidence among mutual fund managers. I investigate 
whether mutual fund managers are subject to self-serving attribution bias, and whether 
fund managers become overconfident after good past performance. Using U.S. mutual 
fund data from 1980 to 2009, we find that fund managers who achieve outstanding 
past performance choose to have significant higher subsequent Active Share and are 
more likely to increase Active Share. These findings are consistent with our prediction 
that superior past performance boosts overconfidence: upon observing successes fund 
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managers overestimate their own skills and put too much weight on their private 
information which is less precise than they thought. Such biased behavior is 
significantly more pronounced among solo-managed funds. 
Our paper directly relates confidence level to subsequent fund performance. There is 
strong evidence to show that overconfidence is associated with diminished future 
performance and increasing fund risk. This result offers one potential explanation for 
the lack of performance persistence among successful fund managers. Specifically, 
overconfident managers overestimate the precision of their private information and 
hence deviate too far from their benchmark indices than they should otherwise, leading 
to underperformance. Perhaps more interestingly, a closer look reveals a clear inverted 
U-shaped relationship between confidence level and subsequent performance, 
consistent with the theoretical model proposed in Shefrin (2010) which illustrates the 
log-change of a measure corresponding to overconfidence bias. 
This chapter also sheds new light on the determinants of fund flows by looking at how 
investors respond to overconfidence of fund managers. Our results suggest that 
investors irrationally chase overconfident fund managers, flocking to funds with 
extremely high Active Share when observing good past fund performance but failing 
to flee from these funds to the same extent following poor fund performance. Such 
asymmetric reactions from fund investors can serve as another mechanism through 
which the performance of overconfident fund managers may suffer: fund managers 
may become even more overconfident upon observing significant higher fund inflows 
as confirming market signals for their investment ability. 
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Figure 4.1 Number of Mutual Fund in Each Active Share Category, across 
Investment Objective Segments 
The figure below shows the number of mutual funds in each time series average of Active Share 
category across four major investment objective segments including Micro-cap and Small-cap funds, 
Mid-cap funds, Growth funds, and Growth & Income and Income funds. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Mutual Fund Samples 
The table below reports the summary statistics of a total of 2740 unique U.S. domestic equity mutual 
fund samples from 1980 to 2009. The mutual fund data with self-reporting investment objectives 
including Growth, Growth & Income, Income, Micro-Cap, Small-Cap, and Mid-Cap are obtained from 
the merged CRSP mutual fund holdings databases and CRSP mutual fund characteristics databases in 
CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Database. CRSP investment objective variable (crsp_obj_cd) is used to 
filter U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from the CRSP mutual funds universe in CRSP mutual fund 
database. The mutual funds are broken down by the CRSP investment objectives, including growth, 
growth & income, income, micro-cap, small-cap, and mid-cap. The number of funds is the total number 
of unique mutual funds that exist during the sample periods. Avg TNA is the average of total net assets 
under management of mutual funds in million dollar. Avg Turnover is the cross-sectional average of 
mutual fund turnover ratio. Avg Exp is cross-sectional average expense ratio of mutual funds. Avg 
Active Share is the cross-sectional average Active Share of mutual funds. Active Share is calculated as 
the one half of the sum of absolute deviations in portfolio weight of a fund portfolio from its benchmark 
index portfolio. Panel A reports the summary statistics of all mutual fund samples over time and Panel 
B reports the summary statistics of mutual fund with different investment objectives. 
 
Year 
Number of 
Funds 
Avg  
TNA 
Median  
TNA 
Avg Exp 
Ratio 
Avg  
Turnover 
Avg Active 
Share 
Panel A Summary statistics of all mutual fund samples over time 
1980 105 195.05 72.90 0.98% 82.91% 90.55% 
1985 159 323.50 150.97 1.03% 80.79% 90.53% 
1990 323 460.69 146.22 1.20% 81.18% 81.69% 
1995 794 931.49 212.59 1.20% 81.42% 78.72% 
2000 1354 1465.24 250.25 1.24% 97.95% 72.06% 
2005 1540 1549.72 252.05 1.26% 82.87% 74.97% 
2009 1287 1591.50 278.40 1.18% 94.60% 74.01% 
Panel B Summary statistics of mutual fund with different investment objectives 
Micro-Cap 38 304.01 131.80 1.62% 108.62% 95.12% 
Small-Cap 592 653.49 213.42 1.32% 98.95% 84.83% 
Mid-Cap 342 845.69 219.90 1.26% 115.20% 78.28% 
Growth 1296 1296.47 195.92 1.21% 88.61% 75.57% 
Growth&Income 612 1957.11 263.31 1.11% 64.86% 67.45% 
Income 126 1625.05 284.10 1.17% 57.52% 71.29% 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of Active Share 
This table below presents the summary statistics of Active Share across funds’ self-report investment 
objectives including Growth, Growth & Income, Income, Micro-Cap, Small-Cap, and Mid-Cap. The 
investment objectives codes are defined and obtained from the merged CRSP mutual fund holdings 
databases. Active Share is calculated as the one half of the sum of absolute deviations in portfolio 
weight of a fund portfolio from its benchmark index portfolio. 
Objective 
Categories 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Minimum 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Maximum 
Micro-Cap 95.12% 6.03% 57.13% 94.67% 97.04% 98.30% 99.89% 
Small-Cap 84.83% 20.00% 0.00% 85.06% 91.23% 94.76% 99.76% 
Mid-Cap 78.28% 21.89% 0.00% 75.04% 85.05% 90.86% 98.73% 
Growth 75.57% 17.79% 0.42% 65.45% 78.49% 89.65% 100.00% 
Growth&Income 67.45% 19.64% 0.00% 59.25% 70.53% 80.23% 100.00% 
Income 71.28% 23.83% 23.83% 63.34% 71.04% 79.26% 98.09% 
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Table 4.3 Past Performance and Active Share 
The dependent variable is Active Share for each fund-quarter observation. Past performance of mutual 
fund is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current 
quarter t. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one 
quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund 
age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm 
of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are 
measured in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current 
manager takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
(1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter 
follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications 
include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment 
fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Past Performance 0.577*** 1.111*** 1.101*** 
 (3.54) (7.54) (7.09) 
Fund Size  -0.007*** -0.009*** 
  (-3.12) (-3.46) 
Fund Age  0.025*** 0.015*** 
  (6.52) (3.43) 
Expense  15.174*** 13.876*** 
  (13.33) (11.89) 
Turnover  -0.006 -0.002 
  (-1.12) (-0.35) 
Tenure   0.027*** 
   (7.78) 
Fund Flow   -0.008 
   (-0.71) 
Constant 1.059*** 0.811*** 0.810*** 
 (85.93) (28.54) (26.76) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.365 0.459 0.462 
Obs 63063 59553 45444 
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Table 4.4 Past Performance Rank and Active Share 
The dependent variable is Active Share for each fund-quarter observation. Past performance rank is the 
normalised rank of fund past performance relative to other funds in the same market segment. The past 
performance is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the 
current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables 
by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. 
Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural 
logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio 
are measured in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current 
manager takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
(1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter 
follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications 
include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment 
fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Performance Rank 0.018*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (4.22) (9.55) (8.78) 
Fund Size  -0.007*** -0.009*** 
  (-3.18) (-3.52) 
Fund Age  0.026*** 0.015*** 
  (6.60) (3.49) 
Expense  15.303*** 14.012*** 
  (13.43) (11.98) 
Turnover  -0.005 -0.001 
  (-1.02) (-0.26) 
Tenure   0.026*** 
   (7.77) 
Fund Flow   -0.011 
   (-0.97) 
Constant 1.051*** 0.792*** 0.792*** 
 (84.57) (27.52) (25.92) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.365 0.460 0.463 
Obs 62928 59433 45345 
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Table 4.5 Quintiles of Past Performance Rank and Active Share  
The dependent variable is Active Share for each fund-quarter observation. LOW represents the bottom 
quintile of past performance rank that is measured as the normalised rank of fund past performance 
relative to other funds in the same market segment. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha 
based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. MID represents 
the three middle quintiles and TOP represents the top quintile of past performance rank. In order to 
mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the 
expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured 
as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net 
assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in 
percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes 
over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and 
winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to 
capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data 
are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOW -0.630*** -0.479*** -0.432*** 
 (-19.28) (-16.16) (-13.49) 
MID 0.002 0.024*** 0.021*** 
 (0.31) (3.70) (2.92) 
TOP 0.785*** 0.637*** 0.606*** 
 (22.44) (23.06) (19.03) 
Fund Size  -0.006** -0.008*** 
  (-2.87) (-3.24) 
Fund Age  0.025*** 0.015*** 
  (6.78) (3.60) 
Expense  14.272*** 13.047*** 
  (12.89) (11.47) 
Turnover  -0.008* -0.004 
  (-1.67) (-0.87) 
Tenure   0.024*** 
   (7.41) 
Fund Flow   -0.023** 
   (-2.05) 
Constant 1.151*** 0.888*** 0.882*** 
 (91.88) (32.22) (29.92) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.402 0.482 0.483 
Obs 62928 59433 45345 
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Table 4.6 Quadratic Rank of Past Performance and Active Share 
The dependent variable is Active Share for each fund-quarter observation. Performance rank represents 
the the normalised rank of fund past performance relative to other funds in the same market segment. 
The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one 
year prior to the current quarter t. Performance rank squared is the quadratic rank of past performance. 
In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, 
except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is 
measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of 
total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured 
in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager 
takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and 
winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to 
capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data 
are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Performance Rank -0.596*** -0.450*** -0.419*** 
 (-21.79) (-22.40) (-18.97) 
(Performance Rank)2 0.615*** 0.485*** 0.454*** 
 (23.10) (23.73) (20.15) 
Fund Size  -0.006** -0.008** 
  (-2.86) (-3.22) 
Fund Age  0.025*** 0.015*** 
  (6.70) (3.55) 
Expense  14.180*** 12.967*** 
  (12.93) (11.51) 
Turnover  -0.008 -0.004 
  (-1.69) (-0.90) 
Tenure   0.024*** 
   (7.39) 
Fund Flow   -0.021* 
   (-1.89) 
Constant 1.147*** 0.888*** 0.883*** 
 (93.71) (33.14) (30.97) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.406 0.484 0.485 
Obs 62928 59433 45345 
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Table 4.7   Quintiles of Past Performance Rank and Change in Active Share 
The dependent variable is changes in Active Share during the previous quarter for each fund-quarter 
observation. LOW represents the bottom quintile of past performance rank that is measured as the 
normalised rank of fund past performance relative to other funds in the same market segment. The fund 
past performance is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior 
to the current quarter t. MID represents the three middle quintiles and TOP represents the top quintile 
of past performance rank. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other 
variables by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data 
availability. Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size 
is natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and 
turnover ratio are measured in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure 
in years current manager takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this 
chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression 
specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to 
control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOW -0.021** -0.017 -0.009 
 (-2.08) (-1.56) (-0.85) 
MID -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.45) (0.13) (-0.55) 
TOP 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 
 (5.86) (5.32) (5.00) 
Lag AS -0.053*** -0.061*** -0.053*** 
 (-13.28) (-14.00) (-11.95) 
Fund Size  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (-5.32) (-3.54) 
Fund Age  0.002*** 0.001** 
  (4.83) (2.22) 
Expense  0.848*** 0.697*** 
  (8.22) (6.50) 
Turnover  -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.23) (-1.61) 
Tenure   0.002*** 
   (2.70) 
Fund Flow   -0.002*** 
   (-2.62) 
Constant 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.051*** 
 (11.52) (9.97) (8.61) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Obs 19694 18860 14042 
 
 
 
190 
 
Table 4.8 Quintiles of Past Performance Rank and Active Share, Solo vs Team  
The dependent variable is Active Share for each fund-quarter observation. Solo denotes the dummy 
variable equal to 1 if mutual fund i is single-managed during the period t-1 to t, and zero otherwise. 
LOW represents the bottom quintile of past performance rank that is measured as the normalised rank 
of fund past performance relative to other funds in the same market segment. The fund past performance 
is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current 
quarter t. MID represents the three middle quintiles and TOP represents the top quintile of past 
performance rank. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other 
variables by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data 
availability. Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size 
is natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and 
turnover ratio are measured in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure 
in years current manager takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this 
chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression 
specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to 
control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Solo 0.009* 0.011 0.011* 
 (1.76) (1.66) (1.81) 
Solo LOW -0.087** -0.125** -0.155*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.86) (-3.60) 
Solo MID 0.003 0.009 0.001 
 (0.31) (0.93) (0.13) 
Solo TOP 0.072** 0.074** 0.096** 
 (1.99) (2.03) (2.48) 
LOW -0.553*** -0.374*** -0.319*** 
 (-13.30) (-8.56) (-7.93) 
MID -0.006 0.009 0.012 
 (-0.39) (0.69) (0.98) 
TOP 0.739*** 0.598*** 0.536*** 
 (16.96) (14.10) (13.06) 
Fund Size  -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-9.04) (-10.14) 
Fund Age  0.025*** 0.015*** 
  (15.17) (9.53) 
Expense  13.538*** 12.637*** 
  (24.05) (23.63) 
Turnover  -0.005** -0.001 
  (-2.62) (-0.46) 
Tenure   0.025*** 
   (17.77) 
Fund Flow   -0.016 
   (-1.59) 
Constant 0.931*** 0.649**** 0.679*** 
 (69.11) (42.09) (45.30) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.212 0.325 0.344 
Obs 58219 56323 43145 
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Table 4.9   Quintiles of Active Share Rank and Subsequent Performance 
The dependent variable is cumulated abnormal performance estimated using past monthly fund returns 
based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for fund-quarter observations. LOW represents the 
bottom quintile of Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment. MID represents the 
three middle quintiles and TOP represents the top quintile of Active Share. The fund past performance 
is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current 
quarter t. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one 
quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund 
age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm 
of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are 
measured in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current 
manager takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
(1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter 
follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications 
include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment 
fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOW(ActiveShare) 0.0067** 0.0054* 0.0030 
 (2.24) (1.63) (0.67) 
MID(ActiveShare) 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0031** 
 (2.23) (2.08) (2.41) 
TOP(ActiveShare) -0.0090* -0.0097* -0.0137** 
 (-1.74) (-1.76) (-2.01) 
Fund Size  -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
  (-4.29) (-3.79) 
Fund Age  0.0006** 0.0006* 
  (2.89) (2.04) 
Expense  -0.0260 -0.0265 
  (0.39) (-0.29) 
Turnover  0.0011*** 0.0014*** 
  (3.66) (3.74) 
Tenure   -0.0001 
   (-0.13) 
Fund Flow   -0.0067** 
   (-2.83) 
Past Performance   -0.0457*** 
   (-9.59) 
Constant 0.0018 0.0023 0.0026 
 (0.80) (0.86) (0.77) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.033 0.034 0.038 
Obs 61208 58112 43388 
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Table 4.10 Decile Dummies of Active Share and Subsequent Performance 
The dependent variable is cumulated abnormal performance estimated using past monthly fund returns based on the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model for fund-quarter observations. The expression 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑛 indicates whether the fund i belongs to the 
segment rank decile n according to its Active Share level during the period of time t-1 to t. The fund past performance is the 
estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged 
one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is 
natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in 
percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place. Fund flow 
is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the 
estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include 
year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly 
and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2 0.0010* 0.0008 0.0004 
 (1.71) (1.38) (0.61) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦3 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009 
 (1.40) (1.03) (1.11) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦4 0.0017** 0.0016** 0.0013 
 (2.55) (2.29) (1.51) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦5 0.0011* 0.0008 0.0005 
 (1.65) (1.26) (0.62) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦6 0.0022*** 0.0020** 0.0021** 
 (3.25) (2.88) (2.36) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦7 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 
 (4.50) (3.96) (3.10) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦8 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0019* 
 (2.55) (2.35) (1.91) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦9 0.0016** 0.0013 0.0020* 
 (2.36) (1.61) (1.99) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦10 0.0009 0.0008 0.0001 
 (1.16) (1.00) (0.16) 
Fund Size  -0.0004** -0.0005** 
  (-3.85) (-3.47) 
Fund Age  0.0006** 0.0006* 
  (2.71) (1.97) 
Expense  -0.0459 -0.0450 
  (-0.68) (-0.49) 
Turnover  0.0011** 0.0015** 
  (3.86) (3.88) 
Tenure   0.0001 
   (0.21) 
Fund Flow   -0.0044* 
   (-1.72) 
Past Performance   -0.0441*** 
   (-8.69) 
Constant 0.0021 0.0023 0.0022 
 (0.91) (0.87) (0.67) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.033 0.035 0.038 
Obs 62934 59475 44399 
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Table 4.11 Quadratic Active Share Rank and Subsequent Performance 
The dependent variable is cumulated abnormal performance estimated using past monthly fund returns 
based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for fund-quarter observations. Active Share rank is the 
normalised rank of Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment. Active Share rank 
Squared is the quadratic term of Active Share rank. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha 
based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. In order to mitigate 
potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses 
and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural 
logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under 
management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in percentage per 
year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place. 
Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To 
mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow 
and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed 
effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover 
the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ActiveShare Rank 0.0079*** 0.0076*** 0.0079*** 
 (3.90) (3.42) (2.70) 
(ActiveShare Rank)2 -0.0065*** -0.0064*** -0.0065** 
 (-2.95) (-2.71) (-2.14) 
Fund Size  -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
  (-4.31) (-3.81) 
Fund Age  0.0006** 0.0006* 
  (2.81) (1.96) 
Expense  -0.0300 -0.0332 
  (-0.46) (-0.36) 
Turnover  0.0011*** 0.0014*** 
  (3.68) (3.77) 
Tenure   -0.0001 
   (-0.18) 
Fund Flow   -0.0067** 
   (-2.83) 
Past Performance   -0.0456*** 
   (-9.58) 
Constant 0.0017 0.0021 0.0022 
 (0.75) (0.80) (0.65) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.033 0.035 0.038 
Obs 61208 58112 43388 
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Table 4.12   Change in Active Share Rank and Subsequent Performance 
The dependent variable is cumulated abnormal performance estimated using past monthly fund returns 
based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for fund-quarter observations. ∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘  is 
changes in the normalised rank of Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment 
between two quarters. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity 
problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio 
which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in 
years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under management in 
millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in percentage per year. Tenure is 
calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place. Fund flow is 
calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the 
impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover 
at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and 
market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period 
from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 -0.0058** -0.0057** -0.0084** 
 (-2.12) (-1.96) (-2.38) 
LOW(ActiveShare Rank)  0.0059* 0.0033 
  (1.71) (0.73) 
MID(ActiveShare Rank)  0.0019* 0.0029** 
  (1.91) (2.25) 
TOP(ActiveShare Rank)  -0.0095* -0.0136** 
  (-1.67) (-1.96) 
Fund Size  -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
  (-4.49) (-3.99) 
Fund Age  0.0007*** 0.0007** 
  (3.03) (2.20) 
Expense  -0.0241 -0.0218 
  (-0.36) (-0.23) 
Turnover  0.0011*** 0.0014*** 
  (3.63) (3.72) 
Tenure   -0.0001 
   (-0.12) 
Fund Flow   -0.0066*** 
   (-2.78) 
Past Perf   -0.0476*** 
   (-9.77) 
Constant 0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 (1.73) (0.88) (0.76) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.034 0.036 0.040 
Obs 60218 56490 42265 
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Table 4.13   Quintiles of Active Share Rank and Performance Extremity 
The dependent variable is the absolute difference between a fund’s performance and the average 
performance of all funds in the same market segment. The future performance is the cumulated 
abnormal performance estimated using past monthly fund returns based on the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model for fund-quarter observations. LOW represents the bottom quintile of Active Share relative 
to other funds in the same market segment. MID represents the three middle quintiles and TOP 
represents the top quintile of Active Share. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and 
turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural 
logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under 
management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in percentage per 
year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place. 
Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To 
mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow 
and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed 
effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover 
the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOW(ActiveShare Rank) 1.0964*** 0.7848*** 0.7123*** 
 (8.60) (5.75) (4.02) 
MID(ActiveShare Rank) 0.6580*** 0.6240*** 0.6208*** 
 (18.52) (17.72) (15.58) 
TOP(ActiveShare Rank) 2.3777*** 2.3430*** 2.2675*** 
 (10.28) (10.50) (9.32) 
Fund Size  -0.0078* -0.0075 
  (-1.73) (-1.40) 
Fund Age  0.0131 0.0072 
  (1.44) (0.64) 
Expense  10.9872*** 12.3382*** 
  (4.79) (4.28) 
Turnover  0.0811*** 0.0922*** 
  (8.77) (8.17) 
Tenure   0.0262** 
   (2.68) 
Fund Flow   -0.1440** 
   (-2.52) 
Past Performance   0.1616 
   (1.14) 
Constant 0.5451*** 0.3751*** 0.3252*** 
 (7.79) (5.03) (3.48) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.075 0.080 0.080 
Obs 61208 58112 43388 
 
 
 
196 
 
Table 4.14 Change in Active Share Rank and Performance Extremity  
The dependent variable is the absolute difference between a fund’s performance and the average 
performance of all funds in the same market segment. The future performance is the cumulated 
abnormal performance estimated using past monthly fund returns based on the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model for fund-quarter observations. ∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘  is changes in the normalised rank of 
Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment between two quarters. LOW represents 
the bottom quintile of Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment. MID represents 
the three middle quintiles and TOP represents the top quintile of Active Share. The fund past 
performance is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the 
current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables 
by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. 
Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural 
logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio 
are measured in percentage per year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current 
manager takes over the place. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
(1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter 
follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications 
include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment 
fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 0.1186*** 0.1374*** 0.1309** 
 (2.58) (2.92) (2.17) 
LOW(ActiveShare Rank)  0.7844*** 0.7139*** 
  (5.75) (4.02) 
MID(ActiveShare Rank)  0.6255*** 0.6218*** 
  (17.73) (15.58) 
TOP(ActiveShare Rank)  2.3362*** 2.2617*** 
  (10.50) (9.32) 
Fund Size  -0.0078* -0.0076 
  (-1.72) (-1.40) 
Fund Age  0.0129 0.0071 
  (1.41) (0.62) 
Expense  10.9318*** 12.2693*** 
  (4.76) (4.25) 
Turnover  0.0812*** 0.0923*** 
  (8.77) (8.18) 
Tenure   0.0263*** 
   (2.69) 
Fund Flow   -0.1422** 
   (-2.49) 
Past Perf   0.1635 
   (1.15) 
Constant 1.0093*** 0.3758*** 0.3261*** 
 (15.59) (5.04) (3.49) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.0001 0.0820 0.0790 
Obs 61867 58089 43372 
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Table 4.15 Quintiles of Active Share Rank and Performance Dispersion 
The dependent variable is the standard deviations of residuals from Carhart (1997) four-factor module. 
∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘  is changes in the normalised rank of Active Share relative to other funds in the 
same market segment between two quarters. LOW represents the bottom quintile of Active Share 
relative to other funds in the same market segment. MID represents the three middle quintiles and TOP 
represents the top quintile of Active Share. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and 
turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural 
logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under 
management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in percentage per 
year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place. 
Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To 
mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow 
and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed 
effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover 
the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOW(ActiveShare Rank) 0.0113*** 0.0078*** 0.0071*** 
 (8.94) (6.11) (4.50) 
MID(ActiveShare Rank) 0.0056*** 0.0054*** 0.0053*** 
 (18.82) (18.20) (15.19) 
TOP(ActiveShare Rank) 0.0199*** 0.0194*** 0.0189*** 
 (10.31) (10.40) (9.14) 
Fund Size  -0.0000 -0.0001 
  (-0.24) (-1.13) 
Fund Age  0.0001 0.0000 
  (1.27) (0.31) 
Expense  0.1147*** 0.1219*** 
  (5.52) (4.79) 
Turnover  0.0009*** 0.0010*** 
  (8.87) (8.37) 
Tenure   0.0002** 
   (2.11) 
Fund Flow   -0.0016*** 
   (-3.00) 
Past Perf   0.0246** 
   (2.57) 
Constant 0.0096*** 0.0073*** 0.0077*** 
 (11.18) (8.27) (7.24) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.2286 0.2378 0.2280 
Obs 61462 58124 44263 
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Table 4.16 Change in Active Share Rank and Performance Dispersion 
The dependent variable is the standard deviations of residuals from Carhart (1997) four-factor module. 
∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘  is changes in the normalised rank of Active Share relative to other funds in the 
same market segment between two quarters. LOW represents the bottom quintile of Active Share 
relative to other funds in the same market segment. MID represents the three middle quintiles and TOP 
represents the top quintile of Active Share. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. In order to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and 
turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural 
logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under 
management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in percentage per 
year. Tenure is calculated as natural logarithm of tenure in years current manager takes over the place. 
Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To 
mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow 
and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed 
effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover 
the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 0.0022*** 
 (5.27) (5.48) (5.05) 
LOW(ActiveShare 
Rank) 
 0.0078*** 0.0069*** 
  (6.09) (4.29) 
MID(ActiveShare Rank)  0.0054*** 0.0053*** 
  (18.27) (15.19) 
TOP(ActiveShare Rank)  0.0193*** 0.0188*** 
  (10.38) (9.24) 
Fund Size  -0.0000 -0.0001 
  (-0.22) (-0.93) 
Fund Age  0.0001 0.0000 
  (1.25) (0.45) 
Expense  0.1146*** 0.1230*** 
  (5.51) (4.68) 
Turnover  0.0009*** 0.0009*** 
  (8.87) (7.70) 
Tenure   0.0001** 
   (2.14) 
Fund Flow   -0.0011* 
   (-1.90) 
Past Perf   0.0041*** 
   (4.68) 
Constant 0.0137*** 0.0073*** 0.0076*** 
 (15.36) (8.28) (7.02) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.1678 0.2380 0.2281 
Obs 62121 58101 43372 
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Table 4.17   Active Share Rank and Subsequent Flows 
The dependent variable is cumulated fund flows in percentage. Active Share rank is the normalised 
rank of Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment. Active Share rank Squared is 
the quadratic term of Active Share rank. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. Performance rank is the 
normalised rank of fund past performance relative to other funds in the same market segment. 
Performance rank squared is the quadratic term of performance rank. In order to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and 
turnover ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural 
logarithm of age in years since first offer date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under 
management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are measured in percentage per 
year. Family size is calculated as natural logarithm of total net assets under management of fund 
complex that the fund belongs to. Family flows and Obj flows are the percentage flows to a fund’s 
family and the market segment, respectively. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
(1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter 
follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression specifications 
include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment 
fixed effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ActiveShare Rank 0.0179*** 0.0136*** 0.0109*** 
 (9.95) (4.04) (3.89) 
Fund Size  -0.0008 -0.0061*** 
  (-1.58) (-8.71) 
Fund Age  -0.0220*** -0.0068*** 
  (-20.27) (-6.54) 
Expense  -0.8817*** -0.2631 
  (-3.69) (-1.36) 
Turnover  0.0048*** 0.0019 
  (3.09) (1.44) 
Fund Risk  -0.4108*** -0.4494*** 
  (-2.73) (-3.81) 
Performance Rank  0.0544*** 0.0422*** 
  (6.13) (5.36) 
(Performance Rank)2  0.0375*** 0.0194** 
  (3.89) (2.34) 
Family Size   0.0043*** 
   (9.35) 
Family Flow   0.6378*** 
   (27.78) 
Obj Flow   0.7268*** 
   (13.28) 
Past Flow   0.0306*** 
   (10.92) 
Constant 0.0210*** 0.0482*** -0.0342*** 
 (3.68) (4.64) (-3.82) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.018 0.089 0.304 
Obs 61462 58111 49410 
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Table 4.18   Active Share Rank, Past Performance and Subsequent Performance 
The dependent variable is cumulated fund flows in percentage. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑  equals to one if a fund belongs to the three middle quintiles 
of Active Share, zero otherwise and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
 equals to one if a fund belongs to the top quintile of Active Share, zero otherwise. 
The following six dummy variables are the interaction between the quintiles of Active Share and the sign of past performance. 
For example, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑁𝑒𝑔
equals to one if a fund belongs to the bottom quintile of Active Share and has negative past performance. 
Active Share rank is the normalised rank of Active Share relative to other funds in the same market segment. Active Share rank 
Squared is the quadratic term of Active Share rank. The fund past performance is the estimated alpha based on the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, one year prior to the current quarter t. Performance rank is the normalised rank of fund past performance 
relative to other funds in the same market segment. Performance rank squared is the quadratic term of performance rank. In order 
to mitigate potential endogeneity problem, this chapter lags all other variables by one quarter, except the expenses and turnover 
ratio which are lagged one year due to data availability. Fund age is measured as natural logarithm of age in years since first offer 
date. Fund size is natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense ratio and turnover ratio 
are measured in percentage per year. Family size is calculated as natural logarithm of total net assets under management of fund 
complex that the fund belongs to. Family flows and Obj flows are the percentage flows to a fund’s family and the market segment, 
respectively. Fund flow is calculated as the ratio of 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. To mitigate the 
impact of outliers on the estimates, this chapter follows the literature and winsorises Flow and Turnover at 1% level. All regression 
specifications include year dummies to capture any time fixed effect and market segment dummies to control segment fixed 
effect. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 1993 to 2009. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors clustered by fund. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑  -0.0072** 0.0017 0.0011 
 (-2.65) (0.67) (0.53) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝
 0.0067* 0.0129*** 0.0077** 
 (1.78) (3.57) (2.61) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑁𝑒𝑔
∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 3.7606*** 2.7427*** 1.8894*** 
 (9.29) (6.98) (5.17) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑁𝑒𝑔
∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 3.3713*** 3.1730*** 2.3889*** 
 (17.85) (17.03) (13.87) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝,𝑁𝑒𝑔
∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 3.4355*** 3.1182*** 1.9620*** 
 (13.00) (10.83) (7.69) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑃𝑜𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 4.7337*** 5.1473*** 2.3503*** 
 (7.44) (8.18) (4.92) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑑,𝑃𝑜𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 5.1766*** 4.9334*** 2.8278*** 
 (12.24) (12.67) (8.32) 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑝,𝑃𝑜𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 6.6228*** 6.1121*** 3.7620*** 
 (10.54) (9.89) (7.50) 
Fund Size  -0.0014** -0.0068*** 
  (-2.67) (-9.41) 
Fund Age  -0.0224*** -0.0069*** 
  (-20.58) (-6.55) 
Expense  -1.0660*** -0.4064* 
  (-4.40) (-2.06) 
Turnover  0.0043** 0.0015 
  (2.89) (1.17) 
Fund Risk  -0.6906*** -0.5792*** 
  (-4.38) (-4.60) 
Family Size   0.0047*** 
   (10.05) 
Family Flow   0.6398*** 
   (28.80) 
Obj Flow   0.7364*** 
   (10.98) 
Past Flow   0.0302*** 
   (10.97) 
Constant 0.0223 0.0907 -0.0044 
 (2.61) (8.62) (-0.49) 
Year Y Y Y 
Segment Y Y Y 
R-Square 0.081 0.103 0.311 
Obs 62920 59473 50602 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
The consensus from extant research is that equity mutual fund managers, as a 
representative group of professional investors, fail to outperform passive benchmarks 
(e.g., Jensen, 1968; Malkiel, 1995; Carhart, 1997) and are unable to time the market 
or risk factors appropriately (e.g., Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Henriksson and Merton, 
1981; Daniel, et al, 1997). Research into fund performance persistence also provides 
disheartening results in that superior fund performance appears to be largely 
unpredictable from past performance (e.g., Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Bollen and 
Busse, 2005). By using a rational competitive market model, Berk and Green (2004) 
offer the explanation that the superior performance of skilled fund managers is quickly 
bid away by fund investors, leading to weakening in performance persistence. 
However, their arguments are not able to explain the stronger evidence consistent with 
performance persistence among poorly performing funds (e.g., Teo and Woo, 2001; 
Kosowski et al, 2006; Barras et al, 2010; and Cuthbertson et al, 2008). Cuthbertson et 
al (2008) suggest that most inferior funds are not unlucky; rather these funds exhibit 
“bad skill”. Together these disappointing findings raise some fundamental questions: 
Why do mutual funds underperform? What skills do fund managers really possess? 
Are fund manager underperformance and “bad skill” due to susceptibility to 
behavioral biases and heuristics? 
This thesis sets out to explore potential sources of fund manager underperformance. 
In the second chapter, it examines whether mutual fund managers possess differential 
skill attributes, and in particular, whether they exhibit “bad skill” that can potentially 
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mask “good skill” and lead to underperformance. Motivated by the findings of 
irrational selling decisions among individual investors from the behavioural finance 
literature (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Barberis and Thaler, 2003), 
my second chapter places emphasis on fund manager trading skills, namely buying 
and selling abilities. Following Chen et al (2013) who document distinct trading skills 
among a relative small number of “star” mutual fund managers, I decompose 
aggregate characteristic-timing performance into buying and selling components. By 
analysing a large sample of actively managed equity mutual funds from 2003 to 2013, 
my results show that on average, mutual fund managers exhibit positive characteristic-
timing ability when buying stocks but negative characteristic-timing ability when 
selling stocks. Further, persistence tests demonstrate that these differential trading 
skills are not merely due to chance: fund managers who exhibit superior characteristic-
timing performance when buying stocks continue to perform buying tasks well, while 
those who are poor performers in selling continue to underperform in their selling 
activity in the near term. Consistent with my hypothesis, these findings suggest that 
the lack of evidence of timing ability in the literature masks the distinct trading 
abilities that fund managers really possess. Moreover, using changes in portfolio styles 
along the size, book-to-market, and momentum dimensions (i.e., active style drift) as 
a proxy for strength of conviction, this chapter reveals an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between fund manager conviction and subsequent overall characteristic-
timing performance. In particular, when fund managers aggressively engage in active 
style drift, their poor selling ability is overwhelming, leading to negative aggregate 
performance. 
The third chapter of this thesis advances the investigation of characteristic-timing 
performance and trading skills by considering the fact that fund managers are often 
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forced to trade in response to investor flows. Consistent with theoretical predictions 
from rational expectation models (e.g., Grossman, 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; 
Hellwig, 1980; and Verrcecchia, 1982), a number of recent studies have shown that 
liquidity-induced trading imposes indirect trading costs on fund managers (e.g., 
Chordia, 1996; Edelen, 1999; Nanda et al, 2000; Alexander et al, 2007). Unlike Edelen 
(1999) who uses a return-based approach to capture the adverse effect of fund flows 
to market timing performance, my results reveal that fund managers exhibit negative 
characteristic-timing performance only when they experience significant fund inflows, 
suggesting that excessive cash holdings from fund inflows do not provide financial 
flexibility but impose trading costs on fund managers. However, there is some 
evidence to indicate that negative characteristic-timing performance is at least partly 
driven by poor timing ability when fund manager conviction is added into the analysis. 
More importantly, by conditioning fund trades on the direction and magnitude of fund 
flows, two key findings emerge. First, consistent with the theoretical predictions, 
liquidity-driven trades underperform valuation-motivated trades. Second, fund 
managers making purely valuation-motivated purchases generate significant 
characteristic-timing performance but are not able to do so when compelled to work 
off excess cash from investor inflows. On the other hand, fund managers are not able 
to produce characteristic-timing returns from their selling decisions, even when they 
are highly motivated by valuation beliefs. Furthermore, this third chapter explores 
whether different groups of mutual fund managers possess different skills. My results 
reveal that fund managers who possess superior selling ability are also significantly 
better at buying stocks than the remaining fund managers and as a result, these fund 
managers exhibit a significantly higher aggregate characteristic-timing returns. 
Strikingly, fund managers who appear to buy stocks well are not able to outperform 
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other funds when selling stocks, and they exhibit no significant aggregate 
performance. Overall, these results highlight and reinforce the insight that fund 
managers have positive buying skill and negative selling skill. 
In the fourth chapter, I study overconfidence among actively managed equity mutual 
fund managers. While there is ample evidence to show that retail investors are prone 
to overconfidence bias (e.g., Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001, 2002; 
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009), empirical evidence on overconfidence among 
professional investors is scarce. Using the sum of absolute deviations from the 
portfolio’s benchmark index (i.e., Active Share) as a proxy for the confidence level of 
mutual fund managers, my results show that fund managers tend to boost their 
confidence after outstanding past performance: they are more likely to increase Active 
Share and also choose a much higher Active Share level. Consistent with the 
diversification of opinions hypothesis in the literature (e.g., Sah and Stiglitz, 1986 and 
1988; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 2005) overconfidence bias seems 
to be more pronounced among solo-managed funds than team-managed funds. More 
importantly, an inverted U-shaped relationship between confidence level and 
subsequent performance is uncovered. In particular, excessive overconfidence, as 
reflected by an extremely high level of Active Share, is associated with diminished 
future fund performance, as well as more extreme performance outcomes and greater 
performance dispersion. This chapter further documents irrational investor reactions 
to fund manager overconfidence. There is a marked bonus for good performance of 
overconfident managers, as rewarded by higher fund inflows than other funds with 
comparable performance, while there is no pronounced penalty for poor performance 
of overconfident managers. 
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Results from chapters 2 and 3 have meaningful implications for identifying fund 
manager skills and for understanding asset management in the real world. My results 
directly question the capability of the traditional evaluation approaches employed in 
the literature, which only consider aggregate mutual fund performance, to detect fund 
manager abilities. The lack of evidence of overall fund performance documented in 
the literature might mask the distinct buying and/or selling skills mutual fund manager 
really possess.  
In terms of practical implications, my results seem to suggest that retail fund investors 
are perhaps well advised to select mutual fund managers who can manage to make sell 
decisions in a more disciplined way. Similarly, the investment industry can also 
benefit by considering differential trading skills in the fund manager selection process, 
rather than being heavily dependent on managers’ past performance record in 
aggregate. Furthermore, a new compensation contract that rewards different 
investment tasks separately might keep fund manager well motivated to allocate their 
limited time and attention to what they are really good at. 
Findings from the fourth chapter can also provide important implications, both to the 
academic literature and the investment industry. For example, my results highlight a 
potential issue of the simple linear regression approach employed in most previous 
studies on active management. The predictive power of active management measures 
such as Active Share and portfolio concentration in those studies might be over-
estimated and as a result, lead to incorrect inference regarding fund manager skills. 
More importantly, my study support behavioural approaches to asset pricing (e.g., 
Barberis et al, 2001; Daniel et al, 2001; and Grinblatt and Han, 2005) with direct 
evidence that mutual fund managers are prone to overconfidence and associated 
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behavioural biases. Since mutual fund managers are likely to be marginal price setters 
in stock markets, their irrational behaviours would not be easily arbitraged away and 
thus could cause asset price diverge from their information-efficient values. 
Since the publication of Cremers and Petajisto (2009), fund managers are more aware 
of the importance of being “active”. Indeed, more active fund managers tout their 
Active Share, and several leading investment house strongly advocate the measure and 
voluntarily disclose Active Share level of their portfolios under management. On the 
other hand, fund investors seem to increasingly view Active Share as an essential 
indicator of fund mangers’ skill and a flawless predictor of fund future performance. 
My analysis highlights a strong positive relationship between outstanding past 
performance and Active Share level, suggesting that a significantly high level of 
Active Share is more likely to be driven by fund manager overconfidence and self-
attribution bias, rather than manager skills. Not surprisingly, such high Active Share 
primarily driven by fund manager overconfidence underperform. Retail investors can 
benefit from these findings by starting to think more seriously about potential 
behavioural biases among fund managers when investing in mutual funds. My results 
seem to suggest that retail investors would better to stay away from overconfident fund 
managers to avoid unnecessary risks such as more extreme performance outcome and 
greater return dispersion. 
Overall, I believe this thesis makes an original contribution to the literature on mutual 
fund performance evaluation and the behaviour of mutual fund managers. Its 
conclusions are also of direct practical relevance to both the fund management 
industry and investors in mutual funds. This thesis also provides the basis to develop 
further work along a number of different dimensions. 
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To further investigate the impact of overconfidence on subsequent fund performance 
and fund flows, future research can extend this chapter by introducing more trading 
behaviors that are commonly used to proxy for overconfidence including portfolio 
turnover, portfolio concentration, and idiosyncratic risk exposure. Odean (1998) 
theoretically shows that overconfident investors trade more frequently, hold larger 
positions in risky assets, hold more concentrated portfolios, and take greater risk than 
do “rational” investors. Barber and Odean (2001) provide evidence that investor 
overconfidence is positively related to portfolio turnover and risk. Similarly, 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) find that overconfidence is associated with under-
diversification. However, there are other potential confounding factors may affect 
these trading behaviours, such as incentive for window dressing and tax management. 
To overcome this, we can follow Eshraghi and Taffler (2012), who employ narrative 
measures for overconfidence based on content analysis on the mutual fund annual 
reports and extend their work by combining these narrative-based proxies with the 
aforementioned trading behaviors.  
The lack of performance persistence also provide fertile ground for future research. 
Berk and Green (2004) argue that in a competitive market superior performance form 
skilled fund managers is quickly bid away by fund investors. Given the adverse impact 
of fund manager overconfidence on subsequent fund performance I observed, 
overconfidence bias can provide one potential explanation for the weak performance 
persistence among successful fund managers documented in the literature (e.g., 
Carhart, 1997). In addition, another possible area for further investigation is the 
demographics factors which might influence fund manager overconfidence including 
education background, experience, location, and gender. 
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Although the fourth chapter of this thesis and other studies in the literature such as 
Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) have shown that overconfidence is associated with 
reduced future performance, the fundamental questions how, and through which 
mechanisms overconfidence affect investment performance still remain unclear. The 
findings of negative selling ability from the first and second chapter may provide a 
good research direction to solve these questions. If mutual fund managers become 
overconfident following outstanding performance, they tend to overestimate their 
investment abilities, and thus, are more likely to form their selling decisions in a much 
less disciplined way. Although this argument is intuitive and reasonable, the rigour of 
this subject requires a thorough investigation in this matter, in particular with data 
limitation on fund manager trades. Since institutional trading data are not publicly 
available, previous studies that examine trade performance have to rely on changes in 
quarterly holdings to proxy for trading activity. This noisy proxy, however, limit 
researchers’ ability to identify superior investment skills, and perhaps more 
interestingly, capture the adverse impact of behavioral bias such as overconfidence. 
To overcome such data limitation and maximize test power, future research can 
employ high-frequency trading data provided by ANcerno Ltd (formally the Abel 
Noser Corporation)7 to explore the effect of overconfidence bias on fund manager 
trade decisions and trade performance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 See Puckett and Yan (2011) for a detailed description of ANcerno Database 
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Appendix A 
The screening procedure for U.S. domestic equity mutual funds I used in the thesis 
builds on Kacperczyk et al (2008). I start with a sample of all mutual funds in the 
CRSP Mutual Fund Database and eliminate funds with the Investment Objective 
Codes (IOC) of International funds (IOC=1), Municipal Bonds funds (IOC=5), Bond 
and Preferred funds (IOC=6) and Balanced funds (IOC=7). Then, I exclude funds with 
CRSP policy codes for Canadian and international (C&I), Balanced (Bal), Bonds 
(Bonds), Preferred stocks (Pfd), Bonds and preferred stocks (B&P), Government 
securities (GS), Money market fund (MM), and Tax-free money market fund (TFM). 
After these two screening steps, I select funds with Lipper Class codes of, if available, 
“EIEI”, “G”, “LCCE”, “LCGE”, “LCVE”, “MCCE”, “MCGE”, “MCVE”, “MLCE”, 
“MLGE”, “MLVE”, “SCCE”, “SCGE”, and “SCVE” or with Lipper Objective codes 
of, if available, “CA”, “EI”, “G”, “GI”, “MC”, “MR”, and “SG”. If neither Lipper 
Class codes nor Lipper Objective codes are available, I include funds with Strategic 
Insight Objective Code (si_obj_cd) of “AGG”, “GMC”, “GRI”, “GRO”, “ING”, and 
“SCG”. If Strategic Insight Objective codes are missing, then funds with 
Wiesenberger Fund Type codes of “G”, “G-I”, “AGG”, “GCI”, “GRI”, “GRO”, 
“LTG”, “MCG”, and “SCG” are included. If none of the above objective codes are 
available, funds with a CS policy are included. If CS policy is not available, I exclude 
funds with average stock holdings less than 80% or more than 105% and fund that 
hold less than 10 stocks and that managed asset less than $5 million in previous month. 
In addition, I search for keywords in the fund full name and eliminate funds with 
keywords of “index”, “idx”, “S&P”, “DFA”, “program”, “ETF”, “exchange traded”, 
“exchange-traded”, “target”, and target date funds. Following Alexander et al (2007), 
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funds with less than four holdings reports that were each preceded by another report 
in the previous quarter are excluded from my final sample.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
